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Abstract
The dependence on past choices of present opportunities, costs, and ben­
efits is pervasive in industrial markets. Each of the three chapters of this 
thesis considers a different example of such dependence affecting dynamic 
behaviour.
In the first chapter a single firm’s present choices depend on what it has 
learnt from past experience. The firm is searching for the best outcome of 
many multi-stage projects and learns as stages are completed. The branching 
structure of the search environment is such that the payoffs to various actions 
are correlated; nevertheless, it is shown that the optimal strategy is given by 
a simple reservation price rule. The chapter provides a simple model of R&D 
as an example.
In the central model of the second chapter firms slowly build up stocks of 
goodwill through advertising. While many firms start to advertise in a new 
market, over time a successful set emerges and the others exit. The chapter 
explores the relative growth of firms and the determination of the number 
of successful ones. The chapter compares the results to those of a model in 
which a firm must complete all of a given number of R&D stages before being 
able to produce.
The final chapter considers one of the effects of urban bus deregulation 
in the UK: bus arrival times are changed very frequently. It is assumed that
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passengers do not know the timetable and once at a stop board the first bus 
to arrive. There can be no equilibrium in which an operator’s bus arrival 
times are never revised: otherwise those of a rival would arrive just before 
and take all the waiting passengers. The chapter considers the pattern of 
revisions when they are costly. The chapter also shows that fares can be 
higher with two competing operators than with a single monopolist.
Contents
A bstract iii
Acknowledgem ents v ii
Introduction x i
1 Exploring a Branching Structure 1
1.1 Introduction...................................................................................  1
1.2 A simple model of R & D .............................................................  5
1.3 The General M o d e l......................................................................  9
1.4 Optimality of the Gittins Index P o l ic y ....................................  12
1.5 Reservation Prices -  Results and Examples..............................  19
1.6 Conclusions.......................................................................................31
2 Accum ulation Games: 35
2.1 Introduction.......................................................................................35
2.2 Model A: Advertising....................................................................... 39
2.3 Model B: Exogenous Sunk C osts...................................................... 74
2.4 C onclusions.......................................................................................95
3 R eversible Location Choice: 97
3.1 Introduction.......................................................................................97
v
CONTENTS
3.2 Bus Deregulation: the Stylised F a c t s ......................................... 100
3.3 Explaining the Differences............................................................107
3.4 Timetable Instability and B unching............................................ I l l
3.5 F a re s .................................................................................................134
3.6 C onclusions.....................................................................................169
Proofs 173
A .l Exploring a branching s tru c tu re .................................................. 173
A.2 Incremental sunk c o s ts ..................................................................183
Acknowledgements
Surviving a PhD, the transition from student to independent researcher, 
means surmounting daunting intellectual, emotional and practical challenges. 
I have received incalculable support in respect of all of these: I could not have 
done it alone.
The first in any fist of debts must be to my supervisor, Professor John 
Sutton, whose graduate lectures in Industrial Organisation meant that a 
whole generation of LSE trained economists will forever know the importance 
of “what is excluded by the model” and which instilled in me the firm belief 
that economics can and should contribute to our understanding of what is, 
and is not, the case. His intellectual integrity has constantly been a worthy 
standard to which to aspire. While this thesis does not five up to that 
standard, it is better for the attempt. He has provided sound practical 
advice at all levels: he has, moreover, done so with great kindness.
I have received invaluable encouragement and warm support during my 
long stay at LSE from many other members, amongst whom I must mention 
Max Steuer, Kevin Roberts, and Margaret Bray.
The whole experience has been made possible, fruitful and enjoyable by 
the interaction with colleagues: if I am ever again amongst so talented and 
kind a group of people I shall count myself extremely fortunate. I must 
especially thank Reinout Koopmans, with whom I spent many happy hours
viii ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
debating economics in general, and our own respective work in particular. 
As much as by anyone, my approach to economics and many of my ideas 
have been shaped by these debates. I owe a great debt to Godfrey Keller, 
my co-author for the first chapter. Not only would the chapter not have been 
written without him, this collaboration was the first occasion when research 
had been fun. I have also benefited enormously, both intellectually and just 
in making LSE a good time for me, from time spent with Mary Amiti, Mike 
Burkart, Abigail Fallot, Denis Gromb, Toni Haniotis, Donata Hoesch, Ana 
Lamo, Volker Nocke, Thomas Picketty, and Tomasso Valletti, among others.
Finally I must thank my friends and family who must often have despaired 
of my ever getting to the end, but who nonetheless gave freely of emotional 
and financial support; my husband, John, who has been through all the ups 
and downs with me, my parents and their partners, my grandparents, brother 
and sister in law.
Financial support from ESRC, FMG and STICERD is gratefully acknowl­
edged, as is my time at Lexecon Ltd, where my belief that economics can be 
useful was renewed, and where I am now employed.
There are, in addition, particular acknowledgements for each chapter.
The first chapter reports joint work with Godfrey Keller. We received 
invaluable guidance and encouragement from our supervisors Patrick Bolton 
and John Sutton, and also from Margaret Bray, Denis Gromb, John Hardman 
Moore, Reinout Koopmans, Sven Rady and Kevin Roberts. Thanks are due 
also to participants at seminars at LSE, the University of Edinburgh, the 
University of East Anglia, the Economic Theory Workshop in Tel Aviv, the 
Royal Economic Society conference in Exeter, and the EARIE conference in 
Maastricht.
The second chapter contains some simulation results. I am indebted to
ix
Ariel Pakes and his co-workers who developed the algorithms on which these 
are based, and made these algorithms freely available. I am also grateful to 
John Sutton for introducing me to Pakes’ work, and for unstinting encour­
agement and advice throughout the project, to Volker Nocke and Tomasso 
Valletti for reading and commenting on numerous versions of the chapter, 
and to Reinout Koopmans and seminar participants at the EEA conference 
in Juan les Pins for valuable comments.
For the third chapter I owe thanks to John Sutton, who suggested I read 
the Select Committee Report into the effects of local bus deregulation, to 
Peter White, with whom I discussed the bus market and who steered me away 
from some blind alleys, to Pedro Marin, for earlier and relevant discussions on 
the airline industry, and to Volker Nocke and Tomasso Valletti for carefully 
reading the chapter and providing many useful comments.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
Introduction
The three chapters of this thesis are concerned with the impact of the passage 
of time in models of Industrial Organisation.
The first considers a firm making sequential choices between a number of 
actions, each with a cost and an uncertain reward. The paradigm for studying 
such situations is Rothschild’s paper on two-armed bandits [51]. Rothschild 
models the pricing decision of a monopolist facing an unknown stochastic 
demand. There are two possible prices (arms), each period the monopolist 
chooses which to charge (which arm to pull), and updates her beliefs about 
demand at the two prices in the light of the resulting sales. The central 
trade-off is between charging the price which maximises payoffs given current 
knowledge, and learning more about demand at the other price. Rothschild 
shows that, with positive probability, the firm will stop experimenting and 
charge the inferior price for ever more. A number of subsequent papers have 
also considered whether a firm, faced with a similar tradeoff, learns enough 
to act as it would have done had it known everything1.
*As an example, see the paper by McLennan [42] on the persistance of price dispersion 
when agents must search for the best price. Aghion, Bolton, Harris and Jullien [1] have 
considered the conditions under which a decision maker, uncertain as to the shape of his 
payoff function, will obtain the true maximum payoff. This paper also contains detailed 
references to this branch of the literature.
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A slightly different approach is taken by Weitzman [61], and by Roberts 
& Weitzman [50]. Although the central tradeoff considered by these authors 
is the same, they are concerned with the decision rule itself, with which 
action is optimal, rather than with whether optimal learning leads to a true 
maximum. Weitzman considers a problem where an agent must choose which 
project to implement. Before choosing, the projects can, at a cost per project, 
be sampled sequentially. Weitzman analyses the optimal order in which the 
projects should be sampled, and the circumstances in which it is optimal to 
stop sampling the projects, and implement one. Roberts & Weitzman look at 
an application to R&D in which there is a single multi-stage project. Benefits 
are received only at the end, and the choice facing the agent at each stage 
is whether to pay to resolve more of the uncertainty and bring the project 
closer to completion, or to abandon the project.
The first chapter of this thesis, on “exploring a branching structure”, ex­
tends the work of Roberts and Weitzman. The innovation of the chapter 
lies in its description of the environment within which an agent makes her 
choices. This environment is intended as a model of the available choices 
during a phase of R&D. A firm which is engaged in R&D takes actions which 
both bring a particular avenue of research closer to completion, and pro­
vide information about the benefits of all possible products of that avenue. 
Moreover, an action may reveal a number of different directions in which an 
avenue can be pursued further: once a prototype has been completed, numer­
ous possible improvements may become apparent. The search environment 
modelled in Chapter 1 captures aspects of the decision over which action 
to take through the way in which actions are related. Some actions can be 
taken only after another has been completed, and the result of one action 
will be informative about the benefits of completing any avenue of research
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proceeding from it.
The central result of Chapter 1 is that, despite the complexity of the 
decision environment, the optimal strategy is given by the same decision rule 
as is found in Robert’s and Weitzman^ and Weijinan’s papers: namely to 
allocate an index2 to each available action which depends only on what is 
known about avenues proceeding from that action, and to take the action 
with the highest index.
The second chapter turns to an issue closer to the heart of the literature 
on R&D: the amount invested, and its relationship to market structure. Das- 
gupta & Stiglitz [9], among others, have encapsulated the modem theoretical 
understanding of the relationship between the amount spent on R&D and 
market structure. Previously debate had centred on whether market struc­
ture caused R&D intensity, or vice versa. Dasgupta & Stiglitz suggested that 
the question was badly posed, and introduced a game theoretic framework in 
which both were simultaneously determined. In their model there are three 
stages3. In the first, firms decide whether or not to enter, on the basis of their 
(correct) expectations of the profits they will earn if they do. In the second 
stage those firms which entered in the first invest in R&D which reduces 
marginal costs, making the best decision given the number of firms which 
entered. In the final stage firms compete in the market place, making the 
best decision given the marginal costs which result from the previous R&D 
investment.
What matters here is that fixed investment in R&D leads to a higher
2the Gittins index. See the references to papers by Gittins, Glazebrook, Jones and 
Nash in Chapter 2, and in Whittle’s paper [62]
3Many other authors have used 3-stage games to model market structure when firms can 
make some investment which affects short run competitiveness. See for example Shaked 
and Suttons’ 1982 paper [53].
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quality, or lower production cost, for each unit sold. Sutton, as part of his 
theoretical and empirical analysis of the relationship between advertising and 
market structure in “Sunk Costs and Market Structure” [54], has noted that 
advertising investments may behave in a similar way. Sutton’s theoretical 
purpose, in this book, is to derive a constraint on the set of possible out­
comes from consideration of a broad class of feasible models. In the case of 
advertising and market structure he shows that there is a lower bound to 
concentration which will not be violated no matter how large the market. 
He shows that there is strong empirical support for such a bound.
The second chapter is concerned with the dynamic behaviour of firms 
when investments are accumulated over time, rather than made all in one 
go. The first part of the second chapter explores a modification of one of 
Sutton’s advertising models, in which firms accumulate quality according to 
a stochastic investment function. Each period firms revise their investment 
levels in the fight of their own previous successes, and those of their rivals. 
There can be many firms, and the profits a firm earns depends on its own 
and its rivals’ qualities.
Although there is no analytical solution available, simulated examples 
show that the most likely market structure is well defined, and depends on 
the model’s parameters in a way which is consistent with the behaviour of 
Sutton’s original model, so that Sutton’s results are robust to at least this 
dynamic version. These examples also highlight some novel dynamic features. 
Early in a market’s evolution many firms invest. Those which fall behind in 
the early stages stop investing and eventually drop out of the market. Later 
(should the number remaining in the market fall to the most likely number), 
firms converge: firms with lower qualities invest more. Finally, there are 
some states, in which many firms have high levels of accumulated quality,
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which axe stable should they arise, but which are unlikely to do so.
This model is an example from a general class of dynamic oligopoly mod­
els described by Pakes & McGuire [47], as part of a program initiated by 
Ericson & Pakes [18]. This program was a response to the empirical findings 
of simultaneous entry and exit within markets, and of considerable flux in 
firms’ relative positions, which sought to explain these phenomena in terms 
of stochastic research and exploration4. However, Chapter 2 also has strong 
links to a quite separate strand in the literature on R&D, one which has 
also found expression in dynamic oligopoly models: the literature on patent 
races.
In a patent race, more than one firm is trying to achieve the same 
patentable innovation. Market structure is not an issue: it is assumed that 
only one firm will win the patent. Patent races axe interesting not so much 
because competition for a single patent is an important determinant of mar­
ket structure in R&D intensive industries, but because races, or sequences of 
races, can be used as the basis for analysing the relationship between firm 
size and firm investment. In an early paper Harris & Vickers [33] assumed 
that in order to win a patent a firm must complete a number of stages5. The 
more is invested in R&D in a period, the more stages are completed that pe­
riod. They considered two firms competing, and found that whichever firm 
had fewer stages left to complete would win the patent, while its rival would 
not invest at all. The winning firm invested at the rate it would have done 
had there been no rival.
Beath, Katsoulacos and Ulph [4] use the idea of a sequence of patent
4Other models addressing the same facts include those by Hopenhayn [35], Dixit [13], 
and Lambson [40].
5 The stages are modelled as a continuum.
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races to investigate industry evolution, specifically whether the leading or 
lagging firm wins the next patent6. As with the relationship between R&D 
and concentration, investment in R&D during a patent race can be used 
as a model of more general investment. As one example, Koopmans [39] 
considers a sequence of general investment opportunities and supposes that 
two firms compete by racing each other for each opportunity in turn. He 
derives results about whether the lagging firm catches up or falls increasingly 
behind in terms of the externality between firms from growth. Another 
generalisation addressing the relative growth rate of firms is that by Budd, 
Harris & Vickers [6]. They consider a somewhat abstract problem which is 
inspired by Harris & Vickers’ original contribution but which differs from it 
in two important respects. First, a firm’s state depends not on how many 
stages it has completed, but on how many more stages than its rival it has 
completed. This reduces the number of cases which need to be considered. 
Second, firms can earn profits whatever their current states, not just when 
one gets so far ahead of its rival that it can be declared the winner.
In the second part of the second chapter a generalised patent race is also 
used to explore market dynamics, and to consider the simulation results of 
the first part in a tractable setting. In the model each of a number of firms 
must complete a fixed number of staged%efore it is able to produce, but 
whereas in a patent race the first firm to finish would get the prize and all 
other firms would get nothing, in the third chapter any number of firms can 
finish and earn profits. The more firms that finish, however, the smaller their 
profits.
Equilibrium in this model has a number of features in common with the 
dynamic advertising model of the first part: there is a well defined expected
6 See also Vickers’ paper [60].
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number of firms which complete all stages, some firms which complete the 
early stages stop investing and never finish, and for some realisations of the 
random variables in the model, more firms than expected finish. Model B  
is sufficiently simple for us to discern the intuition underlying these results. 
Firms must expect to  recover costs sunk in establishing themselves in the 
market, and since profits fall as the number of rivals rises, while the amount 
spent on becoming established is fixed, the number of firms which can prof­
itably establish themselves is restricted. Since costs are sunk incrementally 
and (in some equilibria) investment is stochastic, many firms may begin ac­
cumulating. If they are luckier than their rivals they will establish themselves 
in the market in the long run and make profits. If they fall behind early on 
they can stop investing without having lost too much.
The final, third, chapter considers a different sequential investment deci­
sion: choosing and changing location when location revision is costly. The 
empirical context is that of bus deregulation in the UK. It has long been ac­
cepted that where firms spend on R&D there will be change over time. The 
first theoretical task of the final chapter is to show that reversible choices of 
location can also give rise to change over time. Theoretical work by Foster 
& Golay [22] prior to the enactment of the 1980’s legislation deregulating 
local bus services in the UK concluded that bus operators would probably 
adhere to stable timetables. This conclusion was in spite of evidence, for 
example that given by Chester writing 6 years after the 1930 Act which first 
introduced some control into London’s bus routes [7], that before regulation 
had been introduced timetables were far from stable. Chester goes on to give 
a clear statement as to why instability would arise.
If any operator fixed definite times, rival operators will seek to 
reach stopping places a few minutes earlier and take the traffic.
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Subsequent experience of deregulation has confirmed that competition on 
urban local bus routes leads to timetable instability, and Chapter 3 of this 
thesis builds a formal model to show how it arises. The driving assumption 
is that passengers on urban bus routes tend to arrive at a bus stop at a 
convenient time and then board whichever bus arrives first. As noted by 
Chester, this means that if one company operated a fixed timetable a rival 
would choose to arrive just before, leaving no passengers waiting at the stop.
Once adjustment costs are introduced into the model a distinctive pattern 
emerges. The operator whose buses currently get fewer passengers is more 
likely to adjust its timetable than is its rival, and when it does so will tend 
to choose a new time which is just before its rival’s current one, causing 
buses to arrive bunched together. Such bunching is another noted feature of 
deregulated bus routes.
The assumption on passenger behaviour also drives the second model 
of Chapter 3, which considers the impact on fares of competition on local 
bus routes. Contrary to expectations before deregulation, fares have not 
fallen much, and in some cases have risen [41]. In the fare model presented 
in Chapter 3, duopolists charge higher fares than would a monopolist. The 
intuition is straightforward. A duopolist which lowered its fare would increase 
the number of people choosing to travel by bus. Having chosen to go by bus, 
however, the additional passengers would board whichever bus arrived at the 
stop first, so that some would board the rivals bus, giving rise to a positive 
externality, and to underinvestment in fare reductions.
Chapter 1 
Exploring a Branching 
Structure
1.1 Introduction
In many areas of human activity, an agent has to choose from a number of 
actions, each with a cost and an uncertain reward. Some of these actions are 
highly likely to produce a short-term gain, while others, such as gathering 
information to eliminate some of the uncertainty, may result in only a long­
term benefit. The classic multi-armed bandit problem is a formalisation of 
such a situation: in each period the agent pays a unit cost to pull one of a 
fixed number of arms, different arms having different, unknown, and possibly 
interdependent pay-off probabilities; the agent’s problem is to maximise the 
expected discounted sum of pay-offs.
In bandit problems currently in the economics literature, projects are 
equated with arms. There is no ambiguity about how to engage a project: 
with just one arm per project the only available action is to pull it. Further, 
taking an action leaves the number of possible actions unchanged: with still
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just one.arm per project the only available action is to pull it again. However, 
many decision environments are more complex. Here we introduce a model 
of a more general sequential search process in which, when an action is taken 
in one period, several new actions become available in the next period. The 
set of projects and the actions available within them depend on the previous 
choices of the agent.
Even the classic multi-armed bandit problem resisted any general solution 
until Gittins and his co-workers showed, in a very general setting, that if the 
arms are independent (that is, pulling one arm is uninformative about other 
arms) then the optimal strategy is given by an index policy.1 To each arm 
attach an index (known variously as a reservation price, dynamic allocation 
index or Gittins index) which depends on the current state of only that 
arm; the strategy is to pick the arm which currently has the highest index. 
Calculating the indices, however, can be a formidable task. In the economics 
literature, two notable applications of bandit problems with independent 
arms are by Weitzman [61]2 and Roberts &; Weitzman [50] ,3 in which the 
examples focus on cases where the reservation price is not so difficult to 
calculate.
Models in which the independence assumption is dropped have no simpli­
1See the references to papers by Gittins, Glazebrook, Jones and Nash here and in 
Whittle’s papers [62].
2Weitzman considers a problem where there are several substitutable single-stage 
projects, which can be sampled sequentially. When the agent decides to stop searching, 
only one option is selected, namely the one with the maximum sampled reward.
3Roberts & Weitzman look at an application to R&D in which there is a single multi­
stage project. Costs are additive (pay-as-you-go), benefits are received only at the end, 
and the choice facing the agent at each stage is whether to pay to resolve more of the 
uncertainty and bring the project closer to completion, or to abandon the project.
1.1. INTRODUCTION 3
fying result comparable to that of Gittins to help in determining the optimal 
strategy. Nevertheless, the paper by Rothschild [51]4 which introduced ban­
dit problems into the economics literature centres on an example of such a 
model, and he derives strong results on how much a monopolist learns about 
a stochastic demand function. Subsequent work on similar pricing problems5 
has abandoned the bandit terminology altogether, and indeed the usage of 
the term bandit now appears to be reserved for cases where the different 
arms are independent.
In this paper, we introduce a general sequential search process in which 
the possible actions belong to branching projects. This process generalises 
a standard multi-armed bandit in a number of significant ways: an action 
can reveal information about more than one reward; the pay-offs to various 
actions are correlated; and there is a natural way to talk about the diversity 
of rewards. We give a simple characterisation of when the independence 
assumption can be relaxed, but with the problem retaining the analytical 
convenience of the optimal strategy being determined by an index policy or 
reservation price rule.6
4In this well-known paper, Rothschild models the pricing decision of a monopolist 
facing an unknown stochastic demand as a two-armed bandit problem. No assumption is 
made that the parameters governing demand at the two prices are independently drawn 
and Rothschild does not derive the optimal strategies. The main result is that optimal 
experimentation may not result in adequate learning, that is, there is a positive probability 
that after some finite period the agent will settle for the inferior arm for ever more.
5 See, for example, Aghion, Bolton et al. [1, section 6], and the references in their 
introduction.
6Gittins uses the example of job scheduling with precedence constraints to motivate an 
abstract model which is a finite horizon version of that which we present in this chapter, 
but without the information revelation aspects or the reward correlation which we have 
here [28]. Our proof of the optimality of the Gittins index policy in this set-up was arrived
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A branching project is special case of a multi-action project, a project 
in which there may be several alternative actions which the agent can take 
at any one time, and where this set of available actions depends on the 
agent’s previous choices. A Gittins index can be attached to a multi-action 
project in much the same way as to a single-action project. In an extension 
of his proof of the original result (see Gittins & Jones [29] and Gittins [27]), 
Whittle gives a condition under which the Gittins index policy is optimal for 
multi-action projects [63]; note that it does not specify the optimal action, 
only the project to which the action belongs. In the special case where the 
multi-action projects are branching projects we give a condition under which 
the Gittins index policy picks out not only the optimal project to engage but 
also the optimal action within that project. Essentially, this condition is that 
taking one action gives no information about actions which do not emanate 
from it.
The optimality of the Gittins index policy for a class of branching projects 
considerably reduces the problem of characterising the optimal search strat­
egy. We use a simple model of R&D in order to demonstrate the usefulness of 
our result, deriving the optimal strategy in a generalised way and discussing 
some of its features.
In the next section, we present the example of R&D in order to illustrate 
some of the features which branching projects possess and introduce some 
notation. Then in Section 1.3 we give a formal description of the general 
model, and the central theoretical result as a corollary of Whittle’s theorem. 
In Section 1.5, we apply it to the model of R&D and provide some results 
and examples. We conclude with a discussion and some remarks. Proofs of 
the main technical results are to be found in the appendices.
at independently and adopts what we believe is a self-contained and accessible approach.
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1.2 A  simple m odel of R&D
A simple branching project is represented in Figure 1.1 by a tree, with node 
1 as its root and nodes 4 through 7 as its terminal nodes. When there is an 
arc from node p down to node q we say that node p is a parent of node q and 
that node q is a child of node p. The terms ancestor and descendant have 
the obvious meanings.
The nodes correspond to possible actions, a subset of which are available 
in any given period. There are two sorts of possible action: one is to pay a 
cost Cn to explore node n and then continue; the other is to collect a prize 
whose value is yn and which is located at an explored terminal node n, and 
stop. The actions which are available in any period depend on previous 
actions and can be summarised using the tree. We assume that initially no 
node has been explored, and now in any period the agent can (a) explore 
any node that has not yet been explored, provided that either it is the root 
or its parent has been explored, and then continue, or (b) collect the prize 
at a terminal node that has been explored and stop.
We shall often consider there being an additional fall-back option available
,C>i
O 4 O5 0 6  O 7
Figure 1.1: No nodes explored
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in any period, and if it is chosen the agent collects a prize of value m  and 
stops. For example, suppose that the situation is as illustrated in Figure 1.2, 
in which filled nodes have been explored and empty ones have not, and there 
is a fall-back. The available actions are: explore node 3, explore node 4, take 
2/5, or take the fall-back m.
P ,3, • ,2
m
Figure 1.2: Some nodes explored, & a fall-back
In an R&D setting, node 1 might represent a feasibility study, and nodes 
2 and 3 would represent two different avenues of basic research, each of which 
leads to two development opportunities. One would then think of nodes 4 
through 7 as representing substitutable technologies to produce a product. 
To take the fall-back option is to use the existing technology, and abandon 
R&D. Note that ‘production’ is also a terminating action -  it corresponds 
to stopping R&D and commercially exploiting the know-how that has been 
gained.
Exploring a node not only imposes costs on the agent and affects which 
actions are available in future periods, but also reveals information about the 
prizes at all its descendent terminal nodes: when the agent explores node n 
she receives a random signal zn, which is independent for each node. The
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value of the prize at a terminal node is the sum of the signals at that node 
and its ancestors, so, for example, y5 =  zi +  z2 +  z5. (Because the signals 
contribute additively to the prize, we sometimes refer to them as increments.) 
The implication of this for the model of R&D is that each piece of basic 
research is informative only about products which embody that research, 
and that developing one product is uninformative about the value of other 
products. This means that, whenever the agent updates the expected value 
of any product, she uses only what has been learnt at its explored ancestors.
The agent’s problem is to choose a strategy which maximises the expected 
value of the prize that she collects when she stops, net of the expected costs 
from exploring nodes before she collects the prize.
Note that the way in which actions become available leads to a natural 
measure of the diversity of prizes: those with a com m on parent are closer 
than those with only a common grandparent. Moreover, as a result of the 
specification of the prizes themselves, the values of closer prizes are more 
correlated.7 Two features of this example worth stressing are that in any 
period each available action can be considered as the root of its own separate 
and independent sub-tree. Reconsider the situation illustrated in Figure 1.2.
We can in fact represent the agent’s choice as between the projects shown 
in Figure 1.3 in which each project now contains only one available action: 
explore an unexplored root and continue, or collect a prize and stop. This 
representation is legitimate because all the ancestors of currently available 
actions have been explored, and we can use the state of each project to
7At the start, before the agent has received any signals, the values of all prizes are 
correlated random variables: they all depend on the realisation of z\. The values 2/4 and 
2/5 are closely correlated because Cov(2/4 , 2/s) =  Var(zi) +  Var(z2 ), and even when z\ has 
become known they are still correlated. Contrast this with 2/5 and 2/6 - Cov(2/s,2/6) =  
Var(zi), and once Z\ has become known they are uncorrelated.
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effectively summarise the signals received at the ancestors of its root (and 
at the root itself, if it has in fact been explored). Further, these separate 
projects are independent: nothing that is subsequently learnt in one project 
reveals anything about the prizes available elsewhere, an inherited property 
that follows from the fact that the signals received at one node are informative 
about the prizes only at terminal nodes which descend from it.
Figure 1.3: Separate and independent sub-trees
With regard to an index policy, were the agent to be in the above situation 
and treat the whole tree as a single project as in Figure 1.2, then a rule 
which selected the project with the highest index would simply tell the agent 
whether to proceed with the project or to take the fall-back. However, if she 
views the process with the perspective provided by Figure 1.3, and applies 
the rule to these separate projects, the strategy is completely characterised 
because just one action is picked out. Further, as we shall show, the fact 
that these separate projects are independent ensures that the Gittins index 
policy is optimal.
1.3. THE GENERAL MODEL
1.3 The General M odel
9
In this section we develop more formally the central model of the paper: a 
sequential decision process in which the alternative projects are branching 
projects. We introduce our definition of a branching project and state our 
result (Claim 1) that if the agent is choosing an action from among a set 
of independent branching projects then the optimal action in each period 
is given by the Gittins index policy. This is shown to be a corollary of a 
more general result on stationary Markov decision processes (Theorem 1) 
which gives the conditions under which the Gittins index policy picks out 
the optimal multi-action project to engage in each period.
1.3.1 Branching Projects
Borrowing some notation from graph theory, we represent a branching project 
by an out-tree,8 in which the number of nodes may be infinite, but such that 
the out-degree of any node is finite, i.e. the tree can have infinite depth but 
only finite branching. The nodes are the actions within the project, and the 
arcs represent precedence constraints: an action (other than the root) can 
be taken only if its parent action has previously been taken. An action is 
available if it has not previously been taken, and either it is the root or it is 
the child of an action which has previously been taken.
We shall consider a family of branching projects, and in each discrete 
period, a risk neutral agent chooses one project and an available action within 
it. We first note that the set of alternative projects need not be the same in
8Consider a directed graph, which is a set of nodes and a set of arcs, each arc being 
an ordered pair of nodes. An out-tree is a connected directed graph with a single root, no 
circuits and in which each node has no more than one parent.
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every period.
Lem m a 1 Consider a family of N  branching projects. In every period, there 
is a partition of the actions which have not yet been taken into a set of 
branching projects in which only the root action is available.
P roof: That such a partition exists initially is clearly the case, so assume 
that such a partition exists at time t. If the agent engages project k by taking 
its root action then each of the children of that root is an action available at 
time t + 1 and is the root action of a distinct sub-tree, none of whose actions 
have been taken. Also, each of the projects which was not engaged at time t 
is still a branching project in which only the root action is available. Hence 
such a partition exists at time t +  1, and the lemma is proved by induction. 
■
When project k is engaged by taking action u, the agent receives a reward 
and observes a signal, the signal affecting what the agent knows about the 
rewards associated with actions that may be available in later periods. The 
state of the project, denoted by £*, is a sufficient statistic for the observa­
tional history. It summarises what has been learnt from past signals about 
future rewards, availability of actions, etc. and both the reward, R ^ x ^ u ) ,  
and the signal, Sk{xk,u), depend on the current state and the action taken. 
The new state of a project depends only on the old state and the action 
taken, both directly and indirectly via the signal. If signals are informative 
only about the rewards at descendent actions,9 then the branching projects 
are independent, i.e. the state of unengaged projects remains unchanged.
9Let u be the action taken, and u' be any action which is not a descendant of u. The 
agent’s expectation of the reward to be obtained from taking action u' is unchanged by 
the signal received from taking action u.
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Lem m a 2 Consider a family of N  independent branching projects. If, after 
each period, the actions which have not yet been taken are repartitioned as in 
Lemma 1, then the branching (sub-)projects remain independent.
P roof: Consider the partition at time t,  and observe that no action in 
one project is a descendant of the root action of another. So when taking an 
action is uninformative about actions which do not descend from it, engaging 
any project by taking its root action is uninformative about other projects, 
and the lemma follows. ■
The importance of the above two lemmas lies in the fact that when an 
action in a project is taken, the state of the project changes but thereafter the 
action does not affect the agent’s choices or pay-offs, so that in each period 
we need consider only those actions which have not yet been taken. The 
lemmas then imply that, if we start with independent branching projects, in 
each period we can view the agent as choosing between actions in a family 
of branching (sub-)projects which are still independent and in each of which 
there is just one action available, namely the root action. This is at the heart 
of Claim 1 below.
1.3.1.1 T he agen t’s problem
Rewards are additive and discounted in time by a factor /?, so the agent’s 
problem is to choose a strategy to maximise the expected discounted sum 
of rewards from this process, whose state at time t  is written as x(t) =  
(x1(t),X2(t) , . . . ,  xjv(t)).  The maximal expected reward over feasible policies 
7r, denoted by the value function F(x), is given by:
^ (* (0)) =  s u p e J ] T /?#(*(*), u(t)) | ar(0) l ,
ir L o J
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where R(x, u) is the immediate reward realised when action u is taken in state 
x. When the rewards are uniformly bounded, standard assumptions from 
dynamic programming axe sufficient to establish that the value function is the 
unique bounded solution to the associated dynamic programming equation 
and that an optimal policy exists.10
1.4 O ptim ality of th e G ittins Index P olicy
Following the approach of Gittins and his co-workers, it can be shown that, 
under certain conditions, all optimal policies for the general model are con­
tained in a simple class of policies, and the optimal action is that recom­
mended by the Gittins index.
1.4.1 G ittins Index Policy
Suppose that we can attach an index to any project k , that is a value nik(xk) 
which is a function only of the project and its current state. When the agent 
selects the project with the currently highest index, she is said to be following 
an index policy. The specific index we shall look at is the Gittins index, whose 
definition makes use of a fall-back option. When there is a fall-back option 
m, then the agent has a stopping problem in which in each period (given 
that the fall-back option m  has not yet been taken) the agent can either 
take the fall-back and stop, or continue the project for another period (the 
option of taking the fall-back remaining open in subsequent periods). The 
smallest value of m  which makes the agent indifferent between stopping and
10 Given that the rewards are additive, discounted in time by a factor /?, and are uni­
formly bounded, the assumption that the agent is facing a stationary Markov process, for 
example, is sufficient.
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continuation is the Gittins index of the project.
Denote the value function for the modified problem consisting of a fall­
back M  together with N  projects by $(M, x). Since the rewards are bounded, 
we see that $(M , x) =  M  when M  is large, and that <£(M, x) =  F(x)  when 
—M  is large, and so the Gittins index is well-defined. The usefulness of this 
index is shown in the following result.
1.4.1.1 O ptim ality  of th e  index policy for branching p ro jec ts
R esu lt 1 Consider a family of N  independent branching projects in which 
the rewards are uniformly bounded.
Then the Gittins index policy selects not only the best project to engage but 
also the optimal action within that project.
P roof: Using Lemmas 1 and 2, after each period we can repartition 
the actions which have not yet been taken into independent sub-projects in 
each of which just the root action is available. The claim then follows as a 
corollary of the more general result for super-processes which we present in 
the next sub-section, because the two sufficient conditions for the theorem 
hold. Essentially these are: (a) the state of unengaged projects remains 
unchanged (because signals are informative only about descendent actions); 
and (b) the optimal action within the engaged project is independent of the 
size of the fall-back (because repartitioning after each period ensures that 
there is only one action available in each sub-project). The theorem then 
tells us that the project to which the optimal action belongs is the one with 
the highest Gittins index, and so the optimal action is the root action of the 
sub-project picked out by the Gittins index policy. ■
The above proof highlights the dual role of repartitioning actions into
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projects with only root actions available: it provides a key condition for the 
theorem, and it allows us to move immediately from ‘best project’ to ‘optimal 
action’.
1.4.2 Bandit Super-processes
The proof of the above result relies on a theorem for super-processes which 
we present here.11
A super-process12 is defined by the following collection:
(1) a set of projects, indexed by k =  1 , . . . ,  TV;
(2.1) a state space, with generic element denoted by x;
(2.2) a set of available actions for each project when in state x, denoted by 
Uk(x)-
(2.3) a bounded real-valued reward function Rk(x,u) which describes the 
instantaneous reward from taking action u in project k when in state x;
(2.4) a state transition rule giving the probability of next period’s state, 
conditioned on this period’s state, the action taken &; the project it is in;
(3) a discount factor (3.
The agent discounts the future by a factor (3 and aims to maximise the 
expected discounted sum of rewards from this process.
It is a bandit super-process when the state transition rule refers to each 
project rather than the process as a whole, and also when the action set and 
the reward are functions not of the process state but of the project state. (So, 
items (2.1) through (2.4) above would be for each project, and x should be
11For a fuller treatment, see the appendices and the references cited there.
12The terminology is due to Gittins [27], though the notion is due to Nash [43]. However,
Glazebrook [30] uses ‘super-process’ to mean a multi-action project and so discusses a
family of alternative super-processes.
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replaced by xfc.)
Thus, given a bandit super-process, if project k is engaged in period t  by 
choosing action u € Uk{xk{t)), the agent receives a reward of Rk(xk(t),u); 
states of unengaged projects do not change and the state of the engaged 
project changes by a Markov transition rule: if j  f=k then Xj(t +  1) =  Xj(t), 
and the value of Xk{t +  1) is conditioned only by xk(t), u k.
We assume that the Markov process is stationary or time-homogeneous, 
i.e. the available action set, the reward, the state transition rule and the 
discount factor do not depend explicitly on time. (To give this some force, 
we do not allow time to be incorporated into the state.)
When the agent is maximising the expected reward from a super-process 
she must choose both which project to engage and which action to choose 
within that project. The theorem below shows that the Gittins index policy 
is optimal if two conditions are met: (a) projects are independent (i.e. it is 
a bandit super-process); (b) when there is a fall-back available, the optimal 
action within the engaged project is independent of the size of the fall-back.
T heorem  1 (W hittle ) Consider a super-process consisting of N  alterna­
tive multi-action projects. Assume:
(a) the projects are independent, i.e. the states of unengaged projects do not 
change;
(b) when there is a fall-back option available, the optimal action within the 
engaged project is independent of the size of the fall-back.
Then the Gittins index policy is optimal, in that it selects the best project to 
engage.
Moreover, writing (f>k{m, xk) as the analogue of$(M,  x) when only project
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k is available, the following identity holds:
Jm  d m
where B  is the bound on the reward functions.
P roof: The proof is outlined in the appendices. Appendix A. 1.1 gives 
the proof for simple bandit processes (for which the second condition is vac­
uous), and Appendix A ^  ^ generalises it to bandit super-processes for which 
the second condition is crucial. The approach is essentially due to Whittle 
[63] and the proof elaborates on that in Whittle [62]. ■
It should now be clear from the definitions that a branching project is a 
super-process, and that a family of independent branching projects consti­
tutes a bandit super-process, so the first condition for the theorem is met. 
Moreover, the lemmas show that it is legitimate to reorganise the available 
choices in a convenient way, so that not only is the second condition for the 
theorem met, but also the result is strengthened from the Gittins index se­
lecting the best project in a general bandit super-process to it picking out 
the optimal action from a family of independent branching projects.
1.4.3 Discussion
The index result reduces the original problem significantly: the index is 
calculated without reference to any other outside option or project, and the 
optimal action emerges from a comparison of the indices mk(xk) attached to 
the various projects; further, the index of any unengaged project does not 
change, and so need not be recalculated. We should stress that the index 
is used to determine which project to engage next when the other projects 
will still be available in the next period. It is not the expected value of the 
project. A  brief example will illustrate this point.
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Consider two projects A  and B. You must decide which project to engage 
first, and then whether you want to stop, or to engage the other project and 
take the larger pay-off. The cost of project A  is 20 and it results in a pay-off 
of either 200 or zero, each outcome being equally likely. The cost of project 
B  is 10 and it results in a pay-off of 170 or 130, again with each outcome 
being equally likely. So, the net expected value of project A  is 80, and that 
of project B  is 140. However, the Gittins indices for the projects are 160 
and 150 respectively, so it is optimal to engage project A  first, and only then 
engage project B  if the low outcome prevails.13
It is to the calculation of the indices, or reservation prices, that we turn in 
the next section, after a few remarks on processes consisting of projects with 
variable length project stages, and on finite versus infinite horizon problems 
with discounting.
1.4.3.1 Variable length project stages
If projects have stages whose length can vary, we assume that when the agent 
engages a project she is committed to it for a possibly random number of 
periods, that number being dependent on the current state of the project but 
not on the actual period in which the stage was begun. As is indicated in the 
appendices, the proof of the optimality of the Gittins index policy continues 
to hold.
13This also demonstrates the principle that you should engage the riskier project first -  
the down-side is unimportant because you will never end up taking the low outcome from 
project A. This is shown more formally in Result 2 of the next section.
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1.4.3.2 F inite versus infinite horizon, and discounting
There are two ways of looking at the fall-back m. The first is: in any period, 
either select from the available projects, or settle for a once-and-for-all lump 
sum pay-off of m  and abandon selection for ever. The second is: in any 
period, either select from the available projects, or take a fixed reward of 
(1 — j3)m this period and continue selection next period. In the latter case, 
if it is optimal to take the fixed reward of (1 — (3)m this period, the agent 
learns nothing about the other projects, and so it is optimal to take the fixed 
reward of (l — {3)m in all subsequent periods, and the total discounted reward 
from this period forward is just m. Thus, in the infinite horizon case with 
discounting, the two views are equivalent.
Similarly, in the case when some projects have a terminating action,14 
if the agent selects such a project which is in a terminal state, this can be 
viewed as either settling for the associated lump sum reward, say y, and 
abandoning selection for ever, or as taking a fixed reward of (1 — (3)y now 
(with the state of all projects remaining unchanged) and continuing selection 
next period. If we take the former view, this may seem to imply that the 
selection of a project which is in a terminal state affects the state of other 
projects because they are no longer available. However, if we redefine the 
fall-back as the maximum of m  and y whenever a project reaches a terminal 
state with an associated lump sum reward of y, then once more the choice is 
between selecting from the available projects which have not yet reached a 
terminal state and taking the fall-back.
In the finite horizon case when all projects have terminating actions and 
there is no discounting, we are forced to take the former view (i.e. to take
14This corresponds to the notion of stoppable super-processes in Glazebrook [30]. The 
simple model of R&D presented in Section 1.2 is an example of such a process.
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the fall-back is to settle for a lump sum pay-off of m  and abandon selection 
for ever) and the last remark (i.e. redefinition of the fall-back whenever a 
project reaches a terminal state) applies.
1.5 R eservation Prices — R esults and Exam­
ples
This section returns to the example of the project that was introduced in 
Section 1.2 and employs the interpretation of it as a model of R&D. Using the 
results just derived, we characterise the optimal strategy, and then discuss 
some implications of this strategy. Figure 1.4 illustrates the project. It 
differs from Figure 1.1 in that, to be more consistent with the exposition 
of Section 1.3, the new figure also shows the actions of costless production 
(nodes 4' through 7'). Also, although the figure only ever shows two branches, 
we may wish to assume that in the project itself there are more, and denote 
the number of branches by 7 .
1.5.1 Characterising th e  Optimal Strategy — G ittins 
Indices
The project is clearly an independent branching project, in which the only 
action initially available is the root, and the out-tree which describes the 
structure is the set of arcs illustrated in Figure 1.4. As noted after Theo­
rem 1 in the previous section, this means that a Gittins index policy selects 
the optimal action, and so to characterise the optimal strategy we need to 
determine the Gittins indices for the possible branching projects which may 
arise. Then, if the value of the best available product is greater than the
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Figure 1.4: The project
highest Gittins index of the available (sub-)projects, the agent stops exper­
imenting and makes that product; else she works on the (sub-)project with 
the currently highest index, and continues.
The possible projects can be classified into four types: either a project 
contains just a terminal action (making a product), or it is a branching 
project of depth 1, 2, or 3 (corresponding to a development project, a re­
search project, and a feasibility study respectively). These are illustrated in 
Figure 1.5.
The rest of the analysis of this section concerns representative projects, 
and we adopt the convention that a representative project of type d corre­
sponds to production if d =  0, and is a branching project of depth d i f d >  0.15 
The initial state of a such project is the state when only the root action is 
available, and is a summary of everything known about the products which
15 Subscripts on parameters, variables and functions, etc. will henceforth indicate the 
project depth and no longer the node, but when discussing generic properties we omit the 
subscript.
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d = 3
Feasibility study
d=  1 d — 0
Development ProductionResearch
Figure 1.5: Four types of branching project
may emerge from that project. The sum of the signals received on taking 
actions which are ancestors of the root is such a summary, which we denote 
by y. Consider a project of type d > 0 and suppose that it is in its initial 
state y  at time t. If the agent takes the root action then she learns zj and 
updates the expected value of the products in the project accordingly. The 
root action can now be ignored, being no longer available, and the products 
can be considered as being in one of the 7  (sub-)projects of type d — 1, each 
of which is in its initial state y  -F Zd at time i +  1.
To find the Gittins index for a project, consider the process which consists 
of just that project and a fall-back m, and let y) denote the value of this 
process when the initial state of the project is y. Denote the Gittins index, 
or reservation price, of the project by r(y). By definition, if m > r(y) the 
agent stops with the fall-back m, otherwise she pays c to learn the increment 
2 and then continues. Denoting the continuation value by 4>(m,z +  y), we
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have the general formula for the continuation region:
4>(m,y) = - c  + E[4>(m,z+y) \ y .
As the Gittins index is the minimal fall-back which makes the agent 
indifferent between stopping and continuation, we see that r(y) = (j>(r(y),y), 
so r(y) satisfies:
r(y) = - c  + E[4>(r{y),z + y) \ 3/].
For the rest of the section we will make the following simplifying assump­
tion.
Assum ption
(a) there is no discounting, i.e. (3 = 1;
(b) the number of branches emanating from the root of any project of type 
d > 0 is the same, namely 7d-i, with 70 =  1;
(c) the cost of visiting the root of any project of type d > 0 is the same, 
namely cd]
(d) the signal zd received at the root of any project of type d > 0 is inde­
pendently drawn from the same continuous distribution with support [ad, bd], 
CDF Gd(-) and pdf gd(•).
It will transpire that r(y) = r(0)+y,  which is intuitively plausible: if the 
agent is indifferent between(an)project with initial value y and a fall-back of 
r(y), she will also be indifferent between that project with initial value 0 and 
a fall-back of r(y) — y.
The implication of the above remark, together with the assumption, is 
that the optimal policy in our example will be fully characterised by just four 
quantities, namely r0, 77, r2 and 7-3, the index for each of the four types of 
project when the initial state is zero. We now derive expressions for these.
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1.5.1.1 Production
As we have assumed that production is costless and its value is known, in this 
case c is zero, z is the degenerate random variable equal to zero, and so the 
continuation pay-off is simply the larger of m  and y, i.e. <j>(m, z+y)  =  m V y. 
So, subscripting the variables and functions by 0:
ro(y) = r0(y) V y
and the minimal ro(y) which satisfies this is clearly given by r0(y) = y. For 
consistency with what follows, we define ro as r 0(0), and then we have:
r0 =  0
ro(y) =  r0 + y.
1.5.1.2 Development
In the continuation region for production (m < ro +  y):
(f>o{m,y) = m  V y
and indeed in general:
</>o(ra,y) =  m  V y.
For development, we subscript the variables and functions by 1. If the 
agent reveals z\ she will be‘facing a single production project, the value of 
which will be zi +  y). So, in the continuation region for development:
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the last line following from integrating by parts. So, from indifference:
r i(y) = - C i + n ^ - b  /  ( l - G i i z ^ d z i
J r i ( y )—y
d  =  f  ( 1 -Gi ( z i ) )d z i .
J r i ( y ) - y
This implicitly defines the value of r\(y) — y  in terms of ci and the CDF 
Gi(-), and this value is therefore independent of y. As above, we define r\ as 
r i(0), and then we have:
ci =  f  (1 — G i ( z i ) ) d z i
J r  i
n{y)  = r i + y .
1.5.1.3 Research
In the continuation region for development (m < 77 +  y):
rb\
<t>i(m,y) =  - c i  +  m +  / (1 -  Gi{zi))dzi
J m —y
=  771+/ (1 -  Gi{zi))dzi -  f  (1 -  Gi{zi))dzi
J m —y J r i
=  771+/  (1 — Gi(zi))dzi
J m —y
and in general:
<l>i(m,y) =  m  V (771+  /  (1 -  Gi(zi))dzi).
v J m —y
In the case of a research project, if the agent reveals z^ she will be facing 
several development projects, the value of each of which will be </>i(ra, z2+y).  
Let <£i(M, y) denote the value of these 71 projects when the fall-back is M
and the state of each of them is summarised by y. Using the formula given
in Theorem 1, we have:
$i (M,y)  = B -  ( ^ ! ( m , y ))71 dm
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where B  is the bound on the reward functions. In the stopping region (m >
ri +  y), the partial derivative is 1, otherwise, in the continuation region,
d<j>i(m,y)/dm = G\(m — y). Thus:
(M, y) = M  V (M +  r  (1 -  G1 (zj)* ) d z \
v J M —y
So, in the continuation region for the research project:
<h(m,y) =  - c 2 +  E [$ !{m,z2 + y) | y]
= -C2+ f  m  V ( m +  T  (I — Gi(zi)11) dzi) dG2{z2)
Ja 2  '  J m —y —22,
— —c2 + m +  f  0 V (  /  (1 -  Gi(ziY' )dzi}  dG2(z2)
Ja.2 J m —y—22
— — c2 + m +  f  ( f  (1 — Cti(,zi)71) dzA dG2{z2)
J m —y —T i  '  J  m —y —22
=  —c2 + m +  f  h - G ^ m - y - z 2y tl\ ( \ - G 2(z2))dz2
J m —y —ri  L J
the last line again following from integrating by parts. Again using r2(y) = 
<fo(r2(y),y), we obtain:
c2 = f  [l -  Gi(r2(y) - y -  z2)lx](1 -  G ^ ) ) dz2
J r 2 ( y ) - y - r 1 L
This time, it is not as obvious that this equation uniquely determines 
the value of r2(y) — y. However, having observed that, say, an increase in 
7*2(2/) — V would decrease both the integrand and the range of integration 
whilst leaving the LHS unchanged, we conclude as before that r2(y) — y  is 
independent of y and so we define r2 as r2(0) to give:
c2 = f  [l — G\(r2 — 22)71] (1 — £ 2(22)) dz2JT2—T\ L J
7*2 {y) =  7*2 + 2/.
1.5.1.4 Feasibility study
In the continuation region for research (m < r 2 + y)\
(^{m.y)  =  — c2 +  m +  f  [l — G\(m — y — z2)lx 1(1 — G2(z2)) dz2
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=  m +  f  1 -  Gi(m -  y -  z2)11 (1 -  £ 2(^2) )dz2
J  m —y —r \  Lt 1
— [  [ l  — G i ( r 2 — Z2)11 (1 — G 2 ( z 2)) dz2  
J  7*2—7*i L J
=  m +  f  [ l  -  G i (t2 -  z2)111(1 -  G 2(z2)) d z2
J  rn  — i t— L J
+  /  \Gi(r2 - z 2)11 -  Gi im -  y -  z r f 1] ^  -  G2{z2)) dz2.
The he Gittins index for a feasibility study follows the same
steps as above for a research project. As the calculations are somewhat 
laborious, we simply note that r 3 (y) = r 3 +  y 1 state the implicit formula for 
r 3, and collect the results together.
Reservation prices
1.5.2 Im plications o f the O ptim al Strategy
Much of the intuition underlying the determinants of the index and so of the 
following result is illustrated by considering how r 1? the index for a develop­
ment project, depends on the ‘riskiness’ of the pay-offs. In a development 
project (with an initial value of zero) there are two actions: the root action 
is to observe a signal z 1, and its child is to make the product whose value 
is Z\. The Gittins index is given by the formula Cj = f £ ( l  — Gi(zi))dzi.  
Notice that the Gittins index does not depend on the distribution of low 
values of z\ , because when deciding how to proceed the agent always has the 
option, exercised if z\ is low, of taking the fall-back rather than making the
0: r0 =  0
3: c3 =  [  ( l  -  [l -  f  (1 -  Gi(r3 -  zz -  z2)l l )g2{z2) dz2V 2) ( l  -  G3(z3))d
./TVj 7*0 ' L 7*0--70--7*1 -* fT " 3 —r 2 J r z  — Z z —T\z z r
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new product. The idea that the Gittins index depends just on the likelihood 
of high outcomes is captured by the result that r i increases if we consider a 
mean-preserving spread of the distribution of z\.1%
Result 2 Let H(-) and G(-) be two CDFs such that H(-) is a mean- 
preserving spread of G(-) with the ‘single-crossing property’. The Gittins 
index of the single stage project whose pay-off is distributed according to if(-) 
is greater than that of a similar project whose pay-off is distributed according 
to G (-).17
P ro o f :  When H  and G have the same mean: 
f  (1 — H( z ) )d z=  f  (1 — G(z))dz.
J a  J a
When if(-) is a spread of G(-) with the single-crossing property: 
r { H ( z ) - G { z ) ) d z >  0
J a
with equality a t x  =  a and x  =  b and strict inequality for some a < x < b. 
Together,
f  (H(z) — G(z)) dz < 0.
V  X
Denoting the two reservation prices by rn  and we have by definition: 
c =  f  (1 — H(z ) )d z=  j  (1 — G(z))dz,
J r n  J tg
so
0 =  f  (1 — H ( z ) ) d z — f  (1 — G(z))dz
J  TJJ J  TC
=  f  (G(z) — H(z))dz — f  (1 — G(z))dz.
J r n  J tg
16This is another illustration of the difference between the Gittins index of a project 
and its expected value.
17This point is explored by Weitzman [61].
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The first integral is non-negative, and so f f " (1 — G(z))dz > 0.
This implies that > rc, and if there is some difference in H  and G 
towards the upper end of their support then the inequality is strict. ■
Thus if there is a choice between two development projects in wliich 
the expected value of the product from each project is the same, but with 
different variance, then it is optimal to do the more risky development first.
r
0.2
Figure 1.6: Reservation prices v. cost
Exam ple 1 Reservation prices as a function of cost
The above result can be used to understand the relative behaviour of the 
Gittins indexes /q and r 2 as the cost of experimentation increases. For the 
case with two-way brandling, equal costs of research &: development, and 
where the distribution is uniform on [—1, 1], the reservation prices vary with 
costs as shown in Figure 1.6.
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The indexes r\ and r2 are calculated assuming that the initial states of the 
projects are zero.18 Also note that the expected value of any signal is zero. 
Since the value of a product in a project is the sum of that project’s initial 
state and the signals about the product that are subsequently observed, then 
initially the expected value of any product in both the research project and 
the pure development project is zero. However, the values of products in 
the research project have a higher variance. When the cost of search is low, 
this difference in the variance is the main consideration, and as we would 
expect from Result 2, the Gittins index for research is higher than that for 
development. As the search cost rises, however, a new consideration becomes 
increasingly important: the agent must spend more before production if the 
product is at the end of a research project than if it is in a development 
project. Thus as the cost rises, the Gittins index for development becomes 
higher than that for research. □
The main focus of this section is on how branching affects the way that 
agents pursue R&D. The example above shows that as costs rise, the balance 
tips in favour of pursuing development before engaging in more research, and 
this remains qualitatively the case if we allow the amount of branching to 
vary. In the example below, we shall see that as branching increases the 
agent tends to do more initial research before embarking on any development.
18It is easy to show that r\ satisfies c\ =  [(1—ri)/2]2, giving 7*i =  1—2y/cx for 0 < Ci < 1.
Determining r2 is a little more complicated. For 0 < ci,co <  1, it is the positive root 
which is less than 2 of
m 4 — 24 m2 +  32(2 — 3ci -f ciy/c^m  — 48(1 — 4ci +  Ac\\fcx — c2) +  96c2 =  0 
and it is the negative root which is greater than —2 of
— 24m2 +  32(2 — 3ci +  ciy/c^m — 48(1 — 4ci +  4ciyjc1 — c2) +  96c2 =  0.
30 CHAPTER 1. EXPLORING A  BRANCHING STRUCTURE
First, note that the expected value of a project consisting of 71 identical 
development opportunities is 77 — Gi(zi)71 dzi, which is increasing in 71, 
the number of branches from their common research parent.19 Next, consider 
the effect of the amount of branching on the Gittins index for research (it 
has no effect on the Gittins index for development).
R esu lt 3 As the amount of branching increases, 7*2 increases and 77 is un­
changed.
C2 == f  [l - Gufo - 22)711 (1 - G 2(z2))dz2
J t 2 —t \  L J
P roof: The expression giving r2 implicitly is
1*62
fr ri
If we hold 7*2 fixed and increase 71, then the right-hand side increases. To 
restore the equality with C2, we must increase r2 thereby decreasing the range 
of integration and also the term [1 — G\(r2 — zf)11].
The expression for 77 is independent of the amount of branching. ■
Now, what is the probability that, having explored one research avenue, 
the agent prefers to explore a second research avenue before pursuing any 
development of the first? Assume, without loss of generality, that the signal 
received from the feasibility study was zero. If the signal received from the 
first piece of research is z, then the Gittins index for developments of that 
research is 77 -j- z. Thus the agent will undertake a second piece of research 
if 7-2 > z +  77 so that the probability of doing the second piece of research
19This leads to the final illustration of the difference between the reservation price for a 
project and its expected value. The reservation price for a project consisting of 7 1  iden­
tical development opportunities is simply the reservation price for just one development 
opportunity, namely 7 7 . This is strictly greater than the project’s expected value noted 
above, which approaches the reservation price as the amount of branching tends to 0 0 .
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first is given by Pr(r2 > 2 +  ri), which is just G(r2 — ri). As we would 
expect, this is increasing in the reservation price of research and decreasing 
in the reservation price of development. The final example presented here is 
a direct consequence of Result 3.
Exam ple 2 As the number of ways of developing a single piece of research 
increases, the agent is more likely to do a second piece of research before 
pursuing any development of the first.
The intuition behind this is that the larger the number of development 
opportunities from a single research avenue, the higher are the expected 
rewards from after the development phase, and so it becomes more attractive 
to learn about these expected rewards before pursuing existing development 
opportunities. □
1.6 Conclusions
The central innovation of the chapter is the introduction of a sequential 
search process which can be represented as a family of trees, and the central 
theoretical result is that the optimal action to take in this process is given 
by a Gittins index policy. This result extends the existing work on multi­
armed bandits in the economics literature in two important ways. In existing 
models, either projects are fully independent and the Gittins index policy is 
optimal, or they are not independent and the models have no such simplifying 
result. In our process the stochastic specification means that actions can have 
correlated rewards, so that independence is relaxed, yet the index policy 
remains optimal.
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\
The second generalisation is that in existing multi-armed bandit models 
there is just one action available in each project in any one period, whereas in 
our process, the agent constantly faces choices about the direction in which 
to advance a project. The technical device which allows us to do this, while 
maintaining the result that the Gittins index policy identifies the optimal 
action and not just the optimal project, is to recognise that the way that 
actions are grouped into projects need not be the same in every period.
The final part of the chapter turns to economic applications. The repre­
sentation of the process as a family of trees reflects the notion of precedence: 
some actions follow on from others; and it gives a measure of the diversity 
of rewards: close rewards have a nearer common ancestor than distant ones. 
The process also generates the feature that close rewards are more highly 
correlated than distant ones. This structure is clearly a natural one within 
which to study R&D and technological change20 [59] and we investigate a very 
simple model of R&D in order to illustrate the main technical result. We find 
that as costs rise the agent expects to pursue development before engaging 
in more research, but that as the amount of branching increases, the agent 
expects to do more research before embarking on any development.
There are several ways in which this work could be extended. As men­
tioned in the introduction, modelling R&D as searching a branching structure 
provides a means of investigating the diversity of products that are devel­
oped and marketed, and how this depends on the nature of competition in 
R&D. Branching projects also provide a framework within which to examine
20Vega-Redondo [59] develops a similar model, though there the authors focus is on 
industry turnover rather than optimal search. Furusawa [25] also employs a branching 
structure to aid a game-theoretic analysis of the costs and benefits of Research Joint 
Ventures.
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the dual role of patents as not simply conferring monopoly rights over some 
products, but simultaneously revealing information about related products 
not covered by the patent.
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Chapter 2
Accum ulation Games:
Increm ental Sunk Costs 
and Market Dynam ics
2.1 Introduction
John Sutton in his book “Sunk Costs and Market Structure” [54] explores in 
some depth the idea that in many markets concentration can be understood 
by supposing that in a first stage firms choose to enter a market and, if 
technology and preferences allow, invest in a private stock of some non-price 
strategic variable which we call a state (Sutton focuses on advertising to 
increase customers’ willingness to pay). In a final stage firms compete and 
receive profits which depend on the number of rivals, and on the state of each 
according to a profit function. Concentration is constrained by the need for 
final stage profits to cover costs incurred in the first stages. Since spending 
in the first stages is assumed to be unrecoverable in the last, this approach 
can be dubbed the sunk cost view of concentration. In his book Sutton [54]
35
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considers properties which hold over one of two very general classes of n-stage 
game and showed that the model predicted various features of concentration 
in 20 4-digit industries across 6 countries. Others have since found empirical 
support for his theoretical findings (see references in [55])
These sunk cost models of concentration form one starting point for the 
work presented in this chapter. The second starting point will be Pakes’ 
response to the heterogeneity and variability that has been documented in a 
number of recent studies of firm level panels ([20], [21], [17], [45] and [12]). 
This response, developed in several papers with various co-authors, ([18], [45], 
[47]) has been to build an empirical program in which a model market with 
heterogeneous firm histories can be calibrated against a real market. This 
calibrated model might then be used to asses the expected impact of a policy 
intervention. The basic model on which the program is based is presented 
by Ericson and Pakes in “Markov-Perfect Industry Dynamics: A Framework 
for Empirical Work” [18]. They describe their work as considering
the impact of uncertainty arising from investment in research and 
exploration-type processes. It analyses the behaviour of individ­
ual firms exploring profit opportunities in an evolving market 
place.
Their actual model takes a more restricted view of the actions available 
to firms, and the way the market can evolve. It does however allow a broad 
interpretation of what constitutes research and exploration. The present 
chapter observes that implicit in Ericson and Pakes’ model is a particular 
hypothesis concerning the dynamic behaviour of the market, viz: each firm 
has a stock of some strategic variable, called its state, a firm’s profit at any 
time depend on the state of each firm, changes to a firm’s state in one period
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compared to the previous one depends on that firm’s previous investment, 
and large expected changes in the strategic variable cost proportionately 
more than small changes.
According to this hypothesis the dynamic behaviour of a market and 
the level of concentration are related. Both derive from the dependence of 
one firm’s profits on all firms’ states, i.e. from the profit function. However, 
whereas concentration can be understood by thinking that the state is a stock 
accumulated in a single step, market dynamics derive from the accumulation 
of stocks over time. We dub this hypothesis the incremental sunk cost view 
of market dynamics, and begin an exploration of its implications using a 
number of particular examples.
The central sections of the chapter deal with two incremental sunk cost 
models, Model A  and Model B, in which firms compete over an infinite 
number of periods. In both models a firm’s state is measured by a stock 
which can be accumulated over time through investment. Firm’s earn profits 
in each period, which are related to the state of firms in that period by the 
profit function. Each incremental sunk cost model has a corresponding sunk 
cost model of concentration, with which it shares the profit function. Both 
give similar results, summarised by the following claims.
Claim  1 . There is a well defined number of firms in the incremental sunk 
cost model in the long run. This number of firms behaves in the same 
way as the number of firms in the corresponding sunk cost model of 
concentration.
Claim  2 . Firms in the incremental sunk cost model converge in the long 
run: firms with lower stocks invest more.
Claim  3. There can be excess entry in the incremental sunk cost model,
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where more firms enter and accumulate early on, than persist in the 
long run. Firms which fall behind early on, invest more slowly or stop 
investing altogether.
C laim  4. There may be states in the incremental sunk cost model which 
are stable should they arise, but which are unlikely to do so. These can 
be related to market structures in the corresponding sunk cost model 
in which some equilibrium conditions are satisfied, but in which final 
stage profits do not cover investments made at earlier stages.
Model A describes a branded goods market where market shares depend 
on customers’ perceptions of the quality of the various products on offer. 
The profit function is taken from the sunk cost model of concentration in 
advertising intensive industries given in Sutton’s book [54, chapter 3]. The 
incremental sunk cost model embeds the profit function from the sunk cost 
model into a dynamic framework developed by Ericson, Pakes and McGuire 
([18], [47]). The dynamic behaviour of firms in the model is very rich. How­
ever the mechanisms underlying this behaviour are somewhat obscure; no 
analytic solution is available and all results relate to numerically specified 
examples.
We propose that the dynamic behaviour is driven by two things. First the 
number of firms which can be supported in the long run is governed by the 
same structural features as equilibrium market structure in the corresponding 
sunk cost model. This corresponding market structure is symmetric, which 
has as its counterpart the convergence of firms in the incremental sunk cost 
model in the long run. Second, firms which establish themselves as long run 
participants in the market earn profits. Early in the market’s history, when 
all firms have low qualities, many firms enter in the hope that they will be 
luckier than a t least some of their rivals, will outlast them and so become
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one of the profitable firms supported in the long run. Model B is introduced 
in order to examine this proposal in a tractable setting.
Model B corresponds to the exogenous sunk cost model described by 
Sutton [54, chapter 2], in which firms pay an exogenously given cost in the 
first stage if they choose to enter. Model B displays all the behaviour dis­
cussed for Model A; convergence of firms in the long run, excess entry and 
divergence of firms early on and the possibility of stable fragmented states. 
Yet here the model is simple and the behaviour manifestly derives from the 
constraint placed on market structure by the corresponding sunk cost model.
The next two Sections deal with the two central models. Section 2.4 
concludes.
2.2 M odel A: A dvertising
One approach to modelling the impact of advertising on market structure 
supposes that consumers perceive the quality of more heavily advertised 
goods as being higher. In these vertical differentiation models all consumers 
agree on the ranking of products by quality, and would buy the best one, 
all other things, including price, being equal. A firm’s profits depend on the 
quality of every firm. This is the approach to advertising that Sutton adopts 
using sunk cost models, and tests with some success against data from the 
food and drink industry [54]. We consider one of Sutton’s examples from 
this study and describe behaviour in an incremental sunk cost version where 
the profit function is the same, but where firms accumulate quality over time 
through investment.
It is the contention of this chapter that dynamic behaviour in an incre­
mental sunk cost model is driven by the same factors constraining concen­
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tration in the sunk cost model with which it shares a profit function. We 
begin with an analysis of the sunk cost model. Sutton [54] has already given 
a treatment of the central result of this m odel, that no matter how large the 
market, the number of firms is bounded above. Our reason for analysing the 
model yet again is to consider four aspects of equilibrium that we will later 
compare to the behaviour of the incremental sunk cost model; equilibrium 
is symmetric, and when the market is large the number of firms does not 
depend on market size, the amount spent on advertising is proportional to 
market size, and the number of firms is lower at higher elasticities. We will 
show that all four are preserved as features of equilibrium in the incremental 
sunk cost model, and suggest that the same mechanisms are at work in both 
cases.
2.2.1 The sunk cost m odel o f concentration
Consider a three stage sunk cost model between countably many firms, in­
dexed by i =  1 ,2 ,__
enter: pay a choose Ui : pay A(ui)
Competiton: 
receive Ki(u)
Stage 1 Stage 2 Stage 3
Figure 2.1: 3-stage model
In the first stage each firm chooses whether or not to enter. If firm i 
enters it pays a sunk entry cost cr, otherwise the firm plays no further part in 
the game and is ignored henceforth. In the second stage, firms observe the 
entry choices of the first stage. Let N  be the number of entrants. Each firm
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1 chooses how much to spend on advertising, Advertising determines the 
perceived quality of the firm’s product, a*, according to:
h  = A(ui) =  - { u l  -  1), 7  > 1 (2.1)
7
In the final stage each firm i supplies a chosen quantity qi to the market, 
knowing the number of rivals and the quality of each firm’s product. Each 
firm’s marginal cost of production is c.
If a consumer buys an amount a: of a product with quality it, and consumes
2 of an outside good, her utility is:
U =  (u x ^ z1- 6
As a result each consumer spends 6 of her income in the market. Denote 
the total value of sales in the market by S. If the market clearing price of 
product i is pf, each consumer buys a product which maximises the quality 
price ratio itj/pi.
Subgame perfect Nash Equilibrium is found by solving Stage III first, 
taking the choices made in earlier stages as given. This leads to a character­
isation of a firm’s profits as a function of the vector of qualities of each firm 
in the market. Re-label firms so that they are in descending order of quality. 
The number of firms producing positive quantities is given by1 the largest n 
for which:
n
Y  un/u j > n  — 1 and un >  0
3=1
1Not all firms may find it profitable to produce. Firms which have a lower quality must 
charge a lower price if they are to make any sales. If a firm’s quality is low enough the 
price it would need to charge may be lower than the marginal production cost, in which 
case it does better not to produce at all. In the equilibrium stated here a firm will not 
produce if any firm with a higher quality does not produce. There may be other equilibria 
corresponding to other orders.
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And profits axe given by2:
7Ti(u) =
S  (1 — 1 , ^ i f z < nV E i - i  « * / « # /  ( 2 . 2 )
0 otherwise
It is easy to confirm that if all firms had the same quality the final stage 
profits of each would simply be S /N 2.
Turning to the second stage, consider the choice of advertising level, tak­
ing the number of entrants N  as given. In any equilibrium no firm must 
be able to improve its total payoff through marginal adjustments to its ad­
vertising level. In other words, the marginal increase in final stage profits a 
firm earns from a marginal change in perceived quality must equal the cost 
of that change. Call this the marginal profit condition. Restricting attention 
to symmetric equilibria, it defines a unique quality for each N . It is clearer 
to state the result in terms of the amount spent on advertising rather than 
the resulting level of perceived quality3:
2 ( N —1)2 aMarginal Profit Condition k /S  = —-— -------- -
7 N 6 7 S
The quality at which this marginal profit condition is satisfied is larger, and 
so firms must spend more on advertising, when the size of the market is 
larger. This is not surprising. Advertising a product makes all consumers 
more willing to pay for it. When there are more consumers, or each spends 
more, the same amount spent on advertising yields a greater final stage profit. 
Quality will now need to be higher before the net gains from marginal in­
creases in advertising are exhausted. Note that when the market size is very
2 A derivation of this equation is given in Sutton’s book “Technology and Market Struc­
ture” [56].
3The result is found by setting the marginal profit, derived from 2.2 equal to the
marginal cost of quality derived from the definition of A(u{), and then requiring that
quality be the same for all firms.
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la rg e , th e  a m o u n t s p e n t o n  a d v e r tis in g  b e co m e s p ro p o r tio n a l to  5 ,  so  th a t  
k / S  b e c o m e s  in d e p e n d e n t o f S .
T h e  f in a l s te p  is  to  c o n s id e r f irm s ’ e n tr y  d e c is io n s . In  a n y  e q u ilib r iu m , 
e a c h  f ir m  m u s t g e t a  n o n -n e g a tiv e  o v e ra ll p a y o ff, o th e rw is e  i t  w o u ld  h a v e  
d o n e  b e tte r  n o t to  e n te r . M o re o v e r, a n y  a d d it io n a l f ir m  m u s t g e t a  n e g a tiv e  
p a y o ff i f ,  in s te a d  o f  s ta y in g  o u t o f  th e  m a rk e t, i t  chose to  e n te r. W e  sa w  th a t  
in  a  s y m m e tr ic  e q u ilib r iu m , e a ch  f ir m  g e ts  f in a l s ta g e  p ro f its  o f  S / N 2 . T h e  
m o s t th a t  e a ch  o f  N  e n tra n ts  c a n  th e re fo re  in v e s t o n  a d v e r tis in g , a n d  s t i l l  
g e t a  p o s it iv e  p a y o ff o v e ra ll, is  S / N 2 — cr. T h is  d e fin e s  a  z e ro  p r o f it  c o n d itio n :
Z e ro  p r o f it  c o n d it io n  k / S  =  ^
T h e  la rg e r  th e  m a rk e t, th e  g re a te r th e  f in a l s ta g e  p ro f its  a n d  so th e  m o re  
e a ch  f ir m  c a n  a d v e rtis e , g iv e n  N .  T h e  m o s t th a t c a n  b e  s p e n t b e co m e s  
p ro p o r t io n a l to  S  as th e  m a rk e t g e ts  la rg e  a n d  k / S  b e co m e s  in d e p e n d e n t o f
T h e  tw o  l im it in g  c o n d itio n s  w h e n  7  =  2 a re  sh o w n  in  F ig u re  2 .2 .
T h e  e q u ilib r iu m  n u m b e r o f f irm s  is  N  =  2. F o r a n y  in te g e r N  >  2 ,
m a rg in a l p r o f it  c o n d it io n , a n d  so  th e ir  p ro f its  d o  n o t c o v e r to ta l s p e n d in g  
o n  a d v e r tis in g . T h is  e q u ilib r iu m  n u m b e r is  in d e p e n d e n t o f th e  s iz e  o f  th e  
m a rk e t ( fo r  la rg e  e n o u g h  m a rk e t s iz e s ). A lth o u g h  firm s  e a rn  h ig h e r f in a l 
s ta g e  p r o f its  w h e n  th e  m a rk e t is  la rg e r, th e y  a ls o  s p e n d  m o re  o n  a d v e r tis in g , 
a n d  th e  n u m b e r o f  firm s  w h ic h  f in d  i t  p ro f ita b le  to  e n te r re m a in s  th e  sa m e .
A lth o u g h  th e  n u m b e r o f f irm s  in  th e  m a rk e t does n o t d e p e n d  o n  m a rk e t 
s iz e , i t  d o e s  d e p e n d  o n  th e  p a ra m e te r 7 . T h is  p a ra m e te r is  re la te d  to  th e  
e la s t ic ity  o f q u a lity  to  s p e n d in g  o n  a d v e rtis in g :
5 .
f irm s  h e  a b o v e  th e  z e ro  p r o f it  c u rv e  w h e n  th e  le v e l o f  s p e n d in g  s a tis fie s  th e
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0 . 4 5
0 . 4 0
0 . 3 5
0 . 3 0
0 . 2 5
Z e r o  p r o f i t  c o n d i t i o n
0.20
0 . 1 5
M a r g i n a l  p r o f i t  c o n d i t  i o n
0 .10
0 . 0 5
0.00
3 51 2 6 7 8 9 104
Figure 2.2: Marginal and zero profit conditions
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We might expect that when I /7  is high the number of firms in equilibrium 
is low. The reason for this is that if consumers’ perceptions of the quality of 
a good are easy to change, advertising is an effective means of raising final 
stage profits. Firms’ qualities will need to be correspondingly high before 
the net benefits of further marginal spending on advertising are exhausted. 
Certainly at large market sizes this intuition is correct. From the limiting 
marginal and zero profit conditions we can derive the limiting equilibrium 
number of firms as the largest integer N  which satisfies:
N  < 1 +  7 /4  +  y/(1 + 7 / 4)2 -  1 
Here N  falls as 1 /'y rises.
2.2.2 The increm ental sunk cost m odel
In the sunk cost model firms achieved their chosen level of perceived quality 
in a single step and in a final stage earned profits which depended on the 
quality of each firm. This was sufficient to analyse market concentration but 
in order to analyse market dynamics we need a model where firms can differ 
from period to period. Here we consider an incremental sunk cost model in 
which firms compete over an infinite number of periods, in each period they 
earn profits which depend on all firms’ state according to the profit function 
(from the sunk cost model) in Equation 2.2, and can invest in accumulating 
additional quality. The rules governing the accumulation of quality are taken 
from a model which has been developed by Pakes and his co-authors [47], [46]. 
We describe the model in detail for clarity; it is only presented elsewhere as 
a special case of a more general model.
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2.2.2.1 The M odel
The model is an infinite period game in which a firm’s current profits depend 
on the perceived quality of its own and its rivals goods. In each period, not 
only does a firm earn profits, but it has the opportunity to exit, sometimes 
to enter (if not already active), or invest, such investment giving a proba­
bility that its quality next period is one unit greater than the current level. 
Technically the model is a stochastic game and the solution concept we use 
is Markov Perfect Nash equilibrium4.
The model is a stochastic game between I  firms. Time is discrete. The 
state at time t, denoted &*, is a vector fisting the quality of each firm’s 
product, k1 =  {/c$, k\ , ...}. In period t  each firm i takes an action a\ from a 
set which depends on the state of the industry. In each period a number of 
events and decision points take place. In the order in which they occur the 
are:
1 State realised
2 Exit
3 Competition
4 Investment
5 Entry
6 Quality depreciates
We take each event in turn and describe it in detail.
1. State Realised
Firm z’s quality in period t  is a non-negative integer which is no more 
than some upper limit. k\ 6 { 0 ,1 ,..., k}. If a firm is not currently
4Stochastic games axe described by Fudenberg and Tirole in chapter 13 of “Game 
Theory” [24]. We adopt their notation.
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active in the market its quality is zero and it is referred to as a potential 
entrant.
The industry’s state, which we sometimes refer to as its structure, is 
observed by all firms at the beginning of the period. It is a random 
variable whose distribution depends on the state in the previous period, 
and on the actions taken by firms in the previous period. We will 
consider Markov strategies, so that firms’ actions are time stationary 
functions of the state. As a result, state transition probabilities will 
also be time stationary, and the state will be a Markov Process [32]. 
We will return to describe these state transitions once we have looked 
at all of the events within a period.
2. Exit
After observing the state, each active (i.e. having positive quality) firm 
i chooses whether to exit. If so its action is denoted a\ =  X . It sells its 
assets to get a current reward gi(kl, X )  = </>, and its state in the next 
period is =  0.
3. Competition
Active firms which did not exit now compete in the marketplace, taking 
their own and their rivals’ qualities as given. The rewards to firm 
i from this competition are given by a reduced form function r^/c), 
which depends only on the current state. Later we will enter the profit 
function given in Equation 2.2 as the reward function.
4. Investment
Any active firm which has not exited also invests in advertising. In­
vestment levels are chosen simultaneously and affect the distribution
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of a firm’s quality next period. If firm i chooses investment aj, its total 
reward in the period is:
g i(k \ a\) = r ^ k 1) -  a\, a\ G 11+
Investment buys a firm specific random increment to quality, £*, which 
has distribution (with parameter m):
Xi  =  <
1 with probability px(a\) =  m a \/(1 +  ma|), a\ G 1Z+
(2.3)
0 otherwise
5. Entry
At the end of the period a single potential entrant can choose whether 
or not to  enter the market. Before deciding whether to enter, the firm 
observes the sunk entry cost a1, which is a random variable5 and is 
uniformly distributed over the interval [07, 071]. If the firm enters, its 
action is a\ — E, it pays the sunk cost immediately, though it will 
not be able to earn profits or invest until the next period, so its total 
reward in the current period is <&(&*, E) =  —a1. The entering firm Vs 
quality is set at k\ — ke. Since the entrant has had no chance to invest, 
it cannot win a firm specific increment to quality and so Xi = 0. All 
potential entrants which did not enter have actions a\ =  E.
6 . Market wide depreciation
All firms which are active at the end of the period are subject to a
5The stochastic sunk cost is just a device to introduce noise and so help the numerical 
algorithms converge. See Pakes & McGuire [47] for details.
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common negative stochastic increment to their qualities, ?/, whose dis­
tribution is given by:
V1 =
—1 with probability py 
0 otherwise
We interpret y as random depreciation. It is certainly reasonable to 
suppose that a branded good must be advertised continuously to main­
tain its high profile and perceived quality. It is not at all clear though 
that all brands within a product group should depreciate together. 
Pakes and McGuire interpret y  =  — 1 rather as a random increase in 
the quality of some outside good which consumers use a benchmark [47]. 
Under this interpretation it is the difference between a good’s quality 
and that of the benchmark which enters consumers’ utility functions. 
Unfortunately this interpretation cannot be maintained6. We will refer 
to y  as (brand) depreciation, since this seems the most natural reason 
why firms in branded goods markets must keep investing to maintain 
quality. However, nothing important is likely to turn on the interpreta­
tion of y: assuming that all firms share a common negative shock will 
affect the correlation of firm profitability, but should have little impact 
on the features of equilibrium we consider here.
6Index the outside good by 0. They claim that the real intrinsic quality of a good i 
is Vi and what enters the demand functions is Ui =  Vi — v$, Furthermore when y 1 — —1 
then vl+l =  vfc +  1. However, having taken such care to derive the demand functions, 
it would be gratifying if this interpretation resulted from a well specified maximisation 
problem. It does not seem to in this case. Pakes and McGuire provide an example of a 
vertical differentiation model where demands can be written in these terms, but even here 
they cannot sustain their interpretation since the shocks axe not to w*, but to ki =  c(u{), c 
strictly convex. There is no Vq, cstrictly convex, such that fc*+1 =  k\ — 1 Vi, Vfc E K , 
when y l =  —1.
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7. State transition
Firm z’s state in the next period will be k\+l =  0 if i exited, or if i 
was a potential entrant which did not enter. Otherwise its state will be 
the sum of k\ and the specific and industry-wide increments Xi and y. 
The only exception is when this would specify a state higher than the 
upper bound k. In this case the state is set to k. This is summarised 
in a state transition function q{kt+11 /cf,a*).
Firm i ’s payoff from period t onwards is the discounted sum of its rewards 
in each period:
oo
«(*•) =  W X )
T = t
Each firm i chooses a strategy s* which we restrict to be functions only 
of the current state, i.e. to be Markov, and we look for Nash Equilibria, s* 
of this game. Any Nash Equilibrium will necessarily be Markov. In addition 
we will restrict attention to those equilibria which are perfect, symmetric, 
and have the property that if, in a state, one firm finds it optimal to exit, 
then so do all other active firms with a lower quality.
At this point we can derive the incremental version of the sunk cost model 
analysed above simply by using the final stage profit functions tt(«) from 
Equation 2.2 for the reward function r(k). To do so, however, it is impor­
tant that the final stage profits are given as functions of advertising outlays, 
that is r(k) = 7r (A~1(k)). To see why, consider the cost of accumulating an 
additional unit of quality with a given probability in the incremental sunk 
cost model. This is derived from Equation 2.3 and is independent of the 
firm’s current quality. In contrast, in the sunk cost model the marginal cost 
of quality, derived from Equation 2.1, is increasing. To improve the ‘fit’ to 
the incremental sunk cost model we will simply rename some quantities in
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the sunk cost models. Advertising outlays become quality, and the measure 
of quality which enters consumers’ utility function becomes effective quality. 
This renaming has no impact at all on the sunk cost model. We have already 
anticipated this renaming by using the same symbol, k for advertising out­
lays in the sunk cost model and quality in the incremental sunk cost model. 
Since in the latter game there is no deterministic relationship between the 
amount spend by i and the quality hi, we are not free to rename quantities 
in the same way in the incremental sunk cost model.
2.2.2.2 The Example Markets
No analytic solution is available for the model. However Gowrisnakaran has 
encoded an algorithm which, if the user inputs the profit earned by firms 
in all possible states, and the values of the parameters of the accumulation 
process, will compute an equilibrium. The algorithm is described by Pakes, 
Gowrisankaran and McGuire [46] and the code is available (see Pakes and 
McGuire’s paper for details [47]). The algorithm is computationally burden­
some and convergence to equilibrium is slow, if it occurs at all7. This places 
practical restrictions on the examples we can consider. Ericson and Pakes 
showed that in this type of dynamic model, firms’ equilibrium strategies may 
be independent of the maximum quality, &, and the number of firms, J, so 
long as k and I  he above some bounds [18]. Ideally we would like to set k and 
I  beyond these theoretical bounds in the examples; they are, after all, intro­
duced to make numerical solution possible rather than as reasonable features 
of the model. In practice we need to restrict the state space to a manageable
7The algorithm essentially iterates the Bellman equations. In single agent problems this 
iteration is a contraction mapping and is garanteed to converge on the optimal solution. 
This is not the case in multi-agent problems.
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size. However in all the examples reported firms only invested a little, if at 
all, in high states, which suggests, though it does not prove, that the results 
would be substantially the same if the maximum quality were raised. Also 
we have concentrated on cases where, loosely, the industry spent most of the 
time with at least one firm inactive. We would expect that in these cases 
behaviour would not be much different if the number of firms were increased.
We have not reported all, or even most, of the markets we began to 
examine. Those that looked as though practical values for k and I  would 
constrain equilibrium too much were abandoned early on. Of the remaining 
ones we have included just those which relate to the comparisons on which the 
claims here are based. We cannot make direct comparisons between market 
structure in the sunk cost and incremental sunk cost models, but we can 
compare the comparative statics behaviour of market structure in both. The 
examples we have reported allow a comparison of equilibrium when market 
size changes, and when the effectiveness of advertising increases.
Clearly interpreting simulations is something of an art. However the 
claims support an intuitive story, and one that matches the results of the 
simple analytical models in the rest of the chapter. No example that we 
considered, reported or not, gave us reason to doubt that, were computer 
resources and time available, the claims we make here would prove substan­
tially true over a wide class of possible markets. Table 2.1 lists the parameters 
for the numerical examples we discuss.
2.2.2.3 R esults
Once we have found equilibrium strategies it is a simple matter to derive 
sample market histories8 which chart the state of the market over time for
8The matter is simple not least because Gowrisankaran provides the basis of the routine.
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P a ram e te r Sym bol Com m on A1 A2 A3
No. of firms I 3
Highest quality k 20
Quality of entrants kg 2
Entry cost (low) cri 0.95
Entry cost (high) 07* 1.05
Scrap Value <t> 0.1
Parameter in px{o>i) m 0.5
Pr(depreciation) Py 0.7
Effectiveness of advertising 1 2.2 2.2 1
Parameter in A(ui) a 0.4
Discount Rate 6 0.925
Market size S 200 100 100
Table 2.1: Example Markets
54 CHAPTER 2. ACCUMULATION GAMES:
so m e  re a lis a tio n  o f th e  ra n d o m  v a ria b le s . F ig u re  2 .3  g iv e s  o n e  s a m p le  h is to r y  
o f e x a m p le  A 1  in  w h ic h  a ll firm s  in it ia l ly  h a d  z e ro  q u a lity . T h e re  a re  th re e  
tim e  lin e s , e a ch  s h o w in g  h o w  th e  q u a lity  o f  o n e  f ir m  v a rie s  o v e r th e  f ir s t  2 0 0  
p e r io d s  o f th e  m a rk e t’s h is to ry .
oo
o 23O 00
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o
0  2 0  4 0  6 0  8 0  1 0 0  1 2 0  1 4 0  1 6 0  1 8 0  2 0 0
T i m e
F ig u re  2 .3 : S a m p le  h is to ry : e x a m p le  A 1
T h e re  is  v a r ia tio n  in  m a rk e t s h a re s , in  th e  n u m b e r o f firm s  in  th e  m a rk e t, 
a n d  th e ir  id e n tit ie s . A lth o u g h  P a ke s  d e v e lo p e d  th e  m o d e l s p e c ific a lly  to  
e x h ib it  th is  f lu x , w e  a re  m o re  c o n c e rn e d  w ith  th e  s ta b le  fe a tu re s  o f th e  m o d e l, 
w ith  w h a t is  lik e ly  to  h a p p e n , a n d  w e  d e v e lo p  so m e  to o ls  w ith  w h ic h  to  
e x a m in e  v a r io u s  a s p e c ts  o f e q u ilib r iu m , s ta r t in g  w ith  m a rk e t s tru c tu re . W e  
w il l  o rg a n is e  th e  re s u lts  u n d e r h e a d in g s  re la te d  to  th e  fo u r  g e n e ra l c la im s  s e t 
o u t in  th e  in tro d u c t io n .
Claim  1(A). M arket S tructure
I t  is  c le a r fro m  F ig u re  2 .3  th a t m a rk e t s tr u c tu re  ch a n g e s  o v e r tim e . T h e
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first question is whether the industry spends more time in some states than 
others, and if so what can be said about the likely states. We take a long 
sample history (3 million periods) and find the proportion of all periods spent 
in each state during that history9.
Result 4 In each market there is a clear mode, and at the mode all active 
firms have the same quality.
The modal state for example A l  is shown in Figure 2.4. This shows the 
frequency distribution over states in which a nominated firm, the third firm, 
is not active.
This slice through the distribution is symmetric and single peaked. More­
over, 93% of the total distribution covers states in which at least one firm 
is not active. An indication of the extent to which this peak dominates the 
distribution is given by looking at a slice in which the third firm is active 
and has quality 16. This is shown in Figure 2.5. The distribution here 
is concentrated at the boundaries where one of the two remaining firms is 
inactive.
For most of the time this market is at or near the mode. This state has a 
strong claim to be a point description of market structure in the model and 
there is a strong sense in which the market supports 2 firms.
In example A3 the frequency distribution is very different. Figure 2.6 
shows the frequency distribution when one firm is inactive. Here the prob-
9This procedure approximates the time limiting distribution over states. Suppose that 
the Markov chain described by the state transition function has a unique irreducible subset. 
This will be finite and so have a unique stationary distribution /(•) which is the time 
limiting distribution. Let fik be the mean time between successive visits to state k. Then 
f(k)  =  1//Xfc. See for example Grimmett and Stirzaker’s simple treatment of Markov 
chains [32, chapter 6].
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F ig u re  2 .4 : F re q u e n c y  d is t r ib u t io n  w h e n  th e  th ir d  f ir m  is  in a c tiv e : e x a m p le  
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F ig u re  2 .5 : F re q u e n c y  d is t r ib u t io n  w h e n  k$ =  16 : e x a m p le  A 1
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ability is concentrated on those states in which just one firm is active: the 
market supports 1 firm.
There is no simple relationship between a modal state and the equilibrium 
of the sunk cost model for any particular example10. However, we have 
comparative statics results for the behaviour of concentration in response 
to changes in market size and the responsiveness to advertising. We can 
examine whether the modal state behaves in the same way. The result of 
this comparison is the important and reassuring one that the understanding 
of concentration developed using a 3-stage sunk cost model is preserved in 
the dynamic incremental sunk cost one.
R esult 5 (i) The number of firms in the modal state does not change with 
increases in market size, but quality in the modal state rises roughly in pro­
portion to market size.
(ii) I f l / j  rises, the number of firms in the modal state falls.
Table 2.2 gives the number of active firms and their quality in the modal 
state.
A1 A2 A3
n 2 2 1
k 13 7 14
Table 2.2: The number and quality of firms in the modal state
10This is not at all surprising. For example Fudenberg and Tirole [24, chapter 13] 
describe work by Hanig who, in a differential capital accumulation game between two 
firms, found that steady state capital stocks reflected the replacement cost of depreciated 
capital, the discount rate, and the incentive of firms to increase current capital levels in 
order to reduce the rival’s future levels. None of these factors play a part in a 2 or 3-stage 
sunk cost model.
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From the above table we see that though the size of the market in A l  
is twice that in A 2 , the number of firms in the modal state is 2 in both 
cases. Moreover the quality of active firms in the modal state is (roughly) 
proportional to market size. In these two respects the modal state behaves 
in the same way as equilibrium in the sunk cost model. Markets A2 and 
A3 differ in the effectiveness of advertising, I /7  and the number of firms in 
the modal state is greater when advertising is less effective (and so 1 /7  is 
smaller). Again, this accords with the behaviour of equilibrium in the sunk 
cost model.
In the sunk cost model the number of firms is the largest number which 
can enter and still earn enough profits to cover their advertising costs. As 
market size is larger, final stage profits, all other things being equal, are 
larger. However, another firm would nevertheless not find it profitable to 
enter the larger market because the amount spent on advertising is also 
larger. The results here suggest that a basically similar mechanism dominates 
the determination of concentration in the dynamic model, despite the added 
complexity that costs are accumulated over time at a variable rate, and that 
firms earn profits in all states.
C laim  2 (A). Convergence in  th e  long ru n
Another way to look at equilibrium is in terms of the likely evolution of 
the state over time. We look first at states close to the modal one. Figure 2.7, 
illustrating example A l, shows all states in which the third firm is inactive.
The arrows show the expected change in the qualities of the remaining 
two firms. Specifically consider an arrow whose base is at (£1,^ 2). The 
horizontal (vertical) length of the arrow gives the difference between the 
probability that firm l ’s (2’s) investment is successful, minus the probability 
of depreciation. For clarity, the probabilities are shown scaled up by a factor
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Figure 2.7: State transitions when =  0: example Al
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10, if the distance between states is 1. The state’s evolution does not depend 
just on investment and depreciation, but also on entry and exit decisions: we 
ignore these for now.
The arrows seem to be converging on a single point that lies somewhere 
between (13,13,0) and (14,14,0). What is more the arrows are shorter closer 
to this point. A state transition arrow with no length would indicate that 
the expected change in quality from an investment would exactly offset that 
from depreciation. The state would be stationary11. Though no actual state 
is stationary, it seems reasonable to say that the there is a stable stationary 
state between (13,13,0) and (14,14,0). The smaller of these two, (13,13,0), 
is the modal state. Figure 2.8 shows the corresponding state transitions for 
example A3.
R esu lt 6 (%) The modal state is either stationary or one of the states closest 
to the stationary one.
(ii) Active firms converge12 when the market is close to the modal one: the 
firm with the lowest quality invests more.
Since the market is close to the modal state most of the time in examples 
A l  and A2, most of the time firms are converging.
Finding that the modal state is stationary is no surprise. A state which 
persists is a good candidate as the most likely state. Neither is it a surprise
11There axe states which are close to stationary at (18,1,0) and (1,18,0). However, 
they are not stable, and their appearance is probably due to such considerations as the 
positive scrap value for exiting firms and the fact that entrants start with quality 2.
12 Convergence here is /^-convergence: smaller firms grow faster. As pointed out by 
Quah, this does not necessarily imply that the difference between firm’s states shrinks (it 
does not imply ^-convergence). If the two firms began in a symmetric state, we would 
be surprised, given the stochastic nature of investment, if they remained in a symmetric 
state forever. Quah has discussed these and other notions of convergence [48].
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Figure 2.8: State transitions when =  0: example A3
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to find that many trajectories in the state space end on the modal state, since 
this indicates that it is likely to arise. Stationary states in the dynamic game 
can be related to market structures satisfying the marginal condition in the 
sunk cost model: in both cases small changes to the state are unprofitable. 
States towards which the market moves, even when it starts far away, can be 
related to states in the sunk cost model which satisfy the zero profit condition: 
firms a t the start of a trajectory must expect that their investment costs 
will be covered by their profits, otherwise they would exit. This reasoning, 
together with the finding that the comparative static behaviour of the modal 
state is the same as that of equilibrium market structure in the sunk cost 
model, suggests that in both cases the number of firms that the market will 
support is governed in the same way by structural features of the market: 
the ability of firms to increase their share of a market of fixed size through 
spending on advertising.
Claim 3(A ). New markets: excess entry and divergence
Although firms converge most of the time in examples A l  and A2, since 
in the long run these markets are mostly close to the modal state, there are 
situations where we have a priori reasons to think that the market starts out 
far from the modal state. One example is the new market. Suppose that a 
new market for branded goods opens. To examine the expected early history 
in such a case we took a large number (6000) of sample histories of example 
A l, each with an initial state (0,0,0), and then found the average state of 
each of the highest, middle and lowest quality firm in each period. The result 
is shown in Figure 2.9.
What we see in the figure is excess entry. All firms initially enter and, 
initially, all begin to build up their quality. After a while, however, the 
lowest quality firm starts to fall increasingly behind the other two. It stops
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Figure 2.9: The expected early history of a new market: example Al
investing enough to counteract the depreciation of its brand and its quality 
falls. Eventually it exits: in the long run the average quality of the third firm 
is less than 1, which means it spends most of the time out of the market.
To see the expected industry dynamics underlying this process we also 
looked at the average probability that investment is successful for each of the 
highest, middle and lowest quality firms in each period. These are shown in 
Figure 2.10. The time line which is the first to be positive is the high quality 
firm, the last is the low quality firm.
Certainly after 450 periods, when the expected quality of the third firm is 
less than 1, the remaining active firm with the highest quality invests least: 
this is the convergence in the long run discussed in the previous section. 
However, while three firms remain active, before the third has exited, the 
firm which invests least overall is the one with the lowest quality: early on 
there is divergence of low quality firms from those that will remain in the 
market in the long run. This early divergence can also be seen in the state
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Figure 2.10: Expected probability that investment is successful over the early 
history of a new market: example A l
transitions. Figure 2.11 shows the state transitions of two of the firms in 
example A l  when the third firm’s quality is 8, which Figure 2.9 indicates 
is the expected quality of the leading firm when the trailing firm’s expected 
quality reaches its maximum.
This clearly shows that when the two other firms both have low qualities 
they diverge. Similar analyses for the other markets yields:
R esu lt 7 Suppose that, initially, no firm has positive quality. In the expected 
industry history:
(i) more firms accumulate early on than are in the modal state.
(ii) early on the lowest quality firm invests least and diverges from its rivals.
One explanation for this excess entry is that additional firms enter early 
on and exit later because profits are high when no firms have high qualities, 
and fell when qualities rise13. A second explanation, and the one we support
13 This is the basic mechanism generating excess entry in the models developed by Klep-
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Figure 2.11: State transitions when k3 =  8: example Al
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here, is that an extra firm enters early on in the hope that it will be luckier 
than its rivals and will overtake and outlast at least one. In this view the 
number of firms which the market can support is restricted by structural 
features of the market, in much the same way as the number of firms in the 
concentration model. Excess entry represents rent dissipating competition to 
become one of the supported firms. Firms which fall behind are more likely 
to be among those that exit14, and so have less time to recoup the benefits 
of their investments and invest less.
Claim 4(A ). Fragmented stationary states
One possible consequence of there being more firms than the market 
will support is, as we have just seen, that the lagging firm diverges from 
the others and eventually exits. This result arose in the context of new 
markets where not only did too many firms enter, but they all began with low 
qualities. Another case where too many firms may be in the market is when 
an exogenous increase in the effectiveness of advertising makes advertising 
more attractive, increases a firm’s willingness to invest, and so reduces the 
number of firms which can afford to be in the market. Again, “too many 
firms” is associated with “too low a quality”, and we might expect much the 
same behaviour as firms compete to remain as one of the reduced number
per and his co-authors ([31], [38] and [37]) except that in his models it is capacity (and, 
in the paper with Gort, experience) which is accumulated over time rather than quality. 
Geroski has raised the related possibility that the reason many entrants do not establish 
themselves as long run players in the market may be that they are only exploiting finite 
lived profit opportunities, though he quickly dismisses this as unable to account for the 
fact that de novo entrants have higher failure rates than entrants who are diversifying into 
the market from elsewhere [26].
14This is practically guaranteed by the restriction of equilibria to symmetric ones in 
which, if a firm exits, so do those with lower qualities.
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that the market will support, and invest less when it looks as though their 
efforts have been unsuccessful and that they will soon be forced to exit. Not 
all fragmented states, however, are unstable.
Figure 2.12 shows the transition probabilities of two firms when the 3rd 
has quality 16 in example A l. The two firms are stationary when each has
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Figure 2.12: State transitions when k$ =  16: example Al
quality 15. Since equilibrium is symmetric this suggests that all three are 
stationary at some notional state between (15,15,15) and (16,16,16). What 
is more, firms converge on this state from nearby. We might wonder whether 
the industry spends much time in this stable, locally convergent state. In 
fact there is a local mode close by as we see below. However, we have already 
seen that since all three firms are active for only 7% of the time, this local 
mode arises much less often than does the modal state discussed above. We
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have already seen the frequency distribution over states in which the third 
firm has quality 16, in Figure 2.5. The frequency is dominated by states 
where one remaining firm is inactive and to see the local 3-firm mode we 
must look at the Figure without these states. This is shown in Figure 2.13, 
and for clarity the same distribution is shown again in Figure 2.14, but using 
a contour map.
Figure 2.13: Frequency distribution when k$ =  16, excluding k\ or k<i =  0: 
example Al
There is a stable fragmented state in each of the example markets, though 
it is not locally convergent in example A2.
R esu lt 8 There is a symmetric stationary state with more active firms than 
in the modal state. Table 2.3 shows the number of firms and their qualities
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Figure 2.14: Frequency distribution when ks = 16, excluding k\ or ^  =  0: 
example Al
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in these states.
A l A2 A3
n 3 3 2
k 1 5 -1 6  8 - 9 9 - 1 0
Table 2.3: The number and quality of firms in the fragmented stationary 
state
We previously argued that the modal state can be related to equilibrium 
market structure in the sunk cost model. In both cases marginal changes 
to quality are unprofitable (the marginal profit condition of the sunk cost 
model) and in both cases firms expect to make enough profit to cover their 
investment costs (the zero profit condition of the sunk cost model). The 
fragmented stable states of Result 8 can be related to market structures in 
the sunk cost model in which the marginal condition, but not the zero profit 
condition, are satisfied. Once the state has arisen in the dynamic model 
no firm wants to make small changes to its state. We suggest, however, 
that firms never meant the state to arise in the first place; it just happened 
that, for example, while they were competing to see which of them would 
remain to be supported in the market no clear winner emerged until they had 
all accumulated high qualities. Since investment costs are sunk, once firms 
have high qualities, the requirement that firms earn enough profits to cover 
their total investment costs has no bite. Comparing examples A l  and A2 
in Table 2.3 shows that when market size doubled, the quality of the three 
firms in the fragmented stable state (roughly) doubled, just as the quality 
doubles in the market structure which satisfies the marginal condition for n 
firms in the sunk cost model.
The market spends very little time in these fragmented states, and unless
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there are good a priori reasons to believe a market starts with too many 
firms, but with high enough qualities, they are not likely to be empirically 
relevant. The existence of these states, however, lends support to the view 
that market dynamics can be understood by referring to the sunk cost model.
2.2.3 Conclusions
There are severe constraints on the number of firms and set of possible qual­
ities which it has been practical to consider. We can say, nevertheless, that 
the examples explored support the following claims.
C laim  1(A ). There is a well defined modal state which is symmetric. The 
number of firms in the modal state behaves in the same way as the 
number of firms in the sunk cost model. The number of firms does 
not change as the market size is increased, but hi rises proportionately, 
while the number of firms is lower as the elasticity is higher.
Claim  2(A ). Most of the time the market is converging on the modal state, 
so that firms with higher qualities invest less.
Claim  3(A ). There is a significant exception to convergence: the new mar­
ket. Suppose that a new market for branded goods opens up. A related 
situation arises when there is a sudden increase in the effectiveness of 
advertising in an established market which means that existing levels 
of quality are too low. We find that there may be a competition to 
remain in the market during which more firms advertise than are in 
the market in the long run. Firms which fall behind diverge from their 
rivals: they invest less.
Claim  4(A ). Finally there may be states which are stable, and so persist 
at least for a while should they arise, but which were unlikely to arise.
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These correspond to market structures in the sunk cost model which 
satisfy the marginal profit conditions but in which firms earn negative 
profits overall.
We propose that these results can be understood as consequences of an 
accumulation race between firms, which compete by investing in quality, to 
remain as one of the firms supported in the market in the long run. Because 
the model is so intractable, the mechanisms are somewhat obscure, and we 
will examine our proposal in the context of a simple tractable model which 
shows the same features as this one.
2.3 M odel B: Exogenous Sunk C osts
Equilibrium in the dynamic model in this section can have all the features 
we noted in model A: a well defined market structure, convergence of firms 
in the long run, excess entry, and unlikely but persistent, fragmented states. 
Here these features are related in a transparent way to the restriction that 
the underlying sunk cost model places on the number of firms which the 
market will support, as well as the need for firms to accumulate their strategic 
variable over time, rather than all a t once. This transparency allows us to 
understand some of the forces at work in the advertising game in particular, 
and in incremental sunk cost models in general.
The profit function is taken from an exogenous sunk cost model in which 
firms pay to enter in a first stage. They compete in the product market in the 
second, earning profits which depend on the number of first stage entrants. 
The strategic variable here is just the ability to produce, and it is paid for 
all at once in the first stage, or not at all. We construct an incremental sunk 
cost model in which the ability to produce must be acquired in a number
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of stages, rather than just one. For concreteness consider the following two 
stage story.
Market research has confirmed that there is a demand for a bicycle 
with automatic gears. Before being able to make such a bike, 
a firm would need to conduct R&D to discover an engineering 
principle which would allow gearing to alter as the torque applied 
to the pedals increased, and then to construct a prototype which 
would be cheap enough for consumers to buy. These tasks can 
only be done sequentially.
In this model there is only one reason to invest: firms want to reach the 
end of the project, and cannot earn any profits until they do. The number 
of stages they must complete is fixed and in particular does not depend on 
the number of rival firms which are also active in the market. In these two 
respects it is simpler than the advertising game where firms eamt profits in all 
states. Moreover in the advertising game the quality of firms in the stationary 
states, those states where firms stopped, was endogenous and depended on 
the number of active firms, as well many other factors. In the exogenous 
sunk cost model the restriction that profits cover sunk costs constrains the 
number of firms the market can support in an obvious way. The simplicity 
of this incremental exogenous sunk cost model allows us to consider the pure 
effects of this constraint on market dynamics.
We first confirm that there is always an equilibrium in which exactly the 
same number of firms begin and complete the project in the incremental sunk 
cost model as enter the sunk cost model, and typically these firms have a 
strictly positive payoff overall. However, in the case where the market sup­
ports 1 firm, we also analyse a second equilibrium in which there is excess
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entry. Here 2 firms compete to remain in the market in the long run. Both 
firms initially invest, but if early on one firm falls behind, it stops investing 
and never finishes. During the competition to remain in the market both 
firms invest and hope that they complete stages faster than does their ri­
val. However, sometimes neither gets ahead of the other until both have 
completed so many stages that the cost of completing the remaining ones is 
bound to be less than the profits from producing, even if the rival produces 
as well. In this case both firms complete the project: deciding which firm 
will stay in the market through a competition to accumulate the strategic 
variable fastest leads in a natural way to the emergence of fragmented stable 
states if the competition does not produce a winner early on. We cannot say 
whether active firms converge or not if just one firm remains in the long run. 
For this reason we also analyse a particular 3-firm example in which at least 
2 always finish. Even if the finishing firms have different numbers of stages 
to complete at some point, they are bound to end up with the same number, 
i.e. none.
The incremental sunk cost model does not directly model market dynam­
ics in homogeneous goods industries, which are those industries where the 
exogenous sunk cost concentration game has been most successfully applied. 
The problem is that dynamics in the model relate to behaviour before firms 
are able to produce, whereas in the world firms will only enter our data sets 
once they are producing. In a later section we give an example which is more 
relevant for market dynamics in homogeneous goods markets.
2.3.1 The sunk cost m odel o f concentration
The profit function is taken from a simplified version of what Sutton [54, 
chapter 2] characterises as the exogenous sunk cost model of concentration.
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The market is one where firms offer an identical product and where, before 
being able to produce the good, firms must incur an unrecoverable cost a. 
Once in the market firms engage in some form of competition which generate 
profits which are a function of the number of firms in the market, n, and 
are denoted II (n). Here we assume that the final stage competition yields 
symmetric profits. The situation is modelled as a 2-stage game. In the first 
stage a large number of firms each choose whether to pay a  and enter the 
market. If n choose to do so, then in the second stage each firm receives 
II(n). These profits are discounted in the first stage by a factor 6.
“Price
Competition5
Profit II(n)Sunk cost a
Entry
Decision
Stage 1 Stage 2
Figure 2.15: The Exogenous Sunk Cost Model of Concentration
In any pure strategy equilibrium both entrants and those that stayed out 
of the market must have chosen optimally. The final stage profits must cover 
the sunk entry cost for those that did enter, but would not have done so had 
an additional firm have entered. If N(cr) is the number which enter in pure 
strategy equilibrium when the sunk cost is <r, N(a) is the largest n for which 
OT(n) > <r and firms which enter earn profits <511 (n) — a.
There are also many equilibria in mixed strategies15. For example there
15Equivalently, suppose that firms can invest in a probability of successful entry, say by 
searching for suitable premises, and that when the probability of success is p, the cost is
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is one where firms i = 1 , . . . ,  N(a) + 1  all choose a probability q* € (0,1) and 
no other firms enter with positive probability. To see this, suppose that firms 
i =  1 , . . . ,  N(cr) choose q and consider the optimal reply of firm i =  N(a) +  1. 
Each firm’s final stage payoff if it enters, net of entry cost, is (omitting the 
dependence of N  on cr):
+ E  ( I f W  -  9)N_n«n(n+1)^0 W
The definition of N(cr) implies that this is negative when q — 1 and positive 
when <7 =  0. Since the payoff is continuous in q there will exist a q* for which 
the payoff is zero and the final firm is indifferent over entering or not, and so 
entering with probability q* is a best reply. Hence all N(tt) + 1  firms entering 
with probability q* is an equilibrium. The number of firms producing in the 
final stage is a binomial random variable which will sometimes be greater 
than N(a) and sometimes less. Of course we can easily imagine repeating 
the entry stage, so that if fewer than N(a) initially entered, others would 
enter later on, but even if we added an exit stage, once too many firms had 
entered they would not exit while their final stage profit was positive (gross 
of entry cost).
Even in this trivial example we see some of the features that arose in the 
advertising game: excess entry (more firms are initially active in the market 
than produce in the long) which dissipates the rents from the pure strategy 
equilibrium, and the possibility that fragmented stable configurations can 
arise. The basic mechanism in the dynamic model we present is essentially 
the same, but the dynamic features that it gives rise to are more strongly 
drawn.
ap. There are many equilibria where firms choose interior probabilities.
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2.3.2 T he increm ental sunk cost m odel o f market dy­
namics
In the story about developing a new bicycle randomness entered the model 
through the stochastic investment function. In the incremental sunk cost 
model we investigate here, we suppose that firms either invest or not, that 
investment yields a deterministic outcome, and randomness enters through 
the choice of mixed strategies. This supposition simplifies the exposition of 
the model and results, though much would remain unchanged were we to 
interpret the model in terms of a linear, stochastic investment function.
2.3.2.1 The M odel
The model is an infinite period stochastic game [24] in discrete time between 
I  firms. Firm €s state in period i, denoted A:-, is the number of stages i has 
yet to complete before it can produce, and lies in the set k\ £ { 0 ,1 ,..., d}: 
firms produce in state 0. The industry’s state at t  fists the state of each firm,
** = (*5,... *}).
In each period firm z’s action a\ is either to invest, a\ =  1, or not, a\ =  0, 
and i receives a reward gi(kt,a ti). If k\ =  0 firm i’s only feasible action 
is to do nothing: a\ =  0. It earns profits which are non-increasing in the 
total number of producing firms. Let the number of producing firms be: 
n(A;t) =  #  {k\ =  0}i=1 7, then each earns a profit 7r (n(fcf)). In other states 
i earns no profits. It can invest in completing a stage, however, in which case 
its action is a\ =  1 and it incurs an investment cost c. Otherwise a\ = 0. To 
summarise, the reward function is:
7r (n{k1)) if k\ =  0 
—ca\ otherwise
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The evolution of each firm’s state depends on its own investment. Specif­
ically:
fc‘+1 =  k\ -  a\
Firm i ’s payoff at t is the discounted sum of rewards in all subsequent 
periods:
uti = Y iSrgi (kT,aTi )
T—t
Each firm i chooses a strategy Si(k) which specifies the probability of 
investing as a  time stationary function of the current state, i.e. strategies 
are Markov. The strategy is pure if Si(k) =  1 or 0 for all fc, and mixed 
otherwise16. We look for Markov strategies s* =  (5*(/c),. . . ,  s}(k)) which 
form a Perfect Nash Equilibrium17.
We will consider a family of incremental sunk cost models parameterised 
by the number of stages d. Suppose a firm invests in every period until it 
completes the project, and thereafter shares the market with n — 1 others. 
We require that the values of the profit and investment streams, evaluated 
at the start, be the same for all members of the family, and the same as in 
the sunk cost model. A family which satisfies this requirement, and the one 
we analyse, is:
8d = 6
^(n) ,-r/ \ / «  .X^  =  n(n) (2.4)
c a
~ 8  = ITI
16This is not standard notation, but there should be no ambiguity.
17Equilibrium in this game is identical to that in a related one where a firm’s action 
specifies the probability that its investment is successful, the firm incurs cost c o a n d  the 
firm’s state evolves according to: /c*+1 =  /cf — 1 with probability a*, and is unchanged 
otherwise.
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2.3.2.2 Results
A firm which had x  stages yet to complete and which invested in every 
period until it completed the project, and thereafter shared the market with 
ti — 1 others would get a prize worth SxTr(n)/(l — 6) and would incur costs 
c(l — 6X)/  (1 — 6 ) . Define the u(x, n) as the net payoff in this case:
6X 1 - 6 X 
«(* ,n) =  j— -  y z y c
If the firm starts at d, this gives u(d, n) =  <£Q(n) — cr, exactly what it would 
have received-if the concentration had it entered when n — 1 others did. This 
means in particular that N(<r) is the largest n  for which u(d, N(<j )) > 0. We 
will later use the properties that u(x, n) is non-increasing in n (because 7r(n) 
is non-increasing in n) and non-increasing in x. We first consider equilibrium 
in pure strategies. Here whether or not a firm finishes the project is deter­
ministic, and the number which do so is the number which the market can 
support.
Claim 1(B). Market Structure
Suppose that initially no firms had completed any stages, and so h® =  
d, \fi. Since the outcome is deterministic no firm will invest unless it fin­
ishes, otherwise it is bound to make a loss. Intuition suggests that along the 
equilibrium path those firms that finish at all will do so by investing in each 
of the first d periods, since waiting one period means that the payoff will be 
discounted. If this is so, and n firms finish, each gets a payoff u(d, n), and 
since N(a) is the largest number of firms for which this is positive, exactly 
N(cr) will finish, the same number as entered in the sunk cost model. This is 
indeed what happens in any equilibrium. What is ruled out in equilibrium is 
that, in the continuation from any state fc, one firm will eventually complete 
the project while another, which at k was closer to completion than the first
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one, will not. Essentially, if only one of two firms can profitably finish, the 
firm which is ahead can guarantee that it is the one by investing until a state 
is reached in which it would continue to invest even if the other did18.
For each state k we define a boundary distance x b(k) which is the furthest 
a firm can be from the end and still make a profit if it and all firms closer 
to the end invest fully in every period until they have completed the project. 
More formally, the largest number of firms which would be able to profitably 
complete the project, if all firms were at a distance x, is max {n | u(x, n) >  0}. 
The boundary xb(k) is the furthest distance x  from the end for which this 
number is greater than the number of firms closer than x. The only exception 
to this is when all firms would be able to profitably complete the project 
when none have yet completed any stages, i.e. when N(cr) is greater than 
the number of firms in the market, in which case xb(k) is set to d +  1, V/c. 
Formally:
,*w.
I max {x  | max {n | u(x , n) > 0} > #  {i \ ki < x}} otherwise
Result 9 I f  N(cr) > I , all firms invest in every period unless they have 
completed the project. Otherwise, in any equilibrium, if the state at time t is 
kl, the continuation satisfies the following characterisation, for all possible 
kf:
(i) all firms which are closer to the end than xb(kt) invest in every subsequent 
period until they have completed the project
(ii) i f  there are any firms at x b(kt), some or all will invest in every subsequent 
period until they have completed the project. The number which invests is the
18This sort of reasoning is familiar in the literature on patent races. In particular 
Fudenberg et al. discuss the conditions under which a firm with a small advantage can be 
sure of winning the race [23].
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smaller of all firms at the boundary, and sufficient firms to bring the total 
number of firms which complete the project, and which are at xb(kt) or closer, 
up to the largest number of firms which could profitably complete the project 
were all firms at xb(kt). In other words the number of firms at the boundary 
which invests is:
min jz | k\ < xb(kt)} ,max jn  | u(xb(kt),n) > o}} — #{z | k\ < xb(kt)} 
(Hi) no other firm invests in any subsequent period.
P r o o f :  See Appendix A.2.1 ■
We illustrate equilibrium for an example.
E xam ple 3 d =  3, /  =  2 and the signs on u(x , n) are as in Table 2.4
x
3 2 1 0
n 1 + + + +
2 — — + +
Table 2.4: The sign of u(x, n) in Example 1
Equilibrium for Example 3 is given in Figure 2.16. The Figure shows the 
state space, and arrows between states show the transitions implied by firms’ 
investment behaviour. Consider, for example, the state k =  (3,2). Recall 
that the boundary distance xb(k)^whieh is the furthest a firm can be from 
the end and still make a profit if it and all firms closer to the end invest 
fully in every period until they have completed the project. The boundary 
when k =  (3,2) must be xb(k) = 2. The boundary cannot be at 3: if the 
firm at 3 invested in every period until it completed the project, and so 
did the firm at 2, the firm at 3 would get a payoff of u(3,2), which from
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Table 2.4, is negative. However, if just the firm at 2 were to invest until 
it had completed the project, it would get u(2,1), which is positive. As a 
result, in the equilibrium path subsequent to k = (3,2), firm 2 invests for 2 
periods, while firm 1 never invests, as illustrated in Figure 2.16.
Not all strategies which satisfy Result 9 form an equilibrium, however. 
As an example, consider the strategies illustrated in Figure 2.17. The con­
tinuation from any state satisfies Result 9. Nonetheless, in state (3,3) firm 
2 can profitably deviate by investing for one period, causing the market to 
enter a state where it, rather than 1, finishes the project.
Our original concern was with the number of firms that would finish the 
project and we now turn to the equilibrium path when all firms begin with 
d stages to complete. A simple implication of Result 9 is that exactly N  (a) 
firms finish, the same number that entered the sunk cost model, and these 
earn the same profits as did entrants in the sunk cost model.
R esu lt 10 Suppose initially k f = dV i and that I  > N(a) > 0 . I n  any pure 
strategy equilibrium exactly N(cr) firms invest in each of the first d periods. 
Each of these firms has an initial value of6TL(N((T)) — <j > 0 .N o  other firms 
invest at all.
P roof: This follows straightforwardly from Result 9. The boundary 
x b(k°) is the furthest from completion a firm can be and still be 
sure of a profit if just it and all firms closer to completion invest 
in every period until they have reached the end. Since no firms 
are closer than d, and since N(a) > 0, we must have x b(k°) =  d. 
Result 9 then gives that exactly max {n | u(d, n) > 0} =  N  (cr) 
firms invest in each of the first d periods, and no other firms 
invest at all. The initial value of each of the investing firms is 
u(d, N (a )) =  SlI(N(a)) -  <r > 0 m
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o
Figure 2.16: An example of pure strategy equilibrium
3
k2
3 2 1 0
\
k2
3 2 1 0
\ \ l
Figure 2.17: An example of strategies which satisfy Result 9 but which do 
not form an equilibrium.
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This result confirms that concentration in the dynamic model is governed 
by the same need to cover entry costs as in the sunk cost model and, as in 
the sunk cost model, firms typically have positive values in pure strategy 
equilibrium.
Claims 2(B ), 3(B ), and 4(B ). Convergence in the long run, ex­
cess entry and stationary fragmented states.
Also as in the sunk cost model there are other equilibria where firms 
sometimes choose mixed strategies. The general case is hard to analyse: later 
we consider a particular 3 firm example which, amongst other things, shows 
the kinds of problem we can expect to arise in the I -firm case. Most of the 
results here will relate just to the 2-firm case where the market supports only 
1 firm. Here there is a unique symmetric equilibrium which is the same as the 
pure strategy one except in those symmetric states where, in pure strategy 
equilibrium, just one firm invests. In the symmetric equilibrium both firms 
choose mixed strategies in these states. Thus if one firm is strictly closer to 
completing the project it invests. If both firms are so close to completing 
the project that investing to the end is profitable, even if the market must 
subsequently be shared with the rival, then both invest. Finally if investing 
to the end is profitable only if the rival does not finish, firms choose mixed 
strategies.
To make the following expressions clearer we define um(x) := u(x, 1) and 
ud(x) := u(x, 2). Also denote Vs rival by j .  We are able to give the value 
function for this case, which greatly simplifies the proof that what is proposed 
is indeed an equilibrium, though the proof that it is the only symmetric one is 
just as laborious as in the pure strategy case and is relegated to an appendix.
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R esu lt 11 Suppose that N  = 1 and 1 = 2 and consider the symmetric 
strategies s*(k) and value function V(k) given by:
si W  =  0 i f  ki = 0, otherwise 
1 i fu d(ki) > 0  o rk i<  kj
i-ud(ki)/um(ki) ^  ud{ki — 1) > 0 and ki = kj
i fu d(ki — 1) < 0 and ki = kj 
otherwise
«?(*) =
l+ c /u m (fci)
0
v,(k) =
' um(ki) -  6ki (um(0) -  ud(0)) i f  ud{kj) > 0  and k i<  kj
ud(ki) i fu d(ki) > 0 and ki > kj
um(ki) i fu d(kj) < 0 and ki < kj
0 otherwise
(i) s*(k) is a perfect Nash equilibrium, and V(k) is the corresponding value 
function.
(ii) s*(k) is the unique symmetric equilibrium.
P r o o f :  For part (i) we only need to confirm that the expressions form 
a fixed point of a set of Bellman equations19 as follows. Let:
U*(k,ai) =  - a i C  (2.6)
+s*j (k ) 6V i(k i — ai? kj -  1)
+  ( l  -  S j ( k ) ) 6 V i ( k i -  a i?kj )
then the Bellman equations are, for each state and each firm:
Vi(k) = max U*(k,ai)
s*(k) € jargm ax U*{k,Oi) j  
We just give a couple of examples. First suppose ki — kj = k! and 
ud(kr — 1) < 0 . The two firms are in the same state, but if both
19Tirole gives a simple justification for the one period deviation criterion underlying this 
approach [58, Page 265].
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invested in each period until the project was complete, each would 
make a loss. According to Result 11, the only possible successor 
state in which firm i ’s value is not zero is k =  (k! — 1, k'), where 
i has completed another stage but j  has not. The value of i in 
this state is given as:
Vi( k ' - l , k ,) = um(k, - l )
The Result also gives f  s strategy as to invest with probability:
1
1 -I- c/um(kf)
Substituting into Equation 2.6:
V - « f ,*■), 1) -  - c  +  ( l  -  1 + c /^ (t,) )  « .-(«?  -  1)
and
U* ((*!,*!), 0) =  0
Since um(k') =  —c +  8 um(kf — 1) this implies that U*(k, a,) =  0 
whatever action i takes. In particular i can choose any mixed 
strategy, including the equilibrium one, and its value will be 0 as 
stated.
As a second example consider a state k =  (ki, kj) and suppose 
ud(kj) > 0 and ki < k j , so i has fewer stages left to complete, but 
both would have a positive payoff if both completed all stages. 
According to Result 11, f s  equilibrium strategy is to invest. Sub­
stituting f  s strategy and i ’s value in possible future states, as 
given in Result 11, into Equation 2.6, gives:
U*{k, 1) =  - c  +  Sum (A* -  1) -  S’* (itm(0) -  u^O))
U?(k, 0) =  8um (ki) -  S’* (um(0) -  ud(0))
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Since um(kf) = —c+6um(kf—l) and 8 < 1, U*(k,a,i) is maximised 
when di =  1. In other words, i’s optimal strategy is to invest, as 
stated in Result 11
The proof of part (ii) is the same as the proof of Result 9, except 
in those states where firms have the same state but only one 
invests in the pure strategy equilibrium. In these states firms 
choose mixed strategies. The full proof is in Appendix A.2.2. ■
Figure 2.18 illustrates the state transitions implied by the symmetric 
equilibrium strategies for Example 3 on Page 83. A full arrow indicates that 
the transition is certain, a dotted one that the transition occurs with some 
probability. Firms choose mixed strategies in two states, when both have 3
3
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h
l
o
Figure 2.18: Mixed strategy equilibrium
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and 2 stages yet to complete. The probabilities chosen in these states are:
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fc2
3 2 1 0
3 0 0 0 0
2 u( 2,1) 0 0 0
1 «(1,1) u ( l , l ) u(1,2) u(l,2 )
0 u(0 ,1) w(0,1)
it(0,2) 
+ tt(1) 
- tt(2)
ti(0,2)
Figure 2.19: Firm l ’s value function in mixed strategy equilibrium
Figure 2.19 shows the value function for firm 1. This equilibrium has the 
excess entry and the possibility of stationary fragmented states that we noted 
were features of equilibrium in the dynamic advertising game in the previous 
section. It also has convergence of firms in the long run, though in a very 
trivial sense.
C laim  3(B ). Excess E n try
In equilibrium we can see excess entry, in which both firms initially invest, 
though only one completes the project. Consider the symmetric equilibrium 
of Example 3, discussed above. With probability (s*(3,3))2 > 0 both invest 
in the first period, though the probability that both finish is less than unity. 
Denote the probability that both complete the first stage by p(3). If both 
complete this stage one of two things must happen. Either both complete 
the stage in the first period, which happens with probability (s*(3,3))2, or 
neither complete the stage in the first period, and they subsequently both 
complete the stage, which happens with probability (1 — s*(3 ,3))2 p(3). On
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rearranging this gives the probability that both firms complete the first stage 
as:
p(3) =  (si (3,3))2 +p(3) (1 — s*(3,3))2
=  •, . 2c €  (°> ! )
1 u™( 3)
Likewise the probabihty that both firms complete the second stage together, 
given that they complete the first together, is:
2ud(2) ^ 
um(2)
If both firms complete the second stage together, the state will be k =  (1,1), 
and subsequently both will certainly invest and complete the project. The 
probability that both finish is therefore p(3) • p(2) <  1.
The excess entry in this example is associated with rent dissipation: 
whereas in pure strategy equilibrium the firm which entered had an initial 
value of 611(1) — a > 0, here both firms have an initial value of 0. Excess 
entry arises as the two firms compete to be the one firm that the market 
will support. Early on a firm invests in the hope that it will become the 
only firm which completes all stages and produces: as we saw in the pure 
strategy equilibrium. Were a firm certain that its rival would finish, it would 
not invest. In the symmetric equilibrium a firm which falls behind early on 
cannot catch up to its rival, and so cannot be the sole producing firm. A 
lagging firm will therefore stop investing and fall increasingly behind, as in 
asymmetric states when at least one firm has two or more stages to complete 
in Figure 2.18.
Claim 4(B ). Stationary fragmented states
Although both firms enter in the hope that their rival exits, there is some 
probabihty that their competition never produces a winner and both finish
P( 2) =  -
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the project. This probabihty was calculated above as p(3) • p(2). Of course 
once both firms are producing they stay producing forever. We see here that 
it is possible for stationary fragmented states to arise: they are a natural 
outcome when firms compete to remain in the market by hoping to build 
up stocks of a strategic variable faster than rivals. The possibility that both 
firms finish does not just result from the fact that firms complete the project 
in a finite number of discrete stages. In the limit when the number of stages 
d is countably infinite, the probabihty that both finish is bounded away from 
zero. In order that both finish, both must complete each of the stages for 
which ud(x) is negative at the same time as its rival (since otherwise the 
lagging firm would cease investing), and so the number of events which must 
all be true gets large. However, the cost of completing each stage becomes 
very small as each stage covers less ground, and the probabihty that both 
complete a stage together tends to 1 at a rate which exactly offsets the 
increase in the number of stages.
R esu lt 12 Let 4> be the probability that both firms finish the project.
0 < hm (b
d—*oo
P r o o f :  See Appendix A.2.3 ■
Claim  2(B ). Convergence in  th e  long ru n
The symmetric equilibrium has convergence of active firms in a somewhat 
forced sense. If one firm stops investing leaving a single firm active we cannot 
say whether there is convergence or otherwise of active firms. If both com­
plete enough stages then each completes ah remaining stages no matter what 
its rival does and here we can say firms are in a convergent region. In Fig­
ure 2.18 showing equilibrium strategies in Example 1 this convergent region
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is the one where both firms have completed at least 2 stages. If k  =  (1,0) 
the lagging firm will invest and catch up. However, although in the long run 
either just one firm is active or firms are in a convergent region, firms never 
actually converge: if the initial state is k =  (3,3), k = (1,0) can never arise. 
Actual convergence here could arise only in response to unforeseen shocks or 
mistakes.
A more meaningful case of convergence in the long run is seen in an 
example where the market supports 2 firms and 3 compete to be among 
them, as in Example 2 below.
E xam ple 4 d =  2, I  =  3 and the signs on u(x,n) are as given in Table 2.5
x
2 1 0
1 + 4- +
n 2 + 4- +
3 — + 4-
Table 2.5: The sign of u(x, n) in Example 2
R esult 13 The unique symmetric equilibrium in Example 2 is given in Ta­
ble 2.6
P r o o f:  See Appendix A.2.4. ■
In the first period all firms invest with probabihty q2. If, when actions 
are realised, just one firm invests, the state next period will be k( 1,2,2). 
The leading firm is now sure that it will complete the project, and invests 
and completes the project with certainty, while the lagging firms spend time 
resolving which of them will also complete the project, and each invests with
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k s*{k)
(0 0 0) (0 0 0)
(0 1 1) (0 1 1)
(0 1 2) (0 X 0)
(0 2 2) (0 9i 9i) ® — l-u (2 ,3 )/u (2 ,2 )
(1 1 1) (1 1 1)
(1 1 2) (1 1 0)
(1 2 2) (1 9i 9i) n  —  1 Hi ~  l—ti(2,3)/u(2,2)
(2 2 2) (<?2 92 92) 0 <  q2 <  1
Table 2.6: Equilibrium strategies in Example 2
probability q\ < 1. At least one of them is bound to finish, and so to converge 
on the state of the firm which has already finished. Convergence follows 
straightforwardly from the fact that once they are sure they will remain in 
the market all firms invest until they reach the exogenously determined end 
at which they can earn profits, and so, even if a t some point finishing firms 
have different numbers of stages to complete, they are bound to end up with 
the same number of stages left, viz none.
Result 13 not only confirms that we can see firms catching up in equilib­
rium. The proof also brings to light a curious consequence of the possibility 
that stationary fragmented states can arise: a firm’s value may increase if a 
rival has fewer stages to complete. The reason is that there is some prob­
ability that two distant firms with the same number of stages to complete 
both end up finishing the project, even if a closer rival is certain to finish and 
there is only room for two firms. If one of the distant firms had fewer stages 
to complete, just it and the close firm would finish. Consider the value of 
the close firm. If the profit when two share the market is not much less than 
when one firm is producing alone, the close firm will be unconcerned that a 
rival finishes sooner if it has fewer stages to complete. However if the profits
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when three firms share the market are low, the possibility that both rivals 
may finish can have a large negative impact on the close firm’s profits. The 
proof of Result 13 confirms that the value of the close firm in state (1,2,2) 
can be lower than that in state (1,1,2). This possibility means that we need 
to confirm explicitly that at the start a firm will find it optimal to  invest if 
neither rival invests, which in this case is sufficient to confirm that firms do 
initially choose non-zero probabilities. It is this complication which makes it 
difficult to generalise the symmetric equilibrium to more than one firm.
2.4 Conclusions
All of the features of equilibrium in the incremental sunk cost model of ad­
vertising discussed in Section 2 are also features of the incremental exogenous 
sunk cost model here: a well defined market structure, convergence of firms 
in the long run, excess entry and divergence of lagging firms early on, and the 
possibility that stable fragmented states arise. In the exogenous sunk cost 
case these features are clearly consequences of two factors. First firms must 
expect to recover costs sunk in establishing themselves in the market. Their 
profits fall as the number of rivals rises, yet the amount spent on becoming 
established is fixed. The result of this is that the number of firms which 
can profitably establish themselves is restricted. Second, since costs are sunk 
incrementally and, in some equilibria, investment is stochastic, many firms 
may begin accumulating. If they are luckier than their rivals they will estab­
lish themselves in the market in the long run and make profits. If they fall 
behind early on they can stop investing without having lost too much. The 
advertising model is more complicated than this exogenous sunk cost model. 
In the advertising case there is no exogenously given end. Firms earn profits
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in all states, and the states in which firms stop net accumulation of quality, 
which we can take as states in which firms are established, are endogenous. 
The similarity of the results in the two cases however, suggests that the same 
factors dominate dynamic market behaviour in both.
Chapter 3 
Reversible Location Choice: 
Bus Deregulation in the UK
3.1 Introduction
The 1930 Road Traffic Act created a bus and coach market in which all 
aspects of service were tightly regulated. In order to run a service, an opera­
tor had to meet prescribed standards of vehicle safety and driver competence 
and, more restrictively, acquire a Road Service Licence from the Traffic Com­
missioners. A licence would only be issued if the applicant could show that 
its service was in the public interest. In practice permission would often not 
be granted if existing licence holders, or British Rail1, objected, creating a 
barrier to the entry of independent operators. Permission was also required 
for changes to fares or timetables for existing services, and again the onus 
was on the applicant to prove that such changes were in the public interest. 
Since British Rail could raise objections, this restricted the ability of the
1Or, prior to 1948, the various railway companies.
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incumbents themselves to compete effectively against rail.
The 1980 Transport Act abolished the need for operators to obtain a Road 
Service Licence for express services (defined as those carrying passengers a 
minimum distance of 30 miles in a straight line), thereby allowing entrants to 
compete against what had effectively been the protected monopoly incum­
bent, National Express, a marketing arm of the publicly owned National Bus 
Company. Since the Act, operators of express services have simply needed 
to notify the Traffic Commissioners 28 days before starting a new service. 
The 1985 Transport Act which followed privatised the incumbent operators 
of express coaches, and deregulated the local bus markets. Subsequent to 
the Act an operator needed only to register its timetable and satisfy basic 
safety requirements in order to run a local bus service. The main remaining 
restriction was that the Traffic Commissioners had to be notified of all new 
services, and changes to existing services, 42 days in advance.
A survey of the secondary literature discussing the effects of these Acts 
suggests that while some effects are common to both local bus and express 
coach markets, for example both have emerged with a surprisingly concen­
trated market structure, there are also some striking differences. When com­
paring conditions in those urban local bus markets in which there was com­
petition with the situation prior to deregulation, or to those areas where one 
operator was dominant, observers have found that there was little, if any, fall 
in price, and that the frequency with which timetables were revised was very 
high. With express coaches on the other hand, when there was competition 
on the road then observers found a marked reduction in prices, and they 
made no mention of timetable instability.
This paper puts forward the hypothesis that these two differences in the 
effects of competition stem from a basic difference in passenger behaviour.
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Passengers boarding express coaches know the timetable, indeed they often 
book their trip in advance, and they arrive at the terminal in time to board 
their most preferred coach. In the local bus markets where the instability 
and high fares are most marked, the metropolitan areas where bus frequencies 
are particularly high, passengers intending to travel by bus arrive at the stop 
independently of bus arrival times and wait for a bus to arrive. They may 
have some idea about what fare they expect to pay, and how long they expect 
to wait, but they do not know the exact arrival times.
The paper constructs simple models of a local urban bus market and 
an express coach market which embody these contrasting assumptions on 
passenger behaviour. There are two main results. First, arrival times change 
from day to day when there are two competing operators in a local bus 
market. If it is costly to revise the timetable, the later bus is the more likely 
to change arrival time, and so choose a time just before the early bus. One 
consequence of this is that bus arrival times tend to be bunched together. 
Competition is vital to this result: if all buses are nm  by a single firm, arrival 
times are never changed between periods. The reason for the instability is 
straightforward. Neither operator will stick to a fixed timetable. If it did its 
rival would start to arrive just before it and would take all the passengers.
Turning to the fare level set by buses, we show that in the express coach 
market fares are lower when there are two firms rather than one. In stark 
contrast the paper presents an example model of a local bus market in which 
competing firms charge a higher price than would a monopolist. If one firm 
lowers its fare more passengers will decide to travel by bus. However, since 
they arrive at the stop independently of the arrival times of the buses, and 
then board the next bus, only some will board the bus which lowered its fare; 
the rest will board its rival. If all buses were operated by a single firm, that
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firm would gain all the additional passengers that made journeys as a result 
of a fall in fares. The monopolist therefore has a greater incentive to cut 
fares than a duopolist does.
3.2 Bus Deregulation: the Stylised Facts
3.2.1 Local Buses
In 1995 the select committee on transport produced a report on the effects 
of bus deregulation [8]. Among the many issues raised by the committee are 
four relating to the impact of competition between buses, operating the same 
route, on the performance of the market; on the stability of the timetable, 
on fare levels, on the frequency of service, and on the quality of buses used.2
It is clear from the report that the frequency with which bus timetables 
are updated is a considerable source of irritation to bus users, and that this 
instability is a feature of on-the-road competition. The rise in timetable in­
stability was the first point raised by the National Federation of Bus Users 
(NFBU) in its evidence to the committee and the Road Traffic Commissioners 
agreed that this was the problem which was of most concern to passengers.
2There are many other issues raised in the report, which we do not discuss here. For 
example, rival bus operators on the same network do not always allow through ticketing. 
The committee spent a lot of time considering whether or not bus markets are contestable, 
the issue which dominated the theoretical debate while the 1985 legislation was being 
drawn up, and which is relevant to the policy question of whether the government should 
view consolidation in the industry with equanimity. Another feature of the deregulated 
market which had surprised observers is the relative failure of high quality minibus services 
to develop alongside full size bus services. Such differentiated markets are common in 
South East Asia. The committee also considered the vexed question of whether or not 
there has been predation in local buses.
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Indeed those Commissioners questioned by the committee would have liked 
powers to restrict the frequency with which changes to the timetable could 
be made. In many places the cost of keeping passengers informed about 
timetables is borne by the local authority and those councillors from the 
metropolitan areas, where on-the-road competition is most common, testi­
fied to the committee that the frequent timetable changes were very expensive 
to them. Councillor McLellan from Strathclyde, where four large operators 
and numerous small ones competed, testified that whereas before deregula­
tion timetables were produced at 3 or 6 month intervals, since deregulation 
5 timetable changes had been notified to the Strathclyde Traffic Commis­
sioners every working day. The NFBU observed that frequent changes to 
the timetable are associated with another feature: bus departure times tend 
to be bunched together, and they added that two operators running practi­
cally identical timetables hardly increased customer choice. In its final report 
the committee made a similar point, stating that entrants into bus markets 
typically registered times just before those of the incumbents.
There is anecdotal evidence from previous periods of unregulated bus 
services of similar behaviour. Glaister, in his evidence to the committee, cites 
the example of the horse bus Associations in 19th century London, which had 
to make great efforts to enforce service regularity on their members in order 
not to alienate their passengers. Another example is given by Chester [7]3 
in a book written 6 years after the 1930 Act which first introduced some 
control into London’s bus markets. There he described the ills of “unfettered 
competition” , and argued that such competition means
the running of vehicles to a regular timetable will become impos­
sible.
3Cited by Mackie & Preston [41]
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A number of witnesses to the select committee commented that fares in 
the deregulated bus industry have not fallen, as might have been expected, 
but have risen(for example see Glaister’s evidence). In a recent book on the 
effect of deregulation on the local bus market Mackie &; Preston [41], using 
data supplied by the Department of Transport, confirm the rises in fares 
and give the following table comparing the rise between metropolitan and 
shire counties. On-the-road competition is more common in metropolitan
Fares
English metropolitan counties +49 
English shires +8.8
Table 3.1: %change 1985/86 - 1993/94
areas, so that the fare increases are greatest where competition is greatest. 
Both Glaister and the NFBU, in their evience to the select committee, noted 
that fares have been affected not just by the changes in entry conditions, 
but also by other changes in market conditions; the removal of subsidies 
at the time of deregulation and subsequent increases in the duty on diesel. 
However, the evidence from previous periods of unregulated competition in 
local buses supports the view that competition does not result in low fares. 
Barker &; Robbins, in their “History of London Transport” [2] discuss the 
fierce competition on London’s roads in the 1920’s and note that:
Perhaps the most interesting feature of the bus competition... 
is the fact that there was very little attempt at competition in 
fares..
Instead of cutting fares, various commentators have noted that competing 
local bus operators put on more buses, leading to very low bus loads and a 
great deal of city congestion.
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A  central concern of the Select Committee was safety, and in particular 
whether there was adequate investment in new buses. This concern can be 
seen as part of the wider question of the impact of deregulation on the quality 
of service. In much of the existing literature on bus deregulation, quality was 
identified with service frequency [14]. However, the actual behaviour in the 
deregulated markets suggests that service frequency and bus quality behave 
differently. Frequency has been mentioned earlier; here we just consider bus 
and service quality. There seems to be a basic disagreement about the effects 
of competition on the quality of service. On the one hand in MMC report 
Cm2423 we find
competition and potential competition, in our view, are the main 
safeguards against ... lower services.
And on the other hand the view of the NFBU, given in its evidence to 
the select committee [8], is that
on the whole, competition is wasteful. Bristol, with a dominant 
operator, probably has the best service...
a view which White endorses in his evidence.
Looking specifically at the issue of investment in new buses, much of the 
evidence suggested that investment was highest where on-the-road competi­
tion was absent. The NFBU noted that the lack of modem buses is most 
marked in Sheffield and Manchester, where competition is very fierce, and 
Glaister pointed out that the original 1930’s legislation introducing regula­
tion was brought in specifically to create barriers to entry in order to improve 
the then poor safety standards4. A dissenting voice is that of Norris, then a
4It should be noted that this poor record was due in part to bad behaviour by drivers, 
and not just to inadequate maintenance.
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junior Minister for Transport. He claims that there is no evidence that new 
buses are only being bought by de facto monopolies. Finally, White considers 
a wider notion of quality and notes that service innovation has occurred in 
areas of relatively little inter-operator competition, and has probably arisen 
as bus companies compete against other methods of transport, such as walk­
ing or the car, rather than competing with other operators. In summary, the 
majority view seems to be that quality is higher when there is no competi­
tion.
3.2.2 Express Coaches
One of the purposes behind the 1980 legislation was to introduce institu­
tional changes that would lead to improvements in transport services [11] and 
it does seem that since 1980 there have been significant changes to prices, 
quality, frequency and the coverage of the coach network, and these changes 
have on the whole benefited passengers. Deregulation has led to changes 
in both the level and structure of prices. The structures of concessionary 
fares and of different types of ticket available from National Express have 
seen changes that Thompson &; Whitfield [57] characterise as making prices 
simpler and more customer friendly. Price levels have also changed: they 
have fallen. The initial fall was dramatic, and even though prices began to 
rise again from 1982 onwards, in 1990 they remained below the 1980 levels 
in real terms [57]. Prices could have fallen for a number of reasons, among 
th^n) that the pre-deregulated prices were higher than even a protected mo­
nopolist would want, that coaches were trying to take market share from 
rail, that operators kept prices low so as not to attract entry, or that low 
prices resulted from competition between operators. Of course all of these, 
and other, mechanisms could have contributed something to the fall in prices,
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and various writers, particularly Thompson and his co-authors [57] [36], have 
attempted to disentangle their effects. The main conclusion to emerge from 
this work is that the fall in prices is greater when there is actual competition.
As well as its effects on prices, deregulation led to a dramatic increase 
in frequencies on routes, and an extension of the coach network. Before the 
1980 Act the coach network had been declining [3], yet 4 years after the Act 
Barton & Everest [3] found that an extra 48 million vehicle kms were being 
operated by new express services. The frequency of services has also seen 
important changes. Although Robbins & White [49] found, in 1986, that 
frequencies had fallen on some minor provincial routes, frequencies have on 
the whole seen dramatic increases. Thompson & Whitfield [57] examined how 
the frequency rise depended on the amount and success of entry. They found 
that frequencies rose by over 700% on routes within Scotland, where entry 
was most successful, whereas on UK trunk routes, where National Express 
has maintained dominance, frequency rose by just 179%. The picture is not 
entirely clear, but it does seem that competition pushes frequencies up.
There have been a number of innovations in the type of service offered, 
including a large expansion of airport linked services, and the introduction of 
luxury services offering such facilities as videos, refreshments, hostesses and 
the like [11]. Many of these innovations were introduced first by entrants, and 
indeed those entrants which did survive often did so by offering upmarket 
services [57]. Journey times, another indicator of passenger convenience, have 
also fallen [57].
Thus far the behaviour of deregulated express coach markets is roughly in 
line with what was expected: removing barriers to entry and allowing oper­
ators to compete against British Rail led to lower prices, higher quality (and 
vertically differentiated products) and more travel. However, the market has
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provided one major surprise. It was widely expected that the dominance of 
National Express would dissolve on deregulation [11], yet despite an initially 
high rate of entry it has remained dom inant, and has thrived.
3.2.3 Com paring Local Buses and Express Coaches
Some effects are common to both markets, most notably that both have 
emerged with a surprisingly concentrated market structure, and that in 
both cases, when operators competed on the road, then the number of 
buses/coaches rose dramatically. There are also some striking differences. 
Briefly, when comparing conditions in those urban local bus markets in which 
there was competition with the situation prior to deregulation, or to those 
areas where one operator was dominant, observers have found that there was 
little, if any, fall in price, that buses were old and badly maintained, that, 
despite the prediction of many writers that deregulation would lead to the ap­
pearance of services of differing qualities, no vertical differentiation emerged, 
and that there was a very considerable amount of timetable instability. With 
express coaches on the other hand, when there was competition on the road 
then observers found a marked reduction in prices, they made no mention of 
timetable instability, or of a fall in the cleanliness and newness of coaches, 
and they commented that entrants often introduced higher quality services 
than those of the incumbent, although in some cases the incumbent itself 
offered a differentiated service, even in the absence of competitors.
Two particularly striking and clear cut differences in the effects of on 
the road competition between urban local buses and express coaches stand 
out from this summary: first, competition leads to substantial instability in 
the arrival times of local buses, but not of express coaches, and second that 
prices remain surprisingly high under competition in local bus markets, but
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fall markedly when express coaches compete. The rest of this paper seeks to 
support the hypothesis that both differences arise from the same difference 
in passenger behaviour between the two markets. Before turning to this 
hypothesis a few words are in order to clarify the phenomena the paper seeks 
to explain.
It is clear what is meant by timetable instability: it arises when operators 
frequently change the arrival times of their buses. However, there are different 
senses in which buses could be bunched. It seems clear that congestion and 
random variations in journey times can cause buses to bunch together, even 
if their published arrival times at a stop are well spaced. Also, bus arrivals 
may be concentrated at particular times of the day simply because there 
are peaks in demand. This chapter will be concerned with neither of these 
types of bunching. Rather it will seek to explain the kind of bunching which 
the NFBU complained of when it pointed out that two operators running 
timetables which were almost identical, for example where both ran an hourly 
service, with one arriving on the hour and one arriving 5 minutes past, hardly 
increased passenger choice.
3.3 Explaining the Differences
There are some similarities in the impact of competition on market perfor­
mance between express coaches and local buses. In both cases competition 
is associated with higher frequency, though this is perhaps more marked in 
local buses, and in both the level of concentration is surprisingly high. There 
are also some differences between the two markets. Competition is associ­
ated with frequent changes to the timetable on local bus, but not express 
coach, routes, and competition leads to reduced fares on express coach, but
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not local bus, routes. There is also a difference in the impact of competition 
on the quality of bus services. Competition in local bus markets seems to 
reduce the quality of buses used, while competition on express coach routes 
leads to innovation and improved service. Timetable instability, high fares 
and low quality buses are particularly marked features of local bus routes in 
metropolitan areas and for the rest of the chapter we focus on high density 
urban local bus routes.
This paper puts forward the hypothesis that these differences arise from 
a basic difference in passenger behaviour. On the one hand the time at 
which passengers on urban local bus routes arrive at the stop is taken to be 
independent of the arrival times of buses, while on the other hand passengers 
on express coach routes are assumed to arrive just in time to board their 
most preferred coach.
The assumption that on urban local bus routes passengers arrive at a 
bus stop independently of the arrival time of buses has independent support. 
Savage [52] cites work on passenger waiting times in Greater Manchester. It 
was found that when the intervals between buses are comparatively short 
there is a random element in the arrival patterns of potential passengers at 
stops, so that as frequency increases the average waiting time falls. In fact 
if the intervals are less than around 12 minutes, then arrivals become totally 
random. Savage in his own empirical work on competition on selected bus 
routes assumes that a bus arriving just before its rival will get all the mar­
ket. This behaviour on the part of passengers has also been put forward by 
others as important to understanding the effect of competition on timetable 
stability and low reductions in fares on local bus routes. Chester, who, as we 
saw above, argued that ‘unfettered competition’ on local bus routes would 
undermine regular timetables [7] went on to give the reason for this as that
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if any operator fixed definite times, rival operators will seek to 
reach stopping places a few minutes earlier and take the traffic.
Despite the obvious appeal of this mechanism, early attempts to formally 
model timetable instability were structured so as to exclude the mechanism’s 
operation. Foster &; Golay [22] used a Hotelling framework in which passen­
gers have an ideal departure time. One component of the cost of making 
a journey is an item which increases as the difference between the actual 
departure time and the ideal gets larger. To the passenger it is unimportant 
whether a  bus arrives before or after its ideal time. It follows that the benefit 
to be gained by pre-empting the rival is offset by the loss incurred as a result 
of the increased separation from the preceding service. They identify insta­
bility with lack of equilibrium, and since an equilibrium does exist in this 
location model5, they conclude that there will not be instability. Subsequent 
work on the choice of arrival time has used a similar framework6. A slightly 
different perspective on timetable choice is provided by Glaister in his evi­
dence to the Select Committee. He suggests that irregularity arises because 
there are revenue benefits from service regularity which are external to the 
individual operator but internal to the market as a whole. Presumably there 
is a market benefit because demand is higher for a regular service, and this
5The authors assume sequential entry. Moreover in proving the existence of equilibrium 
the authors rely on the modified zero conjectural variation introduced in Novshek [44], so 
that they do not show that a pure strategy Nash Equilibrium necessarily exists. Their 
result can be seen as part of the debate about the conditions under which a pure strategy 
Nash Equilibrium exists in Hotelling location games, when firms choose both price and 
location. d’Asprement et al [10] pointed out that when transport costs are linear there 
is not neccessarily a pure strategy price equilibium when locations are too close together, 
but there is an equilibrium when costs are quadratic.
6See the papers by Foster &; Golay [22], Evans [19], Dodgson et al [15], [16].
1 1 0 CHAPTER 3. REVERSIBLE LOCATION CHOICE:
demand benefits all operators, not just the one whose choice of timetable 
led to a more stable and regularly spaced service. This observation will only 
imply an underprovision of regularity, however, if there is a private gain to 
creating irregularity. Glaister leaves the source of this gain unexplained.
The hypothesis examined in this chapter is that timetables are unstable 
when there is competition on local bus routes for exactly the reason set out by 
Chester. The formal model we consider also predicts that bus arrivals will 
be bunched together. The select committee concluded that this bunching 
did occur on local bus routes. Finally, the model predicts that the operator 
most likely to update its timetable is the one whose buses currently collect 
least passengers. Many witnesses7 testified to the select committee that 
passengers on high density bus routes take the first bus to arrive, regardless 
of price differentials, and that this undermines attempts by bus operators 
to win market share through cuts in fares. This explanation was also put 
forward by Mackie & Preston [41] as a reason why fares remained so high. 
Many go on to note that competition on local bus routes focuses on being 
first rather than cheapest, and as a consequence operators put many buses 
on a route.
This chapter explores the fares set on local bus routes. Passenger be­
haviour in the model we develop has two important features: passengers ar­
rive at the stop independently of bus arrival times, and passengers will board 
the first bus to arrive even if its fare is a little higher than that charged on 
the next bus. We show that when passenger behaviour has these features, 
not only is the incentive to cut fares reduced, competition between two op­
erators can lead to higher fares than a monopolist would set. The reason for 
this is two-fold. First, as noted by previous commentators, if a bus company
7See the evidence of White and the TGWU
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cuts its fares it does not increase its share of passengers. However, the the 
number of passengers which make bus journeys will increase. Some of these 
additional passengers will board the rival bus, giving a positive externality 
which leads to under-investment in fare reductions.
The reasons put forward in the Select Committee report to explain why 
investment in new buses is low when there is competition rely on financial 
constraints: essentially the profits which firms earn when there is competition 
are too low to cover the investment costs. However, in the concluding section 
of the chapter we suggest that when passengers board the first bus to arrive 
competition will lead to under-provion of investment in much the same way 
as it leads to under-provision of fare reductions.
3.4 T im etable Instability and Bunching
3.4.1 Local Buses
In the model in this section frequent changes to the timetable are a natural 
result of on-the-road competition when passengers arrive evenly throughout 
the day and board the first bus to arrive. This behaviour means that two 
competing operators running alternate buses will try  to  schedule their buses 
to arrive as late as possible after their rival’s, as the later after one bus 
the next one arrives, the more passengers will be waiting. Both operators 
cannot simultaneously choose arrival times just before those of its rival. Each 
operator will keep its rival guessing as to its arrival time since, if it chose any 
time with certainty, its rival would arrive just before it and leave it with no 
passengers.
That each bus operator will keep its rival guessing would, on its own, 
induce bus operators to choose all possible arrival times with equal probabil­
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ity. We also assume, however, that there is a cost to revising the timetable. 
This is in fact likely to be the case. Timetable changes must be registered, 
giving rise to at least some administrative costs. Other costs arise from the 
managerial time needed to decide on a change, and on the form of the new 
timetable. Moreover, since timetables do not come into effect until 42 days 
after initial registration, deciding on a change will involve planning and re­
search into the rival’s planned actions. The cost has a striking effect on the 
pattern of timetable changes: the bus operator whose bus, yesterday, arrived 
just before its rival’s, and so had most passengers, is more likely not to revise 
its timetable today at all, while the other is more likely to change so that its 
buses arrive just before the time its rival’s arrived yesterday. The tendency 
is for buses to leapfrog each other in order to arrive earlier and earlier. One 
result of this behaviour is that bus arrivals tend to be bunched together as 
each bus operator, if it revises its timetable at all, will choose a new time 
just before its rival’s old one.
The model is highly stylised in order to draw out the effects on timetable 
stability of the twin assumptions that passengers board the first bus to arrive, 
and timetable revision is costly. In particular we do not endogenise passenger 
boarding behaviour, it is just taken as a primitive of the model. Also we will 
treat a day as circular in order to focus attention purely on the question of 
whether firms want their buses to arrive before or after those of their rivals, 
without the complications caused by end effects.
We first give a simple discrete example which shows instability, bunch­
ing and leapfrogging. The full continuous model draws out the underlying 
mechanisms more clearly.
As in the earlier work on timetable choice, instability in the model here 
will arise when a pure strategy equilibrium does not exist. However, the
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lack of such an equilibrium here is more fundamental than that discussed 
in early formulations of the Hotelling location game. In those cases the 
lack of equilibrium arose because of problems in optimal pricing when firms 
were located too close to each other, and the problem could be resolved 
through a suitable choice of cost function8. Here there is no pricing problem. 
Instability results directly from a lack of pure strategy equilibrium in the 
choice of location.
3.4.1.1 An Example
Two buses, A  and B, compete to pick up passengers during each of an infinite 
number of days. Each day has 4 minutes arranged around a circle, so that 
minute 3 is just before minute 0. Figure 3.1 illustrates a day.
0 1
• ---------------- •
• ----------------•
3 2
Figure 3.1: A day
In period t  bus z, i = A, B , picks an arrival time a*, a\ G {0 , . . . ,  3}. The 
state in period t, denoted k1, is the arrival times of buses in the previous 
period, kl =  al~l =  (a^-1, ^ 1).
One unit of passengers arrive every minute and if a bus arrives in the 
same minute they board it, otherwise they board the first bus to arrive. Two 
buses arriving at the same time share the waiting passengers equally.
8See Footnote 5.
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A bus gets a gross profit of 1 for every unit of passengers which board. 
Let 7Ti(aAi aB) be the gross payoff of bus i when arrival times are a a , aB. 
The complete gross profit matrix is given in Table 3.2 which shows the pair 
7Tj4, 7tb for each possible combination of arrival times.
aB
0 2 2
CO 1 2 2 1
CO
aA 1 1 3 2 2 3 1 2 2
2 2 2 1 3 2 2 3 1
CO 3 1 2 2 1 3 2 2
Table 3.2: Table of values of tta, kb
Buses also incur a cost of c if they revise their timetable. Let Ci(a*) be 
the cost bus i pays if it arrives at a\ in period t. Then:
C M )  =
0 iial = kt 
c otherwise
For simplicity we assume that each bus i is myopic: it seeks only to 
maximise the expected current profit net of any revision cost. However, we 
will see that this assumption is not as restrictive as it appears: even if buses 
maximised the sum of discounted future net profits the equilibrium strategies 
would be the same as the ones we find here. The problem is essentially a 
one period one (though the past influences the present through the state) 
and we now drop the time superscript. A strategy for bus i, denoted 
specifies the probability that i chooses each arrival time, so that S j ( r a )  is the 
probability that a* =  m. Strategies can be conditioned on the state, but on 
nothing else. In any equilibrium s* = (s*A, s*B) any arrival time chosen with 
positive probability must maximise expected profit net of cost, given the 
rival’s strategy, i.e. if s*(m) > 0 then m  maximises E  n (m, a,j) — C(m) \ .
3.4. TIMETABLE INSTABILITY AND BUNCHING 115
It is easy to see that if the revision cost is less than 1 firms will never 
choose a pure strategy in equilibrium, no matter what the state. Suppose A  
arrived in minute 0 with certainty. If B  arrived at 3 it would collect 3 units 
of passengers, and pay a maximum cost of c, giving a net profit of more than 
2. If B  arrived at any other time it could collect at most 2 units, and so 
it will certainly arrive at 3. But if £  is arriving at 3, A  does best to arrive 
just before at 2, and so on. When c <  1 the only equilibrium is in mixed 
strategies. Each bus randomises to keep its rival guessing as to exactly when 
it will arrive. Equilibrium strategies are shown in Tables 3.3 and 3.4 below.
ks 4 (0 )  4 (1 )  4 (2 )  4 (3 )
0 1_ _ _1 _ c c
1 1 1 c 1 c2 _r 4 2 4
2 2 c 1 _ c _
3 3 c 1 I c 2 4 2 4
Table 3.3: A’s equilibrium strategy
ks 5b (0) 5js(1) 5n(2) sb $ )
0 i _ 1 _ c c
1 1 c2 4 -  1 4- -2 4
2 1_ _ c _ 1 c o o
3 1 c2 4 1 +  C2 4
Table 3.4: £ ’s equilibrium strategy
In both tables we assume that A  arrived in minute 0 yesterday, i.e. kA =  0. 
The state is therefore summarised just by fcjg. We can always ensure that 
kA = 0 simply by relabelling the minutes at the start of the current period.
Before examining what these strategies imply for the pattern of timetable 
revisions, we first confirm that they do form an equilibrium. To do this we 
need just show that each firm only chooses an arrival time with positive 
probability if arriving at that time maximises its expected net profit given
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its rival’s strategy. Table 3.5 sets out the expected net profit of A  when B  
plays the strategy given in Table 3.4. Denote A’s expected profit when it 
arrives at m  and B  plays s*B by 11  ^(m). It is clear by inspection that, given
fcb  n A(o) r u (i)  nu(2) ru(3)
n  o c o 3 c o c  o c0 2 — £  2 -  #  2 — £ 2 — £ 2 2 2 2
1 2 - f  2 — c 2 - f  2 — c
to e) C e\ C ry C c\ 3c z 2 Z 2 Z 2  ^ 2CO 2 - f  2  — c  2 - f  2 — c
Table 3.5: A s expected profit, given sB
the state kB, the strategy given in Table 3.3 only assigns positive probability 
to those arrival times which maximise A’s expected profit. A similar table to 
Table 3.5 could readily be found for B  and this would show that the strategy 
given in Table 3.4 likewise only assigns positive probability to those arrival 
times which maximise B ’s expected profit. This confirms that Tables 3.3 
and 3.4 do specify an equilibrium in mixed strategies. Moreover this is the 
only equilibrium when 0 < c < 1, though to check this requires an exhaustive 
search of other possibilities and the results of this search are not repeated 
here. One final general feature of the equilibrium is that a bus operator’s 
expected net profits do not depend on the state: they are always 2 — c/2. 
Since the current period can only affect the future through the state, this 
means that the current period has no effect on future net profits and firms 
would not change their behaviour if they were not myopic9.
Turning to the implications of these equilibrium strategies for the pattern 
of timetable revision, the case that is of particular interest is when the buses 
arrived in two successive minutes yesterday, so either kB =  1 if B  arrived just
9Suppose buses maximise the discounted sum of net profits, the discount rate is 6 and 
the revision cost cS, then there is a perfect eqilibrium in which strategies are identical to 
those found here.
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after A, or kB =  3 if it arrived just before. The strategies of the two buses are 
shown diagrammatically in Figure 3.2 for the case where kB = 1. According
0.7 -
0.3 -
-  0.7
-  0.3
Figure 3.2: Strategies when kB = 1 and c =  4/5
to equilibrium strategies either A  arrives at a particular time with positive 
probability, or B  does, but not both. In the Figure there is a bar at each 
minute whose height is proportional to the probability that a bus arrives at 
that minute: if it is bus A  the bar has vertical stripes, if B  horizontal. We 
assume that c =  4/5.
The reason why this case is the most important is that whatever the 
actual realisations of firms’ random strategies, they will never arrive at the 
same time, and neither will they arrive evenly spaced: if buses arrived one 
after the other in the previous day, they are bound to arrive one after the 
other in the current day, and so in all future days. When kB = 0 or 2, the 
only other possible cases, firms randomise over three possible arrival times, 
and so with positive probability arrive one after the other in the current day, 
and if not in the current day, then with positive probability in the next day,
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and so on. In the long run, buses will always arrive one after the other every 
day. This phenomenon resembles the bunching of bus arrivals that many 
commentators have noted is a feature of deregulated local bus markets.
In the long run not only do buses always arrive one after the other, but we 
see a tendency for buses to leapfrog each other backwards round the day. In 
Figure 3.2 bus A, which arrived just before B  and collected most passengers 
yesterday, was most likely to arrive at the same time today, whereas B  was 
most likely to revise its timetable in order to arrive just before A s arrival 
time yesterday. The continuous time model in the next section explores the 
mechanisms underlying this leapfrogging and bunching more fully.
3.4.1.2 The M odel
Two buses, A  and B, compete to pick up passengers during each of an infinite 
number of days. Each day has length 1, and is circular, with later times being 
further clockwise round the circle. In each period t  each bus z, i =  A, B, picks 
an arrival time aj, a\ G (0,1]. At the start of period t  all times are relabelled 
so that A s arrival time in period t — 1 is at 0, which just has the effect that 
all times in t are measured in terms of minutes later than A s  arrival time 
in the previous period. The state in period t, denoted kf, is the (relabelled) 
arrival time of B  in the previous period. We will assume henceforth that A  
arrived ‘before’ B  in the sense that k < 1/2. By symmetry, this is without 
loss of generality.
Passengers arrive at a uniform rate throughout the day, with a total mass 
of 1 per day, and board the first bus to arrive after they do, unless both 
arrive at the same moment, in which case half board each bus.
A bus gets a gross profit in the day equal to the mass of passengers which 
boards and the mass boarding a bus is just the minutes after the previous
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bus that this bus arrives. Let 'Ki (atA,a tB) be the gross profit of bus i when 
arrival times are a^, alB. Then:
if atA > a %  
if a \  =  a%*A(atA,a tB) = < 1/2
1 +  (aA ~  a t)) ^  aA <  aB\
and similarly for 7rB .
If buses must pay when they update their timetable different arrival times 
will entail different costs. Denote the updating cost incurred by i should it 
arrive at x  when the state is k by Ci(x, k).
We assume that buses are myopic and seek only to maximise the ex­
pected current profit net of any revision cost. The problem is essentially a 
one period one (the past is summarised by the state), and we now drop the 
time superscripts. We restrict attention to Markov strategies which depend 
only on the state. A pure strategy for bus i is a function Si(k) which gives 
the arrival time chosen when the state is k. A  mixed strategy is a distribu­
tion function Fi(x, k) which gives the probability of arriving in the interval 
[0,x]. We consider Nash Equlibria where each bus chooses a strategy which 
maximises its expected net profit given the strategy chosen by its rival.
The first point is that for updating costs sufficiently low there is no equi­
librium in pure strategies. Consider the extreme case where the updating 
cost is everywhere zero. In this case the state does not affect current payoffs 
and Markov strategies will not depend on it. The best reply function is not 
even defined here. If B  chooses sB =  clb, A  will maximise the profit from 
boarding passengers by arriving as late as possible while still arriving before 
aB, i.e. by setting its arrival time as the largest aA such that aA <  aB. 
When time is continuous there is no aA which satisfies this. However, even 
without this technical problem there would be no equilibrium in pure strate­
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gies. Consider whether an ^-equilibrium (sa>*b ) exists, where if j  arrives at 
5*,no arrival time gives i a payoff of e more than ^(s*), for an arbitrarily 
small e. No such ^-equilibrium exists. To see why, simply note that in any 
^-equilibrium A  will arrive no more than e minutes before B, and B  will 
arrive no more than e minutes before A. When e is small, these conditions 
cannot both be met.
From now on we will consider only mixed strategies. Denote the average 
arrival time of bus i by a*. Let Eh (a;, Fj) be the expected gross profit of bus 
% when it arrives at x  and its rival’s strategy is Fj. This will be given by:
Ili(a:, Fj) =  lim [a; — (dj\aj <  a;)] Fj(x — e)
+  [1 +  x -  { f l j |CLj > x)] (1 -  Fj(x))
+ \  (Fj(x) -  F3(x -  e))
Let lim€_o (Fj(x) — Fj(x — e)) = Pr^ (x) (this will be zero when there is no 
atom in the distribution at x). Then:
n i( i, Fj) =  [ x -  {aj\a,j < x)] (Fj(x) -  Pr j(x))
+ [1 +  x  — {a.j\a.j > x)] (1 — Fj(x))
+  [x — (Sj|a.j =  x)] Pr j(x)
+ \ P i j ( x )
which rearranges to:
II i(x, Fj) = l -  a j + x -  Fj(x) +  |  Pr j(a?) (3.1)
Using these expressions we first find equilibrium when timetable revision is 
costless.
When there is no cost to revising the timetable, so that in the absence of
other considerations all arrival times are equally attractive, there is an equi­
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librium in which both operators choose arrival times according to a uniform 
probability distribution:
F*(x) = x , i  = A , B
To confirm that these strategies do form an equilibrium, substitute into the 
expression for expected profit above to give:
n*(x,F/) = 1/2 Var, i = A ,B
Since, when its rival chooses arrival times according to a uniform distribution 
over all times, an operator earns the same expected profit no matter what 
time it chooses, it is indifferent over all possible strategies, including arriv­
ing according to a uniform distribution. Here we see a radical instability in 
the timetable. Buses choose any arrival time with equal probability, inde­
pendently of their rival’s or their own previous arrival time. This instability 
arises from the desire on the part of both buses to arrive just before their 
rival, when there will be many passengers waiting at the stop.
Once we assume that it is costly to adjust the timetable more structure 
on the probability distribution chosen by firms emerges.
For technical reasons we assume that the cost of choosing different arrival 
times changes continuously. In particular we assume that if the arrival time 
is the same as in the last period there is no updating cost, and that the 
cost rises linearly at a rate m with the absolute change in the arrival time 
until a maximum updating cost of c is reached, at which point the updating 
cost remains constant. When m  is large this function will approximate the 
situation where a firm pays c for every arrival time except that at which it 
arrived in the previous period, for which it pays nothing, and henceforth we
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assume m  > 1. The updating cost functions are:
mx if x  € [0, c/m]
CU(x, k) =  < c if x € [c/m, 1 — c/m] (3.2)
CB(x,k) =  <
m (l —x) if x € [1 — c/m, 1)
c if x € [0, fc — c/m]
m(/c — x) if x € [fc — c/m, k]
(3-3)
m(x — fc) if x 6 [&, A: +  c/m] 
c if x € [fc +  c/m, 1)
An example of these costs are illustrated in Figure 3.3 below. In writing and 
illustrating CB(x,k)  we have assumed that the interval between bus arrivals 
in the previous period, k , was not too small, specifically that k > c/m. In 
the limit where m —*• oo this will almost always be true, but in any case what 
is at issue is notation rather than results. Looking at the illustration of CB in 
the second panel of Figure 3.3, note that the circular day has been mapped 
to a line in the diagrams by cutting it at the point where 1 and 0 meet up and 
placing 0 at one end and 1 at the other. If k < c/m  the diagram is essentially 
the same, but the two ends of the fine will he in a region where the updating 
cost is less than c. The exact expression for CB would differ from the one 
given in Equation 3.3, though the function is, in essence, the same. We will 
ignore this notational complication in what follows. The reader should be 
able to construct the exact expressions relevant to the case k < c/m  from 
the results that follow.
Now that the cost of arrival times varies, there can no longer be a com­
pletely mixed strategy equilibrium in which A  chooses to arrive according to 
a uniform probability distribution. If A  did so, B  would choose to arrive at 
the same time in one period as it did in the previous one, i.e. a t k, since 
all times give the same expected profit from boarding passengers, and by
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CA(x, k)
c —
1 — c/m  ;c m
Updating cost function: bus A
CB(x , fc)
c
0
k — c/m k k + c/m
Updating cost function: bus B
Figure 3.3: An example of the updating cost as a function of arrival time x  
for a given k
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arriving at k  bus B  avoids all updating costs.
There are two cases, depending on whether the buses were bunched to­
gether in the previous period or were evenly spaced, specifically on whether 
k > c or not. We consider the simpler case first where buses were fairly 
evenly spaced and k > c (this case is only possible when c > 1/2). We will 
first formally state and prove the result before describing its implications and 
providing some intuition as to why it is true. We have:
R esult 14 There is an equilibrium in which for k € (c, 1/2].
FX(x,k) =
c a; € [0, c]
x  x  £ [c, k — c/m]
(1 +  m)x  — mk  -l-c x  E [A; — c/m, k]
k + c x  E [k, k  +  c]
x  x E [k +  c, 1)
0 x  E [0, c]
x — c x  E [c, k)
k x  E [k, k +  c]
x  — c x  € [fc +  c, 1 — c/m ]
(1 +  m)x — m x  € [1 — c/m, 1)
Proof. To show that these strategies form an equilibrium, we need to show 
that the net profit a bus operator expects to earn is the same, no matter 
what time in the support its bus arrives, and that this net profit is no less 
than that from arriving at any time not in the support. Substituting B ’s
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strategy into the expression for A s profit from boarding passengers gives:
x G [0, c] 
x € [c, &) 
x = k
Ha (x ,Fb ) = l - a B +
x
c
c/2 
x — k 
c
x G (&, k 4- c] 
x € [£ +  c, 1 — c/m]
771 (1 — x) x G [1 — c/m , 1) 
which gives an expected net profit for A as a function of its arrival time of:
x (l — m) x G [0, c/m]
UA(x, Fg) -  CA(x) =  1 -  aB + <
x — c x G [c/m, c]
0 x G [c, £)
—c/2 x = k
x — k — c x G (fc, fc +  c]
0 i G [ H c,1)
Similarly the expected net profit of B  as a function of its arrival time is:
x — 3c/2 x =  0
n B (x, FJ) -  Cj5(x) =  1 -  +
x — 2c x G (0, c]
—c x G [c, fc]
(x — fc)(l — m) — c x G [&, & 4- c/m]
x — 2c x G [fc +  c/m, fc +  c]
—c x G [& +  c, 1)
This net profit is shown in Figure 3.4 below. Inspection of the expressions 
and the Figures reveals that the expected net profit is 1 — aB if A  arrives at 
any time in the support of FJ(x), and is less than this should A  arrive at any 
other time. This confirms that F J is a best response to F£. Similar reasoning 
confirms that Fg is a best response to FJ and so that these strategies are an 
equilibrium. ■
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n A(x,F£) -  CA{x)
1 —  a s
1 -  aB -  c —
k + cm
Expected net profit: bus A
n s ( x ,F ; )  -  c B(x)
■ih- 1 — a A ~  C
1 — a a — 2c — 1 — a a — 2c
Expected net profit: bus B
Figure 3.4: Expected net profit as a function of arrival time: k < c
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Figure 3.5 below shows the equilibrium strategies. Since marginal prob-
I a ( x )
1 +  m—
1 -\ 
0
0
Q-Q
0——o G—
? T ?c k k 4- c
k - cm
Marginal probability of arriving: bus A
1 +  771-
I b ( x )
o-o—l m
Marginal probability of arriving: bus B
Figure 3.5: Equilibrium marginal probabilities of arrival time for given k
abilities are simpler to interpret than the related distribution function, the 
figures give the marginal probability chosen by each firm in equilibrium, 
where this is defined. A filled square at the top of a line means that there is 
a probability mass at that point, and the probability in that mass is marked. 
The probability mass of c in the distribution means that each bus arrives at
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the same time as it did in the previous period with probability c. Thus, not 
surprisingly, the higher the updating cost, the higher the probability that a 
bus chooses not to incur it. If a bus does update its arrival time, it never 
chooses to arrive a little later than previously, but may arrive little earlier. 
Also we see that a bus never arrives a little later than its rival’s previous 
arrival time, but may arrive a little earlier. In particular with probability 
c+ c/ra  it will arrive in an interval of width c/m immediately before its rival’s 
arrival time in the previous period10. The implication of these strategies is 
that buses tend either not to update their arrival times, or if they do, to 
arrive just before their rival’s previous arrival time. They never arrive later 
than either their own or their rival’s previous arrival time. Since a lot of 
probability is concentrated close to the same two arrival times for each bus, 
this behaviour will cause a tendency for buses to choose close arrival times 
this period and so to bunched arrival times. Moreover we see some leapfrog­
ging to earlier and earlier times as bus operators avoid arrival times later 
than their rival’s previous time, but sometimes choose an arrival time before.
As stated in the proof, to show that these strategies do form an equilib­
rium we need to show that the expected net profit of each bus is maximised 
by its arriving at any time in the support of its equilibrium distribution func­
tion. Suppose A  arrives according to F)J and consider B ’s expected payoff. 
All other things equal B  would arrive at k  and avoid all updating costs. How­
ever, with a relatively high probability A  arrives just before k which increases 
B ’s expected payoff if it arrives a little earlier still. A’s distribution function 
is such that this inventive exactly offsets the disincentive from having to pay 
an updating cost. Also the atom in A’s distribution at 0 makes the expected 
profit from arriving just before this higher so that these times also he in H’s
10c +  c / m =  (k — (k — c/m))  (1 +  m)
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support.
So far we have just considered the case where the buses were not too 
bunched together in the previous period. Now we turn to the case where 
their arrival times were separated by less than c in the previous period and 
so k < c. In this case:
R esu lt 15 There is an equilibrium (F^,F^) which, when k < c, has the 
form:
F*a (x , k)  -
k + c x  € [0, k +  c] 
x x  € [k ■+■ c, 1)
F£(x,k) = <
0 x  € [0, k)
k x  € [/;, k +  c)
x  — c x  € [fc +  c, 1 — c/m]
(1 +  m)x — m x  € [1 — c/m, 1)
P roof. To confirm that these form an equilibrium we can calculate the 
expected net profit from arriving at different times, assuming the rival’s 
times are given by these distributions, the same way as above. This gives:
n*(x ,*S) -  CA(x) =  1 -  aB +
x(l — m) x  € [0, c/m] 
x — c x £ [c/m,k\ 
k/2  — c x  = k 
x — k — c x  E (k, k  +  c] 
0 x  G [k +  c, 1)
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IlB( x ,F Z ) - C B(x) = l - a A +
—kj 2 — Sc/2 x =  0
x — k — 2c xE(0,k — c/m]
(x — k)( 1 +  m) — c x E[k — c/m, &]
(x — k)(l — m) — c x E [k,k c/m] 
x — k — 2c x E [k-\-c/m,k + c]
—c [fe +  c, 1)
These expected net profits are illustrated in Figure 3.6 below. Inspection 
of the Figure and the expressions confirms that each bus’ expected net profit 
is maximised at any point on the support of its equilibrium distribution 
function. ■
These equilibrium strategies are illustrated in Figure 3.7: When bus ar­
rivals were close together in the previous period, the bus which arrived just 
before its rival and so had more passengers, i.e. bus A , is less likely to have 
its timetable updated this period than is bus B  which had fewer passengers. 
This is shown by the fact that the atom at 0 in A s equilibrium strategy 
has mass k +  c, whereas the atom in B ’s equilibrium strategy at k only has 
mass k. Moreover if bus A  does have its timetable updated, it will arrive 
earlier than its own previous arrival time, but will avoid/time either a little 
earlier or later than B ’s previous arrival time. Bus B  on the other hand 
will, with relatively high probability, arrive in the interval c /m  just before 
A*s previous arrival time. The leap-frogging to earlier and earlier times first 
seen for the case when buses were fairly evenly spaced previously, k> c, is a 
much stronger feature of the equilibrium when buses were bunched together 
previously. The later bus is both more likely to have its timetable revised 
than its rival, and if it is revised at all, is relatively likely to arrive just before 
the previous arrival time of the early bus.
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n A(x) -  CA
1 —  a s  —
1 — a s  — c +  k  — — 1 — a s  — c +  k
1 -  aB -  c —
Expected net profit: bus A
nB(x) - c B
1 — a a — c —
— 1 — a a — 2c — k
Expected net profit: bus B
Figure 3.6: Equilibrium marginal probabilities of arriving: k < c
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/a (x )
k + c
1 +  771— —1 + 7 7 1
Marginal probability of arriving: bus A
M * )
1 +  771— 0 -0 —1 +  771
Marginal probability of arriving: bus B
Figure 3.7: Equilibrium marginal probabilities of arriving: k < c
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3.4.2 Express Coaches
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Passengers travelling by express coach know the timetable and travel on 
that coach which they most prefer. Although preferences are not modelled 
explicitly in this section, the assumption underlying the demand function we 
will use is that what matters to passengers is the absolute difference between 
the arrival time of the bus they board and the passenger’s most preferred 
time.
The results of the model express coach market are much more straight­
forward than those for urban local buses, and the whole analysis can be dealt 
with informally. Consider a model identical to the one for urban local buses 
above except that the specification of demand differs. Assume that passen­
gers are located evenly over the day and that the mass of passengers boarding 
a bus is equal to the mass which is closer to that bus than to its rival. For 
both buses this will be 1/2 no matter what the arrival times chosen. So long 
as the updating cost is at a minimum when buses do not update their arrival 
times, there will be an equilibrium in which both buses arrive at the same 
time from day to day.
3.4.3 Conclusions
This section has considered the pattern of timetable revisions that result 
when passengers just turn up at a bus stop and board the first bus to arrive, 
and when there is a cost to updating the timetable, and compared this pattern 
to that when passengers choose their most preferred bus. The results provide 
an explanation for the difference in timetable stability, and in the bunching of 
bus arrival times, which has been noted as between urban local bus markets 
and express coach markets. The next section considers the impact of the
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same passenger behaviour on fare levels.
3.5 Fares
The difference in the impact of market structure on fare levels between local 
urban bus and express coach markets can be investigated by comparing fares 
under monopoly and duopoly in each of the two market settings. In the basic 
model buses of a fixed quality arrive a t fixed, regular times. Operators have 
no choice over quality and frequency. At the end of the analysis we discuss 
relaxing this assumption and argue informally that the results may well be 
robust. Neither do operators have a choice over exact arrival times: work 
in previous sections suggests that in local bus markets competition can lead 
to a fundamental instability in choosing arrival times which would quickly 
make the model intractable. We sidestep the issue here by imposing regular 
arrival times. Varying the assumption on market structure in the model is 
effected by imposing different ownership patterns on the buses.
The results of this section rely on passenger responses to different fare 
levels and, unlike in the previous section, here we explicitly model the pref­
erences underlying their behaviour.
Passengers differ in the cost of walking to the stop/station, which is ex­
actly equivalent in the model express coach market to supposing that they 
differ in the value they put on a coach trip. Waiting at the stop/station is also 
costly and, all other things equal, passengers have a preferred time at which 
they would like to travel. In standard location games the cost of travelling 
at a time different from the most preferred one plays a central role, rather 
than the marginal one ascribed to it here. After the analysis we discuss the 
implications of a significant ‘inconvenience’ cost for the results, and suggest
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informally that the results would largely carry through.
Finally, passengers are assumed always to know the frequency of buses 
and the fares charged by different operators. However, in the model urban 
local bus market we assume that they do not know the exact bus arrival 
time, whereas in the model express coach market they do11. This difference 
generates very different effects of competition on price. In the express coach 
market the duopoly fare is lower than the monopoly one, but in the urban 
local bus the duopoly fare is higher. The basic mechanisms underlying this 
difference are straightforward. Starting with the more familiar case, with 
express coaches, where passengers know in advance when buses arrive and 
what fares they charge, those passengers choosing to travel at all choose 
that coach from the set charging the lowest fare which leaves at the most 
convenient time. The number of passengers travelling by coach is higher the 
lower is the lowest fare. A monopolist, running all coaches, is sure to carry all 
passengers deciding to travel and is able to set fares to trade off the numbers 
travelling against the revenue earned from each. Competing duopolists on 
the other hand get an additional benefit from cutting fares: they get half the 
passengers if they charge the same fare as their rival, but will capture all of 
them if they charge marginally less, giving rise to an over-incentive to cut 
prices compared to the monopolist. In equilibrium both operators set fares 
to zero, which is surely lower than the monopolist’s fare.
In urban local bus markets where passengers do not know the exact arrival 
times of buses, passengers will walk to the stop at the most convenient time. 
Once at the stop, however, they will board the first bus to arrive, even if
11 In the context of express coaches, it makes more sense to talk about “departure times” 
than “arrival times”. However, we will continue to use “arrival times ” to highlight the 
comparison with local buses.
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it charges (not too much) more than the next one, since waiting at a bus 
stop is costly. Consider then a duopolist lowering its fare. More passengers 
will walk to the stop on the expectation of lower fares on average. However 
half of the extra passengers will then board the rival bus, so the duopolist 
gets only half the benefits of the lower fare. A monopolist on the other hand 
always picks up all passengers and so has a greater incentive to cut fares, 
leading to lower fares under monopoly.
3.5.1 T he M odel: Com m on Assum ptions
B uses and Operators
The first part of the description sets down the assumptions on the arrival 
pattern of buses. This is taken to be fixed; what the model investigates is 
the effect of varying the ownership pattern of the buses.
During an infinitely long day, one bus arrives at time ti  and thereafter 
one bus arrives every A minutes. The arrival time of the first bus, ti, is 
drawn from a distribution which represents a uniform distribution on 
[0,A), before the day begins. If an agent knows t\ and A then it knows 
the arrival time of all buses and, conversely, if the agent knows A but not 
t\ then it does not know the exact arrival times of any buses. The identity 
of the operator of the s’th  bus is given by ms. Different market structures 
can be investigated through varying the assumptions made on m s. The two 
with which the analysis of this paper will be concerned are first, a duopoly in 
which each of two operators runs alternating buses, and second a monopoly 
in which all buses are run by the same operator.
In addition we need an assumption on the action set of operators. The 
fare charged on the $’th  bus is given by ps. For most of the section we will 
assume that operators set their fares before the day begins (though after
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t\ is drawn). This is, in fact, what happens: bus drivers do not have the 
authority to start bargaining with passengers waiting at the stop over the 
level of the fare. However, there are no obvious formal constraints which 
dictate why this is so, and at the end of the section we will instead assume 
that prices are set only when a bus arrives at a stop. We find that under this 
alternative assumption prices are so high under all market structures that no 
one ever travels by bus. The main body of the section assumes that before 
the day begins, each operator i chooses the fares on its buses, that is operator 
i chooses ps Vs € {s | ms =  i}. Operators choose simultaneously. This action 
set is further restricted by requiring that a duopolist charge the same fare 
on all its buses, and a monopolist charge the same fare on every other of 
its buses. The first restriction is standard and it will become clear that the 
fares chosen under the restriction would remain optimal, given passenger 
behaviour, were the restriction removed. The reason for requiring that a 
monopolist charge the same fare just on every other of its buses is that this 
makes comparisons of monopoly and duopoly behaviour more transparent. It 
means that the monopolist’s strategy set contains all the options that would 
be available to a colluding duopoly. In fact, and not at all surprisingly, we 
find that it is optimal for the monopolist to charge the same fare on all its 
buses.
Assumptions 1 and 2 below set out the two alternative assumptions for 
the ownership of buses and the additional restrictions on the action sets of 
operators.
A ssum ption  1 Monopoly:
(i) m s =  1, Vs
(ii) ps = Pi, s odd, andps = p2, s even
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A ssum ption  2 Duopoly:
(i) m s =  1, s odd, and m s =  2, s even
(ii) ps = pi, s odd, andps = p%, s even
Under both assumptions, operator behaviour is fully specified by the fares 
on the first two buses, p\ and p2, and we can refer to two types of buses, odd 
and even, indexed by 1 and 2 respectively.
There are no costs to accepting a passenger on board and, if necessary, 
a bus could accommodate any number of passengers. Bus operators aim to 
maximise their average revenues per bus. If a bus charges p  and n  passengers 
board, the revenues earned by the bus is just pn.
Passengers
The second part of the description concerns passenger behaviour.
Each passenger is identified by a pair ( t ,  k ) ,  t  E  R ,  k  e  [ / £ , « ] .  The 
first variable is the time at which the passenger would most like to leave the 
house. The second is the cost a passenger pays should he walk to the bus 
stop/station. The mass of passengers with preferred leaving times in any 
interval St is constant and is just St. Sampling passengers with preferred 
leaving times in any time interval, the proportion with walking cost k  or 
less is given by the distribution function F(k) which represents a uniform 
distribution over [«,7c], and so:
A passenger (r, k) chooses whether to walk to the bus stop, or to stay 
at home and exit the game on the basis of its information set $ a, which is 
the same for all passengers. Assume that passengers know the prices set by
1 if K> K
(3.4)
0 if  K <  AC
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firms, and the interval between firms, and so $ 0 D {ps, A}, but they do not 
necessarily know the exact arrival times of buses. If he chooses to walk to the 
stop, he must also choose a time t. More precisely, each passenger chooses an 
action a from the set A  = {X} U 7Z, where passengers may choose different 
actions, and:
a =  <
t  if the passenger walks to the stop at t 
X  if the passenger stays at home and so exits the game
Here we make what is largely a technical assumption. Passengers suffer a 
small inconvenience cost if they leave the house at a time different from r . 
Specifically, the cost if a passenger leaves the house at t  is:
/(£, r) = e\t — t |
It is reasonable to suppose that passengers incur a cost through either rushing 
to be ready before they would want, or from waiting around with nothing to 
do because they are ready to leave before they need to be. However, such a 
cost is unlikely to be of first order importance and it would be a problem for 
the model if the results rested on this assumption. In fact the assumption is 
made for technical reasons: it means that when a passenger (r, •) is otherwise 
indifferent over leaving the house at any time t in some set T, he will prefer 
the time in T  closest to r .  We will be looking at limit economies as this 
inconvenience cost e goes to zero, its effect in picking between otherwise 
indifferent leaving times will be its only impact.
If passengers stay at home then they get zero payoff. Passengers choosing 
to walk to the bus stop arrive there instantaneously. Assume that they 
learn nothing new at the stop and that once there they wait for the next 
bus. A more realistic assumption might be that passengers learn the arrival 
times t\ once they arrive a t the stop, since bus stops often carry timetables,
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and arriving passengers may infer when the last bus left from the number 
of passengers waiting at the stop. The assumption that, on the contrary, 
passengers learn nothing at the stop is made to simplify the analysis: even if 
some passengers arrive at the stop so long before a bus is due to arrive that 
the passenger would do better to go straight home again, the passenger is no 
better informed about this than when he walked to the stop in the first place, 
so that he has no basis on which to update his decision to be at the stop, 
and we can legitimately ignore such considerations. Waiting at the stop is 
costly, with instantaneous cost c, and costs are paid as they arise. Therefore 
a passenger waiting at the stop for t  minutes will incur a waiting cost C(t) 
given by:
C(t) =  ct
When a bus arrives, passengers at the stop learn the arrival times of 
all buses, and so the information set becomes =  {ps,A ,t i } .  Waiting 
passengers then decide whether to board, go home, or continue waiting. More 
specifically each passenger at the stop chooses an action bs when the s ’th  bus 
arrives, from the set B = { B ,S ,X }  where:
f
B  if the passenger boards 
bs =  S  if the passenger stays at the stop 
X  if the passenger goes home 
We make the additional restriction that passengers always behave in the same 
way when the same type of bus arrives. That is we impose that:
bs = bi if s odd 
bs =  62 if s even 
A passenger boarding bus s payoff associated with the bus trip of:
gs = u - p s, s = 1, 2, . . .
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Note that under either of Assumptions 1 or 2 trip payoffs on all buses are 
either g\ or <72 depending on whether the bus in question was an odd or an 
even one. The variable u can be thought of as the value to a passenger of a 
trip on a bus.
In summary, a passenger can receive four payoffs; the trip payoff, and the 
costs (which are negative payoffs) associated with leaving at an inconvenient 
time, walking to the stop and waiting for a bus. These payoffs are assumed 
to be undiscounted and additive.
Equilibrium
If operators choose their fares before the day begins, then there are no 
decisions for them to make during the day. The only decisions are those 
made by passengers over whether to walk to the stop, and whether to board 
a bus. We look for strategies;
gi e K, 2 = 1,2, 
a(r, k | $ a) : x  [«,7c] —► A ,
bi{$b) G £ , i =  l, 2
which form a PNE. One such equilibrium is derived below. Equilibrium is 
derived by first finding how passenger behaviour depends on the fares set by 
operators, and then finding optimal operator choices of these fares.
3.5.2 Local Buses
Passenger behaviour will be dictated just by the fares offered by buses, not 
on bus ownership, and so the questions of whether passengers board arriving 
buses, and how many of them walk to the stop in the first place, can be dealt 
with independently of market structure. Passenger behaviour is accordingly 
dealt with first, and the findings are summarised in Result 16 on Page 149.
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The analysis then turns to compare fare setting under monopoly and duopoly, 
and the findings are given in Result 18 on Page 157-
Passenger Behaviour
Here we examine the implications for passenger behaviour of the assump­
tion that they do not know the exact arrival time of buses. The section shows 
first that lower fares on alternate buses will increase the total number of pas­
sengers walking to the stop. Second it shows that so long as the difference 
in fares between alternate buses is not too large then passengers board the 
first bus to arrive, and the share of passengers boarding each bus is just 1/ 2. 
Cutting fares on alternate buses, then, will mean that more passengers board 
all buses, and it is this fact that will lead to competing duopolists charging 
higher fares than a monopolist.
In markets for urban local bus services we take Assumption 3 below to 
hold. This asserts that passengers know the interval between buses, A, the 
fares charged on all buses, ps, V$, but not ti and so not any actual arrival 
times. Passengers believe that ti could be any time in the interval [0, A] with 
equal probability
A ssum ption  3 Urban Local Buses:
=  {Psj A, -Ff}
We also make Assumption 4, which is a technical assumption on param­
eter values that ensures both that even if all buses were free, not every pas­
senger would find it worthwhile walking to the stop, and that if every other 
bus were free, at least some passengers would find it worthwhile walking to 
the stop. It means that there are no reasonable circumstances under which 
all passengers walk to the stop, and that there is always a fare which is suf­
ficiently low that, if charged on alternate buses, some passengers walk to the
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stop. This reduces the number of different cases that need to be considered 
during the following analysis.
A ssum ption 4 k  — cA  < u < k  — cA /2
Passenger boarding behaviour bi
Boarding behaviour is restricted to depend on whether the bus number 
is odd or even (though we confirm below that passengers would behave no 
differently were they able to condition on additional variables). This means 
that a passenger at a stop will either wait at the stop forever, if b\ =  62 =  S, 
or will wait a t the stop for no more them two buses to arrive, one from each 
operator. It is easy to see that waiting at the stop forever cannot be optimal 
since a passenger which did so would never get a trip payoff, but would incur 
an infinitely large waiting cost. Moreover, if a passenger stays at the stop 
when a bus of type i arrives, i.e. if 6* =  S', then he will surely board a bus of 
type j ,  i.e. bj =  B. This follows because, as we have already seen, it cannot 
be optimal to also stay at the stop when both i and j  arrive, and if the 
passenger goes home, i.e. bj = X ,  then he has incurred an unnecessary wait, 
and would have done better to leave when i arrived. The only remaining 
choice is to board j .
Passengers’ boarding behaviour depends, then, on a simple comparison of 
the payoffs accruing from; exiting, boarding the bus, and staying at the stop 
and boarding the next bus. These depend on the trip payoffs, the waiting 
costs, and the fall-back payoff of zero that the passenger gets from exiting. 
As an example, it will be optimal to board a bus i when it arrives if this 
gives a higher payoff over the rest of the game than exiting or waiting and 
boarding the next bus. This will be so when the trip payoff on i is positive, 
and greater than the trip payoff on j  net of the cost of waiting for the next
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bus to arrive, which will be in A minutes The full description of passengers’ 
optimal behaviour is given in Equation 3.5. Note that optimal behaviour is 
uniquely defined over almost all combinations of trip payoffs, the exceptions 
being just those boundary cases where more than one action gives passengers 
the highest payoff12.
=  <
B
0A
l and 9i > Qj -  cA
 S if Qj — c A >  0 and 9i
<101V
X if Pi < 0 and 95 -  cA < 0
1,2, i € { i ,2 } , i /  i
(3-5)
A number of cases arise, depending on the fares of the two types of buses. 
Passengers at a stop may board the first bus which arrives, they may board 
those of just one type and either stay at the stop or go home should one of 
the other arrive first, or they may go home whichever bus arrives first. These 
cases are shown in Figure 3.8 which splits up the space of trip payoffs (pi 
and P2) according to passenger boarding behaviours. The boundaries of the 
Figure are given by the equations in Equation 3.5.
Behaviour of arising passengers, a(r, k)
Next consider the choice arising passengers make over whether or not to 
walk to the bus stop. Whether this is in a passenger’s interest depends on
12 Although we have restricted possible strategies to depend just on the identity of the 
operator of an arriving bus, it is worth pointing out that even if passengers were free to 
condition behaviour on other observable factors, such as time or the number of passengers 
at the stop, it is not optimal for them to do so. To see this, note that if a passenger 
eventually boards a bus i then it is always better to board the first bus i that arrives, 
so if passengers board a bus it will always be one of the first two to arrive, and optimal 
behaviour will be given by just the comparisons set out in Equation 3.5.
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(S,B)
(B,B)
(X,B) (B,S)
cA
( * , * ) (B , X )
Figure 3.8: Regions of passenger boarding behaviour, (&i, 62)? depending on 
trip payoffs. Regions are delineated by the heavy lines.
the expected trip payoff, net of the cost of waiting at the stop. Denote the 
expected trip payoff net of waiting cost of a passenger who walked to the stop 
by k*. This k* will depend on the prices, qualities and arrival intervals of 
the buses, but whatever its value the optimal behaviour of arising passengers 
is simply to walk to the stop at their preferred time if k* is greater than 
their particular walking cost, and to stay at home otherwise. When e > 0 
this optimal behaviour is uniquely defined for all passengers except those for 
which k* =  k. However, when there is no cost to leaving at an inconvenient 
time, although leaving at the most preferred time is still optimal, so is leaving 
at any other time, given that the net trip payoff exceeds the walking cost.
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In the rest of the analysis we take optimal walking behaviour as given in 
Equation 3.6 below, which assumes that passengers leave at their preferred 
time, whatever e.
T he num ber of passengers walking to  th e  stop , F (k*)
Bus operators choosing prices and qualities before the day begins are 
more interested in the total number of passengers walking to the stop than 
in the behaviour of individual passengers, that is they are concerned with 
E(k*) and how their choices will affect this. The way that k* is affected 
by price and quality will depend on which buses passengers may board once 
they get to the stop: for example if passengers do not board odd buses 
then small changes in pi will have no impact on the number of passengers 
who find it worthwhile walking to the stop. In other words, the expression 
for /c*(<7i, <72) will depend on the region of boarding behaviour in Figure 3.8 
above that operators’ choices place passengers in. As an example, consider 
region (23,22), where passengers always board the first bus to arrive. A 
passenger walking to the stop will arrive before bus of type i with probability 
1/2. Given that he arrives before i he expects to wait A /2 minutes, and to 
get a trip payoff of gi. Writing out the expected trip payoff net of waiting 
cost gives k* = l/2(gi — cA/2) -f 1/2 (^2 — cA/2), which simplifies to k* = 
l/2(gi -f£2) — cA/2. Consider next region (61, 62) =  (23,5), where passengers 
will always wait for bus 1 to arrive before boarding. The trip payoff is always
X  if K < K*
if K < K*
(3.6)
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gi and the expected wait is A minutes, giving the expression above.
Note that if any passengers who were at the stop found it optimal to 
go home, i.e. if (&*, bj) = (B ,X )  or (X, X), then no passengers would find 
it worthwhile walking to the stop in the first place. It is easy to see why. 
Suppose first that passengers a t the stop go home whatever bus arrives, so 
(&i, bj) =  (X ,X ). In this case passengers never get a trip payoff, and cannot 
recover the cost of walking to the stop. Suppose now that (6*, bj) =  (B, X )  
so that passengers at the stop go home when bus j  arrives. The trip payoff 
from i must therefore be less than cA, or it would be better to wait for i. 
However, a passenger walking to the stop expects to wait at the stop for cA/2 
minutes, and yet only gets a trip payoff of gt with probability 1/2 (otherwise 
he gets zero). Consequently the expected trip payoff, net of waiting cost, is 
negative, and it is never worthwhile walking to the stop. This result is shown 
formally in Lemma 3.
L em m a 3 I f  (6*, bj) =  (£ , X) or (X, X) then k* < k.
P roof. Prom Equation 3.7, k* <  0 if (b^bj) = (X ,X ) and since k > 0 
by assumption, k* < k. Also, from Equation 3.7, k* = 1/2& — cA/2 if 
(&i, bj) =  (B ,X ). But from Equation 3.5, boarding behaviour will only be 
(£ , X) when gi < cA and so k* <  0, and hence k* < k. ■
The boundaries where k* =  k and k will depend on the boarding be­
haviour of passengers. As an example, suppose that (6*, bj) = (£ , B), so 
that trip payoffs are in the region where passengers take the first bus to
1/2(9! + g2) - c A / 2  if (b1,b2) = (B,B)
if (bi,bj ) = (B,S)  
if (bi,bj ) = (B ,X )  
if (bi,bj ) = (X ,X )
(3.7)
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arrive. In this case the expected trip payoff, net of waiting at the stop, is 
k* =  1/2(#i +  <72) — cA/2. Then ac* =  k, when l/2 (^ i+ p 2) =  ft +  cA/2. Simi­
larly, k* = k  when 1/ 2(<7i + £2) =  ac+ c A / 2 .  Figure 3.9 shows the boundaries 
between the different regions of ac* , superimposed on the boundaries of dif­
ferent boarding behaviour. The Figure is for parameters where the support 
of the passenger distribution is large relative to the waiting cost, specifically 
cA <  7c — /c, although it looks much the same for other parameter values: 
the only difference being in whether or not point X  is at a higher value of <72 
than point Y.
cA
K -
0 £ c A k+cAk
Figure 3.9: Regions of <72)- Region boundaries are given by the heavy 
fines.
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The proportion of passengers walking to the stop is given by F (k*) which 
is zero whenever k* < k and equal to 1 whenever k* >  7c, and given by 
(k* — /c)/(7c — k) otherwise. The full dependence on trip payoffs is given 
below in Equation 3.8. As before, in reading the equation, expressions such 
as “if (B ,B )n should be read as “if (bi,bj) = (B ,B )” . The more compact 
notation has been used to make the various cases clearer.
( |(S i + 52) -  ^  if K* e  [k,k] and =  (B
F (k*) =  < ^ 5  (9i - cA - k) if k*€  [k,k] and (&*,bj) = (B
1 if ac* > 7c
0 if k > K*
V
Sum m ary o f passenger behaviour in local bus m arkets
The central findings of this section on passenger behaviour, which will 
be used below, are gathered into Result 16. The result states first, that if 
the trip payoffs do not differ by too much then passengers board the first 
bus to arrive. Second, when passengers are boarding the first bus to arrive, 
then increasing the trip payoff on alternate buses increases the number of 
passengers walking to the stop.
R esult 16 Passenger behaviour in local bus markets, 
ft) U 19i - 9 j \ <  cA then (&*, bj) =  (£ , B).
(ii) I f  {bi, bj) =  (B,B)  and k* € [/c,7c] then F (k*) = =zg{^(gi +  <fe) — ^
The next section turns to the choice of trip payoffs by operators.
3.5.2.1 M onopoly
The analysis begins by considering the fares offered by a monopolist and so 
Assumption 1 will hold throughout this section.
Characterising Optimal Fares
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n.
When choosing the optimal fares to set in order to maximise average 
revenues per bus, the monopolist must trade off the increase in the number 
of passengers boarding when the fare is reduced against the cut in the amount 
some passengers pay.
Denote by ra* the number of passengers which board buses of type i, given 
the trip payoffs offered on the two types of bus. Then, except for the first 
bus, which will have no impact on average revenues:
i F ( K*) if (bi,bj) =  (B, S) 
i = \ if (h,bj) = {B, B) (3.9)
0 otherwise
The monopolist will then choose a pair (g*,g2) to solve:
(91 ,92) =  max [u -  g^m  +  [u -  g2]n2 
(9 1 ,9 2 )
The task of characterising optimal fares is greatly simplified by an initial 
observation, set out in Lemma 4, which states that the monopolist’s optimal 
fares will always put boarding behaviour in (£ , B). If this were not so, 
passengers would board some of its buses, but not others. The operator 
would do better to cut fares on the expensive buses to the level of those on
the cheap ones so that passengers boarded all buses. This would not affect
the revenue per passenger, and would encourage more passengers since the 
expected wait a t the stop would be cut.
Lem m a 4 There exists a solution to the monopolist’s problem and it satisfies 
(&!, 62) =  ( £ ,£ )
Proof. Suppose first that a solution exists. By Assumption 4 there is a 
positive fare at which the monopolist can attract some passengers to the 
stop. Clearly it cannot be optimal to set fares so that no one walks to the
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stop and so by Lemma 3, boarding behaviour will be either (B, B ) or (B , S'). 
Suppose it is (6*, bj) =  (B, S) and so all boarding passengers pay p*. if 
the operator lowered pj so that p'- =  pi then boarding behaviour would be 
(B ,B), all boarding passengers would still pay p*, and more would board 
since the expected waiting cost would be lower. Thus (B, S) cannot result 
from optimal fare setting. A solution, if it exists, will thus lie in (B, B). But 
the set of trip payoffs for which boarding behaviour is (B, B) is compact, 
from Equation 3.5, and [u — g\]n\ + [u — p2]^2 is continuous over this region, 
so that a solution exists. ■
The importance of Lemma 4 is that optimal fares can be characterised us­
ing a modified problem in which the monopolist maximises per bus revenues 
as though passengers always boarded the first bus to arrive. We will then 
confirm that at this modified optimum the monopolist chooses fares which 
do indeed cause passengers to board the first bus, which is enough to con­
firm that if the optimum exists, it will be the modified one. In the modified 
monopolist’s problem revenues are calculated as though passengers always 
board the first bus and make their walking decisions accordingly. Specifi­
cally we can define a modified function n' which will be identical to rii when 
boarding behaviour in the original problem is (B, B) and is given by:
n'i =  (|(ft +«#) ’ 3i,9j € M  (3.10)
Then let R (gj)  be i ’s best response in the modified problem, so it is that trip 
payoff of Vs which would maximise its per bus revenues were the numbers 
boarding given by nf rather than n.
fail 92) =  arg max [ti -  gi]n\ + [ u -  P2K 2, 9i,92 € [0, u] (3.11)
It is easy to confirm that (p^, gQ will satisfy the first order conditions for
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Equation 3.11 which are found to be, by standard calculations:
91 =  ^ (2 (u -g '2)+ c A  + 2K)
92 = ^ ( 2 ( u - 0 i ) - f  cA +  2/c)
These will be solved simultaneously at a unique symmetric pair g[=  g'2 =9*, 
which implies an equilibrium fare p* = u — g* where:
p* =  -  (2u — cA — 2k )
Since, in the modified problem, it is optimal for the monopolist to set 
fares equal on all buses, passengers will indeed board the first bus to arrive, 
so that optimal fares are in the region in which the modified and original 
problems are identical. Therefore, if optimal fares exist, they will be the 
modified ones.
The reader can easily confirm that these are exactly the results that would 
have been found from imposing that the monopolist charge the same fare on 
all buses.
3.5.2.2 D uopoly
Now consider the trip payoffs offered on buses when alternate buses are run 
by competing operators, i.e. when Assumption^ holds. The analysis will 
closely follow that for monopoly.
Characterising Equilibrium
As under monopoly, when choosing the optimal fare to set in order to 
maximise average revenues per bus, operators must trade off the increase in 
the number of passengers boarding when the fare is reduced against the cut 
in the amount each passenger pays.
g
1
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The number of passengers which board Fs bus, given the trip payoffs 
offered by the two operators, will be the same as the number of passengers 
boarding buses of type i under monopoly, viz. the function ti* given in 
Equation 3.9.
Operator z’s problem is to choose its best response R{gj) to the trip payoff 
offered by its rival, that is to solve the problem:
R(gj) =  argmax[w -
9i
As with monopoly, the task of characterising equilibrium is made signifi­
cantly easier by the observation that if there is an equilibrium then it must be 
the case that passengers board the first bus to arrive. The reason is simple: 
any operator which finds itself with no passengers is earning no revenues and 
could have done better by cutting price until passengers wished to board. 
Lemma 5 states this more precisely.
Lemma 5 I f  a price equilibrium in pure strategies exists, in which F(-) > 0, 
then (bi,bj) = (B ,B ).
Proof. Note first that there can be no price equilibrium in which one oper­
ator earns positive revenues while the other does not. Suppose the contrary, 
and suppose, w.l.g., that pi > 0, k* > k  and (6i, 62) =  (B, S) which implies 
Pi < P2 — cA. Operator 2 is getting no revenue. If it charged p'2 =  pi then 
the number of passengers would not fall (k* is monotonically non-decreasing 
in gi), and half of them would board bus 2, giving operator 2 positive rev­
enues. Thus it cannot have been an equilibrium to have (61, 62) =  (5 , S). 
By Lemma 3 the only other region giving positive flows of passengers is 
(bi,bj) =  (£ , B). This proves the first part. Now note that if F(-) > 0 
then prices must be strictly positive. If not then neither operator is earning 
positive returns, while at least the one charging the lower price is making
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positive sales. This one could raise price a little, still get positive sales (F(-) 
continuous, and the firm gets at least half the market so long as it charges a 
fare no greater than its rival’s plus cA) and so get strictly positive returns.*
Again, as with monopoly, Lemma 5 allows us to characterise equilibrium 
using a modified problem in which operators maximise fares as though pas­
sengers always boarded the first bus. We then confirm two things. First we 
show that in this modified equilibrium operators choose fares which do in­
deed cause passengers to board the first bus. This is enough to confirm that 
if equilibrium exists, it will be the modified one. Second, however, we show 
that there are parameters for which, even if operators assumed the correct 
functions for passenger boarding behaviour, their choice of fare would be the 
same as in the modified equilibrium, which means that there are parameters 
for which equilibrium exists.
In the modified problem operator i aims to choose its best response R (gj) 
to the trip payoff offered on f s  buses as though passengers always boarded 
the first bus, and make their walking decisions accordingly. If n' be as given 
in Equation 3.10, the modified problem is to solve:
R(gj) =  argmax[w -  (3.12)
9i
It is easy to confirm that K (gj) will satisfy the first order condition 
d/dg([u — g]n') =  0 and is found to be:
& ( 9 j )  = ^ { u ~ 9 j + c A  + 2k ) (3.13)
If p' is the fare corresponding to a trip payoff of g' then
P1 =  |(2 u  -  v, -  cA -  2k)
Since the modified best response functions are the same for both oper­
ators, are linear and have slope different from 1, the modified equilibrium
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foi 5 #2) which Rf{g*) = g*, i = 1,2, j  ^  i, is unique and symmetric, and 
so let g* = g2 = an(i let p* = u — g*. Substituting R(g*) = g* into 
Equation 3.13 and rearranging gives the modified equilibrium trip payoffs 
and fares:
g* = ^  (u -f cA + 2 k ) 
p* =  ^  (2u — cA  — 2«)
Since operator fares in the modified equilibrium are equal, passengers will 
board the first bus to arrive, i.e. the equilibrium lies in (£ , £ ) , the region in 
which the functions n' and n are identical. Moreover, if equilibrium exists in 
the original problem it will lie within this region, and so if equilibrium exists 
it will be the modified one.
Having characterised equilibrium, the analysis turns to consider when an 
equilibrium exists.
E xistence
This section examines the conditions under which equilibrium exists. The 
reason why equilibrium sometimes fails to exist is that at the modified equi­
librium outlined above, each operator may have an incentive to cut fares to 
such a low level that all passengers waiting at the stop board its buses. As 
an example Figure 3.10 illustrates the number of passengers boarding l ’s bus 
as a function of g\ for the case g2 > cA  and K — k >  cA.
Three distinct regions are clear from Figure 3.10, corresponding to dif­
ferent regions of boarding behaviour. At low trip payoffs, specifically 
gi < P2 — cA, no passengers board bus 1. The trip payoff is so low that 
either none walks to the stop, if g2 is also low, or if some do walk to the stop 
then all wait for a bus 2 to arrive, rather than board bus 1. At intermediate
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A n
K—K
K—K
Figure 3.10: n\ when g2 <  cA and k — k > cA
prices, when g2 — cA < gi < g2 +  cA, the trip payoff on l ’s buses is suffi­
ciently high that passengers at the stop when a 1 arrives will now prefer to 
board than wait for the next bus, and so boarding behaviour is (B, B). At 
9i =  <72+ cA there is a sudden doubling of the number of passengers boarding 
bus 1 since once the trip payoff exceeds g2 +  cA then all passengers at the 
stop prefer to wait for a bus 1 to arrive than board a bus 2.
There are two candidate best responses. There is a local maximum which 
maximises profit given that boarding behaviour is (B, B), and so the operator 
gets just half of the passengers walking to the stop. This is the modified 
best response analysed above. However, there is also a local maximum at a 
discretely higher trip payoff, and so lower fare. This maximises profits given
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that boarding behaviour is (B, S), so that the operator has undercut its rival 
and all passengers now board its buses.
Equilibrium may fail to exist, therefore, because of the possible incentive 
of operators at the modified equilibrium to undercut their rival by a large 
margin, thus winning all waiting passengers. However, it is only possible to 
undercut if fares in the modified equilibrium are sufficiently high, since in 
order to win all passengers one operator must charge at least cA less than its 
rival. Clearly then, undercutting is impossible if p* < cA. This will happen 
when:
^ (2u — cA — 2 k )  < cA
or it < k  +  2cA
R esu lt 17 I f  u < k  4- 2cA then equilibrium exists.
Note that this is a strong condition guaranteeing existence: it guarantees 
that it is not possible to undercut and steal all passengers at the modified 
equilibrium. A weaker condition would rule out only those cases where un­
dercutting was profitable.
3.5.2.3 Fares in  local bus m arkets.
For convenience, we summarise the results on fares in local bus markets in 
Result 18 below, which shows that fares are lower under monopoly them 
duopoly.
R esu lt 18 Fares in local bus markets.
(i) Optimal fares under monopoly exist, are the same on all buses, and are: 
p* =  j(2w — cA — 2k )
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(ii) Equilibrium fares under duopoly exist i f  u < k  +  2cA, are the same on 
all buses, and are:
p* = \{2u  — cA — 2 k ) 
o
(Hi) Fares are lower under monopoly than duopoly
3.5.2.4 Comparing M onopoly and D uopoly w hen fares are set at 
the bus stop.
There is an obvious institutional reason why we can take arrival times as 
fixed before the day begins: arrival times are fixed by the legal requirement 
that operators register their timetables. There are no corresponding formal 
constraints which dictate that faxes on buses are set before the day begins, 
although in practice this is what happens. Here we drop this assumption and 
no longer require fares to be equal on alternate buses, so that we no longer 
restrict ps =  pi, s odd, and ps — p ^  s even. Instead we examine fare setting 
when fares are set when a bus is at the stop and look for strategies for each 
type of bus, pi(•), i =  1,2. In analysing behaviour in the model we will 
look for an equilibrium described by strategies for all players which satisfy 
a number of conditions. First, a player’s strategy will specify an action, at 
each time at which the player can make a decision, which maximises the 
players expected payoff during the rest of the game, given the strategies of 
its rivals. In other words equilibrium is Perfect and Nash. Second, strategies 
are conditioned only on the current environment, and not on the past history 
of the game, or on time, i.e. strategies are Markov. Let x  be the number of 
passengers at the stop when a bus arrives. We seek a set of Markov strategies;
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Pi(x) : R  —>R, i = 1,2,
which form a Perfect Nash Equilibrium (PNE). The following Result charac­
terises such an equilibrium.
R esult 19 There exists a MPNE in which no one travels by bus. Specifically, 
the strategies;
f
B  if  p < u
<
X  if  p >  u 
a(r, k) = X , Vr, k
Pi (x)  = u, i =  l ,2  
form a MPNE.
Proof. Consider first b(p), the choice made by waiting passengers when a bus 
arrives and offers fare p. If all buses in the future charge a price equal to their 
quality, the trip payoff in the future is zero. Therefore, passengers always do 
better to exit now rather than stay at the stop and incur additional waiting 
costs before exiting later or boarding a later bus. Passengers prefer to board 
now than exit if boarding gives a positive trip payoff, confirming b(p) = B  
when p < u. If the trip payoff is negative, so p > it, then it is better to exit, 
so b(p) =  X  in this case, and, finally, if the trip payoff is zero then passengers 
are indifferent between boarding and exiting, so that b(p) = B  when p = u 
is one best response. Now consider the price offered by a bus of type i. All 
passengers board so long as p < it and since, if there are any passengers at 
the stop, revenues rise with price, the bus charges P i ( x )  =  it, Vx > 0. If there 
are no passengers then revenues will always be zero and P i(0 )  =  it is a best 
response. Next consider a(r,/c). Since all passengers earn zero trip payoff, 
the cost of walking to the stop is never recovered, and so it is always better 
for passengers to stay at home. ■
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In equilibrium no passengers ever walk to the bus stop. Bus fares are 
always set at w, which is the full value of a bus trip to passengers. Passengers, 
knowing this, will board any bus with a fare of u or less, rather than wait at 
the stop and incur additional waiting costs. Given this behaviour on the part 
of passengers buses maximise revenues by charging the highest fare consistent 
with all passengers boarding. However, if passengers pay u to board a bus, 
then it is never worthwhile incurring the cost of walking to the stop.
The result rests on the type of hold-up problem that is explored in the 
literature on property rights13. By the time passengers and bus drivers come 
to trade over the level of bus fares, passengers have already sunk the costs 
associated with walking to the stop and waiting for the bus. Bus drivers 
can make a take it or leave it offer over the fare level and extract the full 
value of the ride from passengers, leaving them with no surplus to cover 
their sunk costs. Of course operators would be better off if they could assure 
passengers that they would set a lower fare, thus enticing them to walk to 
the stop and providing positive sales, albeit at the lower fare. However, in a 
Perfect equilibrium they cannot do so.
In fact, of course, people do travel by bus. It might be argued that reality 
differs from the model’s result because opportunistic behaviour on the part 
of bus operators drives only some, and not all, potential passengers to stay 
at home: it might be thought for example that the starkness of the result 
arises from the simplifying assumption that all passengers make the same 
choice so that an operator which raises its fare will either keep all passengers 
or lose them all, or that the bargaining assumption, that buses make a take 
it or leave it offer to passengers, might also contribute to the starkness of the
13 See, for example, the paper by Hart and Holmstrom on “The theory of contracts” 
[34]and the references therein.
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result. More importantly, it might be observed that operators and passengers 
in fact interact over many days, and that current prices somehow affect the 
number of future passengers: if passengers regretted walking to the stop on 
one day, they may stay at home the next. In this case, operators would be 
concerned with the effect of their fares on the number of future passengers. 
What is certain is that in the real world the operational structure of bus 
companies rules out any opportunistic behaviour in the first place. Fares are 
in fact set centrally, and individual bus drivers do not have the authority 
to start renegotiating the fare with waiting passengers14. This operational 
structure may be chosen as a device to allow operators to credibly set their 
fares before the day begins, though it more likely results from factors outside 
those considered here. All that is important here is that the more appropriate 
assumption for modelling bus behaviour would seem to be that prices are set 
before the day begins, so that operators consider the effect on passenger 
numbers of their pricing decisions.
3.5.3 Express Coaches
The simpler market to analyse, and the more familiar, is that for express 
coaches in which passengers know the arrival time of buses. As before, pas­
senger behaviour can be analysed before moving on to consider the fares set 
by operators under different market structures.
Passenger Behaviour
Passengers now know the timetable and so there is no reason for them to 
spend costly time waiting at the bus stop: they can time their departure to
14This is in contrast to the case of minicabs, where individual drivers do have some 
discretion over the fare. Minicabs, note, drive up to the door so passengers have not sunk 
a walking cost by the time they negotiate over fare.
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arrive at the same time as a bus. Moreover, they know bus fares, and so if 
one bus is cheaper than the other they can make sure that they always catch 
the cheap one.
The distinguishing assumption for express coach markets is Assumption 5 
below that passengers’ information sets contain the exact arrival times of 
coaches.
A ssum ption  5 Express Coaches 
$ a = {Ps, A ,ti}
We also make a technical assumption on parameters: passengers would 
always prefer to leave the house at an inconvenient time and arrive just in 
time to catch a coach than wait at the bus station for a coach to arrive.
A ssum ption  6 e < c
In fact for much of the analysis, we take e =  0, but we decide between 
multiple optimal strategies by taking the limit e —> 0.
P assenger board ing  behaviour, bi
Once at the stop, boarding behaviour is as with local buses, and so is 
given by Equation 3.6. The difference in behaviour between express coaches 
and urban local buses lies in the decision to walk to the stop, and the time 
at which to leave the house.
Passenger travelling  behaviour, a(r, k)
In the case of express coaches, where passengers know bus times in ad­
vance, and where it is more costly to spend time at the coach station than to 
leave home at an inconvenient time, they will, in equilibrium, never wait at 
the stop, but will arrive at the same time as the coach they intend to board.
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Passengers choosing to travel will therefore always choose a leaving time to 
coincide with one of the coaches.
Note that, for any positive inconvenience cost, passengers will only ever 
board either the closest odd coach or the closest even one (if any), since any 
other choice would involve unnecessary inconvenience. This means that a 
travelling passenger (r, k), where r  lies between the arrival of the s ’th  and 
s +  l ’th  coach, will travel at either ts or ts+\. When the inconvenience cost 
is zero, travelling on one of theses two coaches is still optimal, but so is 
travelling on many others.
When contemplating which, if any, of the two closest coaches to board, 
passengers are aware of the fares. If the two sorts of coach charge the same 
fare, passengers do best to board the closest one, and so minimise the cost 
of travelling at an inconvenient time. This behaviour is uniquely optimal 
for any positive inconvenience cost (though when e =  0, catching any other 
coach is also optimal). If the two sorts of coaches charge different fares, 
however, passengers will board that coach charging the lowest fare, if the 
fare difference is sufficiently high to compensate for the inconvenience. If the 
inconvenience cost is zero, any fare difference is large enough (though now 
it is also optimal to board any coach charging the lower fare). For example, 
a passenger (r, k) where r  lies between the arrival of the s’th  and s -b l ’th 
coaches, who intends to travel, will use the s’th  coach if:
u - p s - e ( r - t s) > u -  ps+1 -  e(ts+i -  r) 
or ps+i - p a > e(ts+1 +  ts -  2t)
Suppose that the above inequality is true, so that it is better for the passenger 
to travel at ts than ts+\. It will be worth making the journey at all if trip 
payoff on s, net of inconvenience cost, is greater than the agent’s walking
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cost, i.e. if:
u — ps — e(r — ts)> K
Writing the optimal travelling behaviour of passengers when the inconve­
nience cost is e as ae(r, k) gives:
if t  €
a£(r, k)
( t s , ts+l]
ts If Ps+1 Ps ^  ^{ts “I- ts-1-1 2t)
and u — ps — e{r — ts) > k
ts+i If Ps+i Ps — e(ts ^s+i
and u -  ps+i -  e{ts+1 -  r) > «
X  otherwise
There are a few points to note here. First, when fares are different and 
when the inconvenience cost becomes small, passengers travel on the cheaper 
coach, regardless of which is closer. The second point is that as the fare 
differential gets very small behaviour depends only on whether (ts+ ts+i — 2r) 
is positive or negative, i.e. on whether r  is closer to ts or ts+\. In other 
words, as fares on alternate buses become equal, passengers need take into 
account only the cost of travelling at an inconvenient time. Here we take the 
view that the cost of travelling at an inconvenient time is not a driving force 
underlying whether or not fares are higher under monopoly than duopoly, and 
accordingly we henceforth assume that e =  0 and take passenger travelling 
behaviour a(r, k) to be the limit of ae(r, k) as e —► 0 .
A ssum ption  7 e = 0
Let s satisfy r  € (ts, t s+i] for passenger (r, k). Then if max{<7i, <72} < «'•
a(r, k) = X
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otherwise:
a(r, k) =
t s if ps > Ps+i
or =  ps+1 and |is -  r |  < |ts+i -  r\ (3.14)
ts+1 otherwise
T he num ber of passengers walking to  th e  stop , F (k*)
As described above, passengers always board a coach offering the highest 
trip payoff and so the payoff of a passenger travelling by coach is k* = 
max{<7i, £2} and the number of passengers walking to the stop is then:
F (k*) =  - 1 - (max{ffi,g2} -  «) (3.15)
K  ~ ~ ~ K
3.5.3.1 M onopoly
Suppose now that Assumption 1 holds and so all coaches are run by a single 
monopolist. The number of passengers boarding its coaches is F (k*) and 
depends only on the largest trip payoff offered. Moreover by Equation 3.14 
passengers will board only those buses with the highest trip payoff and so 
revenues per passenger also depend just on this. Therefore the monopolist’s 
problem is to choose a pair of trip payoffs {g*:gr) to solve:
g- = a r gmax( l l -  «)
9' < 9’
Standard calculations show that any solution satisfies:
l t \9 =  2
9' <
and so the lowest fare offered, p* = u  — g*, will be:
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3.5.3.2 D uopoly
Now suppose that Assumption 2 holds so that alternate coaches are run 
by two different operators. From Equations 3.14 and 3.15, the number of 
passengers boarding operator €s coaches given the trip payoffs offered by 
both operators, will be:
If its rival charges a positive fare, it can never be optimal for an operator 
to charge a higher fare: no one would board the operator’s coaches, whereas 
charging the same or a lower fare as its rival gives positive numbers boarding 
at a positive revenue per passenger. Moreover, charging the same fare cannot 
be optimal since charging infinitesimally less leads to a negligible fall in per 
passenger revenues, but at least doubles the number of passengers boarding. 
The best response, then, must be to charge less than the rival, if the rival 
charges a positive fare. Clearly there is no set of fares which either
is positive and both are charging less than their rival. If the rival charges a 
zero fare, then charging anything gives zero revenue and is a best response 
and so pi = p2 = 0 is the unique equilibrium fare, and g\ — pj =  u the 
unique equilibrium trip payoff.
R esu lt 20 Fares in express coach markets.
(i) Optimal fares under monopoly exist, are unique, are the same on all 
coaches, and are:
1 9i~K  
A K—K if  9 i > 9 i
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(ii) Equilibrium fares under duopoly exist, are unique, are the same on all 
coaches, and are:
p* = 0
3.5,4 R obustness
The model analysed here has been designed to make transparent the pri­
mary impact of assuming that potential bus passengers do not know the 
exact arrival times of buses. This transparency leads to stark results. When 
passengers do not know the timetable, fares are higher under duopoly than 
under monopoly. When, on the other hand, they do know when buses arrive, 
fares are higher under monopoly. Here we consider, informally, the likely 
effect on the results of relaxing some of the assumptions.
First, suppose that frequency, instead of being given as is assumed so far, 
were endogenous. In fact, when there is competition both in real express 
coach markets and local bus markets, frequency appears to be higher, and so 
the interval between buses, A, smaller. In the results for the model local bus 
market, the duopoly and monopoly fares are higher as A is smaller. To see 
why note that if A is high, not many passengers walk to the stop because the 
waiting cost is so high. But then, cutting fares is not very costly in terms of 
loss of revenue from existing passengers, while the gain in numbers walking 
to the stop is the same. If endogenising frequency in the model did result in 
higher frequency under duopoly, this would only serve to reinforce the finding 
that duopoly fares are higher than monopoly ones in local bus markets. In 
the model express coach market the interval between buses has no effect on 
prices in either market structure, so that endogenising market structure will 
not affect the finding that monopoly fares are higher than duopoly ones. It 
is worth noting, incidentally, that a monopolist in the express coach market
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would only choose to run one bus over the whole day, so frequency could 
only rise under duopoly (so long as there was some positive cost to running 
a bus).
Another stark assumption that has been maintained in the express coach 
market is that the inconvenience cost s  is zero. It is certainly plausible that 
passengers suffer a cost if they travel at a time which differs from their most 
preferred one, and introducing this would give duopolists some market power 
over close passengers, so that they would likely be able to charge a positive 
fare. It would remain the case, however, that if an operator cut fares on one 
type of coach, those coaches would gain market share from the other type, 
giving each duopolist excessive incentives to charge low fares compared to a 
monopolist.
It was noted earlier in the model local bus market that passengers arriving 
at the stop learnt nothing about the timetable. Suppose, on the contrary, 
that they did. There may then be some passengers who walked to the stop 
and, on learning how long was the wait until the next bus, and how much 
the fare would then be, decided to go straight home again. Cutting fares on 
one type of bus would then affect that type’s market share, as well as the 
number of passengers walking to the stop. However, the additional market 
share would be gained not from the other type of bus, but just from affecting 
the number of passengers going straight home from the stop, and so it would 
still be the case that cutting fares on one type of bus increased the number of 
passengers boarding the other type, creating an under-incentive for duopolists 
to cut fares compared with a monopolist.
The final question concerns the robustness of the results in the situation 
where quality is a choice variable. This must remain an open issue: there 
seems to be no compelling way to model quality choice. Different ways could
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be appropriate in different markets. In local bus markets it seems that the 
main determinant of quality is the newness and maintenance levels of buses, 
and there is little evidence of differentiation in quality. In express coach 
markets operators on both duopoly and monopoly routes have introduced 
vertically differentiated services, with quality being such factors as journey 
time and whether or not drinks are available. Also marketing has been cited 
as playing a large role in determining market shares in express coach markets, 
which can be taken as a measure of spending on perceived quality and is a 
fixed cost with respect to the number of coaches.
3.6 Conclusions
In this chapter we have made a simple, well motivated assumption on the 
way that passenger behaviour differs between local bus routes on which the 
frequency of buses is high, and express coach routes where there are fewer 
departures. This assumption is that passengers travelling on high density 
routes tend to arrive at the stop independently of bus arrival times, and 
to board the first bus to arrive, whereas passengers using express coaches 
will arrive in time to board their preferred coach. We have shown that 
this assumption can provide an explanation for two different aspects of the 
experience of competition in the deregulated bus and coach markets of the 
1980’s and 90’s. In the first model of a local bus market, there are frequent 
changes to bus timetables, bus arrival times bunched together, and the bus 
with least passengers being the most likely to make a revision. The first 
two of these results have been observed in local bus markets in which there 
is competition. In the second model local bus market we found that two 
operators competing set a higher fare than did a monopolist. Again this
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accords with what has been observed in local bus markets, where fares have 
risen since deregulation, and risen by most in those metropolitan areas where 
competition is most comm on.
Finally we will make a few remarks about quality. We have already 
noted in the discussion of the robustness of the results on fare levels that 
quality should properly be modelled in a different way in the two types of 
market. Here we will mention local bus markets where the main determinant 
of quality is the newness and maintenance levels of buses. The dominant 
view of those giving evidence to the Select Committee was that quality was 
lowest where there was most competition. This is not particularly surprising: 
competition reduces a firm’s market share, and so the number of customers 
from which it can recoup any investments in advertising. The contrary would 
not have been surprising either: if advertising affects only market share, and 
not the size of the market, a monopolist will not advertise at all, though 
competing firms may well do so. However, there is additional evidence in 
the Select Committee Report that part of the explanation for the low quality 
is that passengers arrive independently of bus arrival times, and board the 
next bus to arrive. This additional evidence is the experience of Stagecoach 
in Manchester, related by the Traffic Commissioners in their testimony to 
the Committee. In Manchester, Stagecoach entered a market with new, high 
quality buses, while the incumbents used old poorly maintained ones. The 
Commissioners were surprised that the quality of Stagecoach’s buses did not 
enable them to win greater market share (Stagecoach eventually withdrew 
from the market), and they attributed this failure to customer loyalty. While 
some customers may have been locked into using the incumbent’s services 
through discount cards, if passengers turn up at the stop and board the 
first bus we would not expect higher quality buses to get higher markets.
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This in turn suggests that one reason for the lower quality of buses on those 
local bus routes with competition is essentially the same as that for high 
fares. The mechanism would operate somewhat as follows: as the average 
quality of buses rises, consumers make more journeys by bus. However, once 
a consumer has made the decision to take a bus, he then arrives at the stop 
and takes the first bus to arrive, regardless of its quality. Firms investing 
in newer or better maintained buses do not, therefore, gain all the extra 
customers that result from this investment, leading to under-investment in 
quality.
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Appendix A
Proofs
A .l Exploring a branching structure
A . l . l  Optim ality o f  th e G ittins index policy for sim ple 
bandit processes
We give an outline of the proof of the optimality of the Gittins index policy 
for multi-armed bandits; it is essentially from W hittle’s [63] and also used 
by Berry and Fristedt [5]. It is included here for accessibility, and contains 
some notational changes and expository material due to the present authors.
There are N  projects1 and in each discrete period you can work on only 
one project. The state of project k at time t  is denoted by £&(£), and the 
project engaged at time t  is denoted by k(t). The state variable at time 
t is written as x(t) = (xi(t),X2(i) ,. . .  and the information at time
£, namely past and current states and past actions, is written as I(t). If
1Here, we are dealing with single-action projects. At any stage, each of the 
fixed number of projects has a single action (i.e. there is no branching) so that the 
notions of engaging a project and selecting an action are interchangeable.
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project k  is engaged at time t  then you get an immediate expected reward of 
Rk{xk{t))- Rewards are additive and discounted in time by a factor (3. States 
of unengaged projects do not change and the state of the engaged project 
changes by a Markov transition rule: if k(t) ^  k then x k(t +  1) =  x*;(f), and 
if k(t) = k then the value of x k(t +  1) is conditioned only by k k, x k{t). 
Assume that rewards are uniformly bounded:
—oo <  —B (  1 — (3) < Rk(x) < B(1 — (3) < oo .
Writing R(t) for the reward R k(t) (xk(t)(t)) realised at time t, the total 
discounted reward is then X]o° with a maximal expected reward F(x)
over feasible pohcies 7r given by:
F(x(0)) =  s u p E j f ; ^ ( t )  | 7(0)1.
7T «■ o J
F  will be the unique bounded solution to the dynamic programming equation: 
F  =  max L kFk
where L k is the one-step operator if A: is the project engaged:
L kF(x) = R k{xk) +  /3E^F(x(t +  1)) | x(t) =  x ,k(t) =  k .
Introduce a fall-back M , where the option of taking the fall-back remains 
open at all times. The maximal expected reward of the modified process, 
conditional on x(0) =  x, is 4>(M, x) and solves
<$ =  M  V maxLfc<£. (A.l)k
Let 4')k{m,Xk) be the analogue of $(M ,x) when only project k is available; 
<j>k solves
(j>k = m  V Lk<j>k• (A.2)
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(Lk changes only x k, so Lk<j>k is well-defined.)
The Gittins index, denoted by m k(xk), is the infimal value of m  such 
that m = (f>k(m ,xk), namely the alternatives of stopping with m k and of 
continuing project k (with the option of taking the fall-back staying open) 
are equitable, and so m k =  L k<f>k.
It is fairly easy to show that $(M , x), as a function of M, is non-decreasing 
&; convex (convexity following from the fact that we are dealing with the 
supremum of expressions which are linear in M), and that $(M ,x) =  M  
when M  > B. Also <£(M, x) =  F(x) when M  < —B.
Similarly, <f>k(m ,xk), as a function of m, is non-decreasing & convex, and 
4>k(m, x k) =  m  when m  is large, certainly if m  > B ,  and more precisely for 
I'Ti > m k, so m k < B. Note that, since 4>k(m, x k), as a function of m, is 
convex, the derivative d(pj(m^Xj)/dm exists almost everywhere.
We “guess” the form of the value function:
and proceed to verify it by showing two things:
•  0  satisfies (A.l), that is 0  =  M  V max*; LkS;
•  the action recommended by the Gittins index maximises the RHS of 
the above equation, i.e. when M  > maxfc L kO it selects the fall-back, 
and when M  < max* LkQ it selects the project which maximises LkO.
So, define Pk(m ,x) =  TJ
d m
and m-jg =  rnaxm,.
3
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Pk(m ,x ), as a function of ra, is non-negative and non-decreasing, and 
Pk(m ,x) = 1 for m > m^k- (These follow directly from the properties of 
4>j.) Note that
dmPk(m,x) > 0 V ra, and dmPk(m, x) =  0 for ra > m ^k.
Rewrite 0(M , x) as
noting that <f)k(B ,x k) =  B  because ra* < B, and Pk(B ,x)  =  1 because 
m-,k < B. Also, dmPk(m, x) =  0 when m > B, so we can amend the range 
of integration:
0(M , x) =  (/>k{M, x k)Pk(M , x) +  <j)k(m , xfc) dmPk(m , x). (A.3)
Now fix x, so we can focus on the dependence of various function on m 
or M. We want to show that:
(A.5) ‘if’ & part of (A.4): Consider M  > maxj
In this case, <fik(M) = M , Pk(M) = 1; and dmPk(m) =  0 for m >  M . So 
from (A.3):
O (M) =  M.
and use integration by parts to obtain
O(M) >  M  for any M, 
and S (M ) — M iff M  >  maxra7;
3
and that 0(M ) >  LkQ(M) for any M,
(A.4)
(A.5)
(A.6)
and 0(M ) =  LkO(M) iff =  m a x a n d  M  < m k. (A.7)
j
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(A.5) ‘only if’ & rest of (A.4): Consider M  < max, rrij.
Let k  =  argm axjm j. So M  < m k, and we have <j>k(M) > M. When 
M  < m  < 771*;, <j>k(m) > M, and when m  > m k, dmPk(m) =  0. So from 
(A.3):
©(AO > M  (p k(M) + £ "  dmPk(m )j 
= M P k(mk)
=  M, because Pk(mk) =  1.
So from (A.4) and (A.5):
M  < maxTRj => 0(M ) > M
j
M  = maxrrij => 0(M ) =  M  (A.8)
j
M  > maxmj => 0(M ) =  M.
j
Now, define 6k(m , xfc) =  ^ ( m ,x fc) -  Lk<f>k(m , xfc).
Fixing x again, note that 6k(m) > 0 V m, and 6k(m) =  0 for m < ra* and 
that
©(AO -  LkQ(M) = Sk(M)Pk(M) + f°° 6k(m) dmPk(m) (A.9)
J M
which follows from applying the one-step operator L k to each side of (A.3), 
subtracting the result from (A.3), and applying the definition of 6k to the 
RHS.
(A.6): Sk(m) > 0, and Pk(m) is non-negative and non-decreasing, so from 
(A.9) we have
0(M ) > LkB(M ).
(A.7): When m k > M, 6k(M)  =  0, so the first term on the RHS of (A.9) 
is 0.
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When m k > M  and m k =  max, mj,  the integral on the RHS of (A.9) is 
0, because either 6k(m) =  0, or dmPk(m) =  0, or both. So we have
e(M) =  Lke{M ).
(If either m k < M  or m k < m^k: then at least one term on the RHS of (A.9) 
is positive.)
Now using (A.6) & (A.7) with the implications from (A.8), and with 
k =  argmaxj m f
M  < max rrij = m k => 0(M ) =  LkO(M) and 0(M ) >  L^fc0(M )
j
=> m axL j0  =  Lk0  =■ 0  > M, so {M  V maxL jO }  =  Lk0;
j  3
M  =  maxrrij = m k => 0(M ) =  LkQ(M) and 0(M ) >  L~,kQ(M) 
j
=> maxLjQ = LkS  =  0  =  M , so {M  V maxLj-0} = M  = U
j  3
M  > max rrij = m k => 0(M ) >  LkQ(M)  and 0(M ) > L~,kQ(M)
3
=> maxLj-0 < 0  =  M, so {M V m axLj0} =  M.
i  3
So 0  satisfies (A.l), that is 0  =  M  V max.,- LjQ, and the Gittins index 
policy is optimal. ■
Thus, 0  =  $  and the following identity holds:
$ (M ,x )  = B -  f B T[ dm. (A. 10)
J m dm
Whittle [63, section 9] indicates that the proof can be modified to incor­
porate variable length project stages.
Assume that when one engages project k in state xk then one is com­
mitted to it for a stage of length s =  s(k, x k). We shall suppose that s and 
x k(t +  s) are conditioned only by k and xk, and not by t. The dynamic
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programming equations become recursions between discrete stages instead 
of between discrete periods, and we modify the definition of the one-step 
operator Lk'.
L kF(x) = Rk{xk) +  E [psF (x(t 4- s)) | x{t) = x , k(t) = fc]
where R k(xk) is now the reward from the stage starting from state x k.
The single project return (j>k(m , xk) defined in (A.2) is now in terms of the 
modified Lk, and the identity (A. 10) after the end of the proof of the main 
result still holds between $  and the <f>k\ the Gittins index policy is optimal. 
■
A .l .2 Optim ality o f th e G ittins index policy for bandit 
super-processes
We now show how Whittle’s proof (outlined above) of the optimality of 
the Gittins index policy for simple processes (consisting of single-action 
projects) can be generalised to cover super-processes (consisting of multi­
action projects).
Remember, a super-process is one in which, after a project has been 
chosen, there is a further decision to be made as to how to proceed, and this 
affects both the reward and the state transition of the chosen project. The 
proof of the optimality of the Gittins index policy for super-processes fails 
except in one special case, which is when the following condition holds: the 
optimal subsidiary decision as to how to proceed with the chosen project is 
independent of the size of the fall-back. (In other words, if a project is the 
only one available then your optimal action does not change when the fall­
back varies over the range in which you prefer to continue with the project.) 
The proof below that this condition is sufficient elaborates on that in Whittle
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[62]. That this condition is also necessary can be found in Glazebrook [30].
There are N  projects, each project having possibly more than one avail­
able action when in a given state, and in each discrete period you can take 
only one action and thus work on only one project. The state of project 
k at time t is denoted by Xk(t) and the state variable at time t is written 
as x(t) = (xi(f),Z2( t) ,. . .  ,Xjv(t)). The set of available actions for project k 
in state x k is denoted by Uk(xk), and the set of all available actions is the 
union over k of these, denoted by U(x). Let «(•) be the indicator function 
mapping available actions to projects, i.e. k ( u )  = k for u € Uk. The action 
taken at time t  is denoted by u(t), and thus the project engaged at time t is 
K,(u(t)). If action u is taken at time t  then you get an immediate expected 
reward of w). Rewards are additive and discounted in time by
a factor (3. States of unengaged projects do not change and the state of the 
engaged project changes by a Markov transition rule: if K(u(t)) ^  k then 
Xfc(t-l-l) =  xk(t), and if «(it(£)) =  k then the value of xk( t + 1) is conditioned 
only by u(t), k k  x k(t).
Continue to assume that rewards are uniformly bounded:
—oo  < —B( 1 — (3) < Rk(x,u) < B ( 1 — (3) < o o .
When m  is the available fall-back, <f)k(m ,xk) now solves 
(j>k = m  V sup L k>u<f>k
u€Uk
where
LK{u)tU$ (M ,x) = R K(u)(xK(u),u )+ (3 E [$ (M ,x(t + l)) | M ,x(t) =  x,u(t)
As usual, the Gittins index of project k , denoted by m k(xk), is the infimal 
value of m  such that m  = <pk(m, x k), namely the alternatives of stopping with
(A-11)
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m k and of embanking on project k (with the option of taking the fall-back 
staying open) axe equitable, and so m k =  snpuGUk LkyU<f>k.
0(M , x) is defined as before, and we still have (A.3):
roo
0(M , x) = <pk(M , xk)Pk(M , x) +  /  <j>k(m , x k) dmPk(m , x)
J  M
so, having fixed x, the following ((A.4) & (A.5)) still hold:
0(M ) >  M for any M, 
and 0(M ) =  M  iff M  > max rrij.
The function <§(•) is now action-specific not merely project-specific, so, for 
u € C/jfe, define
<5M (m ,xfe) =  <j>k(m ,xk) -  L Ku<i>k(m ,xk).
Fixing x as before, to focus on m  or M , note that
0(M ) -  L m 0 ( M )  =  6k,u(M)Pk(M) +  f "  6ktU{m) dmPk(m)
J  M
so 0 (M ) — sup Lk u^S (M )
=  inf (Sk,u{M)Pk(M ) +  f°° 6k,u{m)dmPk{m))(A.12)
We want to show that:
0(M ) >  sup Lk&(M ) for any M, (A.13)
UGUic
and 0(M ) =  sup LkO(M) iff mfc =  maxm^ and M  < mfc. (A.14)
u€U k •?
It is still the case that, for any u € Uk, 6kjU(m) > 0 for all m, so inequality 
(A.13) still holds, and if we are able to assert that, for some u G Uk, 6k,u(m) =  
0 for m < mfc, then equality (A.14) also holds, by considering the RHS of 
(A.12). The assertion that such an action u G Uk exists is the same as saying
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that in the continuation region for the single project the optimal action is 
unique. ■
However, if there is not a unique optimal action u € Uk when m < m k, 
then the RHS of (A. 12) might be strictly positive for some M  < m k, in which 
case equality (A. 14) would not hold, and the remainder of the proof would 
not go through.2 To see this, suppose that a switch of actions occurs when 
the fall-back is m, i.e. when m  is such that m < m  it is optimal to take 
action v!, and when m  is such that r h < m <  m k it is optimal to take action 
u". For action v! this implies that Sky  (rn) =  0 when m  < m, & 6ky (m ) > 0 
when m  < m < m k, and for action u" this implies that Sky/{m ) >  0 when 
m  < m, &; 6k,u"(m) =  0 when m  < m  < m k. Consider M  < to, and suppose 
that the other projects under consideration are such that Pk(M) > 0 and 
dmPkim) > 0 for M  < m < m k. Looking at the RHS of (A. 12) for the two 
actions in turn we see that (a) the first term is zero because 6ky (M )  = 0, 
but the integral is non-zero because neither Sky (m )  nor dmPk(m) is zero over 
[m, 771*;], and (b) Sky> (M) > 0 and also the integral is non-zero (over [M, m]). 
So the expression in parentheses on the RHS of (A. 12) is strictly positive for 
either action, hence the infimum over the two actions is positive.
As in Appendix A. 1.1, when the number of periods required to complete 
an action in a project is different for different actions and different projects,
2 As an informal example of the second condition failing, consider a project with 
two actions: one leads to a state with a low mean value and a high variance; the 
other one leads to a state with a high mean value and a low variance. Taking 
either action renders the other unavailable. When the fall-back is high enough, it 
is optimal to take it. When the fall-back is lowered, it becomes optimal to take 
the more risky action, because if a poor outcome is realised there is always the 
fall-back. However, as the fall-back is lowered even further, it is no longer a good 
enough guarantee and so the optimal action switches to the less risky one.
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the definition of the action of L* can be suitably modified so that the above 
result remains valid.
Assume that when one takes action u in project k =  k ( u )  in state x* then 
one is committed to it for a stage of length s =  s(k, Xk, u). We shall suppose 
that s and Xk(t +  5) are conditioned only by k , x*;, and u, and not by t. The 
definition of the one-step operator Lk becomes:
t),v,F(x) — Rk(u)(PCk,(u)i'U) d" E[/3 F (x(t ■+■ s)) | X , l l ( t )  u\
where R K(U) (xK(u), u) is now the reward from the stage starting from state xjt 
when action u is taken.
As before, the single project return </>fc(m,xfc) is now defined in terms of 
the modified Lk, and the identity (A. 10) still holds between $  and the fa, 
the Gittins index policy is optimal. ■
A .2 Increm ental sunk costs
A.2.1 P roof o f Result 9
Suppose first that the Result is true in all possible successor states to k l. We 
show that it is then true for kl . This implies, by backward induction from 
the state where all firms have completed the project, that the Result is true 
for all states.
The proof is broken down into a number of intermediate steps.
S tep  1: T he boundary  in  period  t +  1 will be  e ith e r xb(kt) or 
xb(A:t) — 1, no m a tte r  w hat actions firm s tak e  in t .
The boundary in t +  1 cannot be further from the end than x b(kt) since 
the number of firms at xb(kt) or closer can only be higher in t +  1 than in t. 
Moreover the boundary in t  + 1  is at least as far from the end as x b(kt) — 1:
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the number of firms which could profitably finish were all firms at x b(kt) is 
more than the number of firms at x b(kt) — 1 or closer in period f, and so is 
more than the number of firms at xb(kt) — 2 or closer in period t + 1. This 
implies that the number of firms which could profitably finish were all firms 
at x b(kt) — 1 in period t  + 1  is more than the number of firms at x b(kt) — 2 or 
closer, and so that the boundary in period t+ 1  is at least as far as x b(kt) — 1.
S tep  2: A ssum e th e  R esu lt is t ru e  in  all possible successor s ta te s  
to  kl. T hen  all firm s a t x b(kt) — 1 o r closer in  period  t  will invest in 
£, in  any equilibrium .
Recall that the Result is assumed true in all possible successor states to 
kl, and that we have just shown that the boundary in period t +  1 will be 
either x b(kt) or x b(kt) — 1. Together these imply that the largest possible 
number of firms which will finish subsequent to t  is the number which could 
profitably finish were all firms at xb(kt) — 1. They also imply that all firms 
at xb(kt) — 2 or closer in period t +  1 will invest fully in each subsequent 
period until they have completed the project. Any firm at xb(kt) — 1 or 
closer in period t can thus guarantee that it will be among those completing 
the project, and that it will make a profit, by investing in period t  so that it 
is at x b(kt) — 2 or closer in period t +  1. If any of these firms waited instead, 
they would not reduce the number of firms that finished in total, they might 
find a rival finished in their stead, and their payoff would be discounted, so 
that in any equilibrium, all firms at x b(kt) — 1 or closer will invest in period 
t.
Step 3:Assum e th e  R esu lt is t ru e  in  all possible successor s ta te s  
to  kl and  suppose th a t  a t  t  som e firm s a re  a t  th e  bo u n d ary  xb(kt). 
If  th e  num ber a t th e  bou n d ary  o r closer is less th a n  th e  num ber 
th a t  could profitab ly  finish w ere all firm s a t th e  boundary , th e n  all
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firm s actually at th e boundary invest in period t in  any equilibrium , 
otherw ise exactly max jn  | u(xb(kt), n) > o} — # { i  | k\ < xb(kt)} of them  
do so.
Suppose instead that fewer than this invest. In period t +  1 the boundary 
will remain a t xb(kt), and since the Result is assumed true in all successor 
states, at least one firm at the boundary in t+ 1  will invest in each subsequent 
period and complete the project. If this firm had been at the boundary at t it 
would have done better to invest in t rather than wait for a period. If not, one 
of the firms which was a t the boundary at t  and which never invested would 
have done better to invest a t t and so ensure that it was among the finishing 
firms. Suppose now that the number of firms at the boundary or closer is 
more than the number which could profitably finish were all firms at the 
boundary, and that more than max |n  | u(xb{kt)1 n) > 0 } - # { *  i *}<**(**)> 
of the firms actually at the boundary at t  invest. Subsequently either all 
of these firms, and all those which were closer than the boundary at £, will 
complete the project, and the firms which were at the boundary at t  will make 
a loss. Alternatively at least one of the firms which was at the boundary at 
t  and which invested does not invest further, in which case it cannot have 
been part of an equilibrium for that firm to invest at t.
Step 4. Assum e the R esult is true in all possible successor states 
to  kt. Then the R esult is true in kl.
This follows directly from steps 2 and 3 above.
Step 5. The R esult is true in all states.
This follows by backward induction from the state in which all firms have 
completed the project. In this state, the Result is clearly true. Suppose 
all firms but one have finished the project, and the exception has just one 
stages to complete. The Result is true in all possible successor states, and so
186 APPENDIX A. PROOFS
is true in this one by step 4. Suppose that all firms but one have finished the 
project, and the exception has two stages to complete. The Result is true in 
all possible successor states, and so is true in this one, and so on. Suppose 
all firms but two have finished the project, and the two exceptions have just 
one stage each to complete. The Result is true in all possible successor states 
and so is true in this one, and so on. In this way the Result is proved in all 
possible states. ■
A .2.2  P roo f o f R esult 11
The proof that these strategies form the only symmetric perfect Nash equi­
librium can be taken from the proof of Result given in Appendix A.2.1 
for all states except those where firms have the same number of stages to 
complete but if both invest fully to the end they would each make a loss, i.e. 
those states where k* =  kj and ud(ki) <  0 in Appendix A.2.1. We now show 
that in these states the only symmetric perfect Nash equilibrium has firms 
choosing mixed strategies.
Define x? as the greatest number of stages a firm can complete and be sure 
of a positive payoff, no matter what the rival does: x^ =  max jx  | ud(x) > o j. 
Start with kj = kj = xd 1. In the pure strategy equilibrium just one firm 
would invest but this cannot be so in a symmetric equilibrium. If one firm 
invests while its rival does not its value in the state next period will be u7n(z?i) 
and so its value this period is ?xd(xd + 1 ). If both invest both get ud{p^ 4-1). 
If a firm does not invest its value will be zero whether its rival invests or 
not (as strategies are time stationary). In a mixed strategy equilibrium the 
firm will be indifferent between investing and not. If its rival invests with
A.2. INCREMENTAL SUNK COSTS 187
probability s * ^  +  1 ,^  +  1) then:
0 =  S j(x ,x )u d(x) + ( l  — S j(x ,x fj  um(x), x = a? +  1
which rearranges to give:
Sj (x , x)  = ------ -77 - 7 7 — 7- 7 , x  =  x d +  l
J 1 —  ud(x) /um(x)
as given in Result 11. The value of each firm in (x^ 4- 1,2?* +  1) is clearly 0.
When ki = kj > 5 ^  +  1 then if one invests while the other does not it gets 
um(ki) while if both invest each gets — c. This gives:
*’ ( l ’x ) = l + c / W ) ’ * =  - 1 .  •••** + 1
and the value is again 0. ■
A .2.3 P roof o f Result 12
In order to find the probability that both firms complete the project, we first
examine the conditions under which both finish. According to the equilibrium
in Result 11 there is a bound x** such that if both firms have x** or fewer stages
to complete both will certainly finish the project. If at least one has more
than x^ stages to complete either both have the same number and choose
mixed strategies, or one has fewer stages and it alone finishes. Therefore both
firms complete the project if and only if they complete each of the symmetric
states outside the boundary, (x, x), x =  d, d — 1 , . . . ,  x** 4-1, at the same time
as each other. As is clear from the equilibrium strategies the boundary x** is
defined by the condition that a firm completing x^ or fewer stages and then
producing has a positive payoff even if its rival finishes first, but a negative
payoff if it has to complete more than x** stages and then share the market
with its rival. In other words x^ is the largest x for which:
1 — f)x
ud(x ) = -  Y ^ ~ 6 C ~  0
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or in terms of the parameters of the sunk cost model of concentration, it is 
the largest x for which:
1 — fixld
ud(x) =  6x/dU (2)---------- —a > 0 (A. 15)
1 —  6
We have seen that both firms complete the project if and only if each 
completes every stage x, x = d,d — 1 ,. . .  ,3d -I-1, at the same time as its 
rival. Denote the probability that both firms complete stage x  together given 
that the market has arrived at state (x, x) by p(x). Both choose probability 
s*(x, x). If both complete the stage at the same time this is either because 
both invested in the first period in which the state was (x,x), or because 
neither finished, in this period and both finished together at a later time. 
Thus:
p(x) = (a4*(x,x)) +  (l -  s* (x ,x ) f  p(x) 
which rearranges to give:
P(X) =  2 /s '(x ,x )  -  1 (A'16)
Inspecting this expression, and that in Result ( | giving the optimal strategies 
s*, confirms that p(x) is non-increasing in x: a firm is less likely to complete 
a stage at the same time as its rival when it has more stages left to complete.
The probability that both firms finish the project is denoted <p and is the 
product of the probability that they complete each of the stages (x,x), x = 
d, d — 1 , . . . ,  +  1 together.
x d+ l
<t>= n  p (x)
x= d
We can place a lower bound on this product by considering just the smallest 
possible value of p(x), i.e. p(d). Denote this lower bound by:
4> =  W ) f +2-d < 0
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Substituting for p(x) using Equation A. 16 and the strategies given in Re­
sult 11 gives:
1 x d+2—d
- =  l  +  2c
and we will consider the limit of this expression in the limit as d —► oo.
Two parts of the expression for 0 above depend on d: the power of the 
expression, 3^ +  2 — d, and the cost c in the bracket (from the definition of 
the parameters in Equation 2.5 we have um(d) =  <513(1) — a, no matter d). 
We consider each in turn.
Consider first the term xd+ 2—d. The boundary a?* is the furthest integer 
distance from completion, ar, satisfying Equation A.15. Define £ as the real 
value satisfying:
udm  = fl«n(2) -  =  0
1 — 0
Note that £ is independent of d. In the limit as d —» oo there is always a 
distance x  such that x /d  is arbitrarily close to any real value, so that:
lim xd =  d£
d—► oo
Turning to the cost c we have, from Equation 2.5:
1 -  PI*c =  —cr
1 - 8
We can find the limit of this as d becomes large by taking a binomial 
expansion of 8l/d — ( l  — (1 — Sfj  ^ and ignoring all high powered terms in 
1/d. This gives:
Jim ( l -  (1 - i ) ) Xli =  1 -  1(1 - 6) +  M ( M (i - S f
" "  (1/1) (1 /d - 1 )  (1 / d - 2) (1 -s)3
3!
190 APPENDIX A. PROOFS
where:
(1 - 8?  (1 - 6?  
k ~  2 3
which converges. Thus: 
lim c =  ^  ( l -----
<*—  OO d  \  1  _  S  I
(A.17)
We are now able to consider the limit of the lower bound to the probability 
that both firms complete the project as the number of stages becomes large.
d(€-1)i
lim <f> =  limd—►oo — d—*-oo
exp
1 4 - 2 ( 1  _  _ k _ \  g (g - l)
_ A  ^  u™(d) V \ - 6 j
2<r({ -  1) fc
um{d) 1 - l-<5.
> 0
A .2.4 P roof o f R esult 13
The state space is sufficiently small that we can construct equilibrium back­
wards state by state starting at (0,0,0) in which no firms can take any action. 
In (0,0,1) a single firm can choose to invest and get u(l, 3). Since this is pos­
itive investment is optimal. In (0,1,1) two firms can choose to invest. Both 
will finish since if either finishes it gets a positive payoff no matter what its 
rival does. There is no incentive to wait and both invest straightaway. In 
(0,1,2) the firm with 1 stage to complete has a dominant strategy: since 
w(l,3) > 0 it will invest no matter what the other firm does. Given this the 
firm with 2 stages to complete does not invest since the best it can hope for 
is a payoff of u(2,3) which is negative. In (0,2,2) there is no symmetric pure 
strategy equilibrium: it is profitable for one firm to finish but not both. If 
one invests while its rival does not the state next period will be (0,1,2), it
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will invest again, and so its payoff is u(2,2). If both invest both get u(2,3). 
If a firm does not invest its value will be zero: it will never arrive at a state 
in which it invests. Each firm will be indifferent between investing and not 
when its rival invests with probability q\ and if it invests it also gets an 
expected payoff of zero:
0 =  qi u(2,3) +  (1 -  gi) u(2,2)
which rearranges to give:
u(2,2)
91 -  it(2,2) - ti(2 ,3 )
Both will invest with this probability in any symmetric equilibrium. Strate­
gies in the other states follow in a similar way, except k = (2,2,2).
It is straightforward to show that in (2,2,2) in any symmetric equilibrium 
all invest with a probability <72 which is strictly less than 1. They must choose 
the same probability since strategies are symmetric by assumption. Moreover 
they cannot all invest with certainty since if they do the state next period 
will be (1,1,1), all will invest again, giving an initial value u(2,3) which is 
negative. The difficulty is in showing that firms invest with a strictly positive 
probability. As we have seen, when two firms invest the third gets a negative 
payoff if it invests as well. It is a sufficient condition for <72 > 0 that when two 
firms do not invest the third has a positive payoff if it does. This sufficiency 
follows simply from the facts that (a) any interior probability is optimal if 
and only if the payoff from investing is zero, (b) a firm’s payoff if it invests 
is a continuous function of its rivals’ investment probabilities.
Next we confirm that if two firms do not invest the third does indeed get 
a positive payoff from investing. If one of the other two invests the third 
firm will certainly get a positive payoff from investing itself: the state next 
period will be (1,1,2), the two lead firms alone will invest and so its payoff
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is u(2,2) >  0. However, a firm with one stage to go may prefer that one 
rival also has just one stage to go that both still had two stages to complete.
This can arise because if two still have two stages to go they will choose 
mixed strategies and both may end up completing the project, reducing the 
profits earned by the third. We need an explicit expression for the value 
of a firm when it has one stage to go and the other two have two, i.e. for 
V i(l,2 ,2). Suppose that initially the state is (1,2,2). The first firm invests 
with certainty and the two rivals invest with probability q\. If neither rival 
completes the first stage before t and at t  just one completes the stage, the 
first firms payoff, evaluated initially, is:
u( 1,1) — St Pr (1 firm completes first stage at t) (u(l, 1) — it(l, 2))
and similarly if two firms complete the first stage at t. The first firm’s initial 
value is thus:
Vi(l,2,2) =  «(1,1)
O O
— ^2  ^  Pr (1 fi1111 completes the first stage at t ) (u( 1,1) — u( 1,2)) 
t=o
oo
— ^2  6* Pr (2 firms complete the first stage at t) (u(l, 1) — u( 1,3))
t=o
The probability that neither rival completes the first stage before t and at t 
just one completes the stage is:
( l - S l f - 1*!
and similarly for the probability that both rivals complete the first stage at 
t. Substituting these and rearranging gives:
Vi(l, 2,2) =  «(1 ,1) -  ■■ _  ((“ (1,1) -  “ (1- 2)) +  ?1 M l , 2) -  «(1,3)))
Note first that this can be less than Vi(l, 1,2) =  u( 1,2). The second term 
is always positive and so Vi(l, 2,2) is less than u( 1,1). If the first firm to
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finish does not mind when a second firm finishes because u(x, 1) =  u(x, 2) 
then it will also be less than Vi(l, 1,2). For our purposes, this means that we 
need to show explicitly that the third firm will invest in (2,2,2) if the other 
two do not as we cannot rely on the fact that it(2,2) =  <5Vi(l, 1,2) — c > 0  
to argue that <5Vi(l, 2,2) — c is likewise positive. Writing out the payoff from 
investing when the other two do not gives:
<5Vi(l,2,2) — c =  < 5 u (l,l)-c
^  +  91 ^ 1’ ^  3^
= u (  2, 1)
~ 1 - £ (1 - ^  ((“ (2’1} “  “ (2> 2)) +  91 (“ (2’2) “  “ (2,3))) 
Note that the expression for q\ found earfier gives q\ (u(2,2) — u(2,3)) =  
u(2,1) so that:
<5^(1, 2 ,2 )- c  = u{2,1) ( l  -  f S S{l -
This is positive when qi < 1 — <5(1 — <?i)2, i.e. when <5(1 — qi) < 1, which is 
always the case.
This concludes the proof. ■
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